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This thesis extends the literature by adding new empirical evidence associated with 
firm’s decisions in fixed investment and capital structure, under the assumption of capital 
market imperfection. In Chapter 2, we combine a panel of over 95,000 Chinese 
manufacturing firms of different ownership types over the period 2000-2007 with the 
Marketization Index for China’s provinces during the same period and investigate whether 
or not, and how, the cross-regional differences in institutions and financial development 
can affect the firm level financing constraints. Our main results indicate that institutional 
and financial development in China can reduce financing constraints significantly for the 
investments of private firms and partly for foreign firms, while increasing the financing 
constraints for the investments of state and collective firms. Different from previous 
studies at aggregate level, we identify a positive relation between finance and growth in the 
Chinese economy from a micro-perspective. In Chapter 3, we estimate the respective effect 
of state ownership and share concentration on firms’ leverage adjustment speed towards 
optimal level by using the Chinese listed firms dataset (1998-2010). We find that the firms 
with state ownership present lower leverage adjustment speed towards optimal leverage 
ratio than their privately owned counterparts. A positive relation from share concentration 
to leverage adjustment speed is also detected. These results suggest that ownership 
structure can significantly determine a firm’s costs of adjustment as well as incentives to 
adjust. Our works offer a new channel for people to understand the heterogeneous leverage 
adjustment behaviours among firms. In Chapter 4, using the Chinese listed firms dataset 
(1998-2016), we test the casual relation from short debt maturity to firms’ fixed capital 
expenditure. After controlling the level of leverage, we obtain a significant negative 
coefficient on short debt maturity in the investment regression model, especially for the 
sample of firms with worse financial condition. This indicates that rollover risk plays an 
important role in determining firms’ investment decisions and it is more likely to be 
triggered at bad time. Overall, our research suggest several policy implications. First, 
deeper economic decentralization and further financial liberalization are important for 
reducing the resource misallocation between state and non-state sectors in the Chinese 
economy. Second, more applicable provisions for minority investor protection are required 
to be formulated, which are expected to provide more options for ownership reform in 
publicly listed SOEs. Lastly, alternatives for long-term debt financing, other than bank 
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Frictions in the capital market connect a firm’s real decisions with its financing 
activities. For example, either agency conflict or asymmetric information can substantially 
increase the costs of external finance and dampen managers’ incentives to capture growth 
opportunities when firms’ internal funds are limited. This general definition of financing 
constraint sets up a channel for information and agency problems to determine firm-level 
real economic outcomes. Using Chinese firm-level datasets, in this thesis, we aim to extend 
the literature by adding new empirical evidence associated with firm’s decisions in fixed 
investment and capital structure given imperfections in the capital market. 
 
There are several reasons for us to choose China as a laboratory for studying firm’s 
behaviours. First, China has an immature capital market full of frictions. In detail, lending 
activities in the financial system are controlled by the banking sector which is dominated 
by four state-owned banks (Ayyagari et al., 2010). Other official financing channels, such 
as equity and public bond, are not comparable to the banking sector either in size or 
importance and have very high entry requirements (Allen et al., 2008). Furthermore, there 
is a well-known ‘political pecking order’ of domestic firms in the economy (Huang, 2003). 
Government policies provide large preferential treatment to the firms controlled by central 
or local authorities while strongly discriminating against domestic privately owned firms. 
Even worse, China’s law and institutions, including investor protection systems, corporate 
governance, accounting standards and quality of government, are significantly less 
developed than many other emerging economies (Allen et al., 2005). Given a bank loan 
dependent credit-supply system plus deep government intervention but poor legal 
protection, the private and non-state sectors are believed to face a high degree of external 
financing constraint in the domestic capital market. If detecting the working mechanism of 
frictions such as financing constraint is essential for understanding the incentives behind a 
firm’s real economic decisions, then Chinese firms’ datasets provide an excellent 
opportunity for us to do so. 
 
Over the past two to three decades, China has been improving very quickly in many 
aspects and no other country’s economy can match Chinese potential. For instance, 
although the stock market was initially established for financing very largest state owned 
firms and remained thin at first, it has presented a sort of explosive development after the 
non-tradeable share reform starting in 2005. At the end of 2015, the A-share market had a 
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combined value of 8.53 trillion US dollars, of which tradable shares accounted for more 
than 60% of China’s GDP that year.1 Comparing across countries, probably only the New 
York Exchange would be larger. In terms of the banking sector, improvements can also be 
observed. The level of non-performing loans over GDP has been steadily decreasing after 
reaching its peak during 2000-2001 (Allen et al., 2008). In 2012, around 52% bank loans 
had flowed to the private sector (Lardy, 2014). Although it is not clear whether or not these 
loans can largely satisfy the requirement from private enterprises, we should at least be 
able to conclude that domestic banks indeed support the rise of private business in China. 
More essentially, the Chinese government continuously takes steps to improve laws and 
enforcement. For example, China’s Code of Corporate Governance was released in 2002 
and its implementation resulted in disclosure of information about large shareholders in 
listed firms.2 After almost 10 years discussion and verification, the property law in China 
was finally implemented on 1st October 2007. Besides, after entering WTO, the reform of 
state owned firms has gradually shifted from direct privatization to corporatization. Further 
separation between ownership and management is expected to make the remaining large 
state owned firms behave more competitively3  (Geng et al., 2009). Overall, China is 
moving away from a planned economy to a market-oriented one. A better understanding of 
the impact from these institutional and financial changes on firms’ decisions may help us 
to explain why China is growing so quickly.  
 
Lastly, as the largest transition economy in the world, China has a business environment 
which is very different from that of many developed countries. The observed firm-level 
decisions should reflect such differences. However, the main stream theories in modern 
corporate finance literature are developed to fit the data of western firms, particularly the 
firms in the United States. Although it may sometimes be appropriate to view Chinese 
empirical findings from a Western perspective, at other times it may not be. Economic 
reform should be a long-term project. Positive changes happened, but time is still required. 
Instead of emphasizing how big the gap between the situation in China and the ideal case 
suggested by western theories could be, it is more meaningful for us to take advantage of 
such differences and to rationalize the seemingly ‘unreasonable’ behaviours of Chinese 
firms. From the standpoint of firms’ decision makers, our work may provide several useful 
suggestions for them to optimize their choices given some existing common frictions in 
                                                          
1 KPMG report (2016): https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/03/china-outlook-2016.pdf  
2 Several managers and stakeholders were even arrested at end of 2004 due to illegal behaviours in the stock 
markets (Jiang et al., 2010). 
3 The slogan was ‘grasping the large and letting go the small’. 
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China’s capital market. Referring to public policy, the results may demonstrate general 
directions for governments and authorities to ameliorate their strategies drawn for 
promoting economic prosperity.   
 
 
1.2 China Background 
1.2.1 State owned firms reform 
The reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), began almost four decades ago at the 
beginning of economic recovery after The Culture Revolution (1966 – 1977), is nowadays 
one of the most important remaining issues in China’s transition to a market economy. 
Given a centralized economy, SOEs functioned as passive agents of the state economic 
bureaucracy and their workers lacked motivation. The information can be seriously 
distorted from production floor to management team and to state agencies. Therefore, in 
1979, the Chinese government started to grant more autonomy provisions to (selected) 
enterprises. Firms were allowed to retain a portion of their profits rather than handing them 
over in their entirety to the Ministry of Finance. Meanwhile, a dual-track pricing system 
replaced a unitary system of state fixed prices. The new incentive mechanisms were proved 
to be effective at improving productivity and investment of SOEs in 1980s (Groves et al., 
1994; Groves et al., 1995; Li, 1997). It seems that efficiency can be acquired even without 
real privatization of SOEs (Lau et al., 2000). Nevertheless, the autonomy system quickly 
resulted in serious ‘insider control’ issue that enterprise managers often colluded with 
workers and used their control over assets of SOEs to benefit themselves at the expense of 
the state (Qian, 1996). The soft budget constraints which were backed by the lending from 
state owned banks further deteriorated the situation. The magnitude of financial losses of 
SOEs soared, reaching a peak of 3% GDP in 1990. The debt to equity ratio of SOEs was 
over 300% in 1994 and 85% of debt was bank loans (Lardy, 1998). Annual profits of SOEs 
can only cover half of the interest payments.  
 
A major turning point emerged in the 3rd Plenum of the 14th Party Congress in Nov. 
1993 (Qian and Wu, 2003). The plan of privatization was firstly proposed. Latter in the fall 
of 1995, the Central Committee endorsed the idea of ‘grasping the large and releasing the 
small’ (Garnaut et al., 2005). The status of large SOEs were further strengthened while the 
lose making small and medium SOEs were allowed to be sold to private investors or 
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simply went bankruptcy. The number of industrial SOEs fell from 127600 in 1996 to 
61300 in 1999 (NBSC 4 , 2000). The remaining SOEs were either traditional ones or 
transferred limited liability firms and shareholding limited companies in which the state is 
the majority or dominant shareholder. The profitable operations of those very largest SOEs 
were carved out and (partially) privatized through initial public offering in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock markets. On the aggregate level, the reform over this period was likely to 
be successful. The proportion of SOEs with negative profits declined from around 40% in 
1996 to 25% in 2007. The corresponding losses of these SOEs to GDP were reduced from 
2.9% in 1990 to 0.3% in 2007. The average return on assets quintupled to about 5% in 
2007 than in 1996 (Lardy, 2014). Nevertheless, the micro-level evidences provide 
somewhat mixed implications. The reformed/privatized POEs presented significant 
improvement in (labour) productivity, output, real sales and leverage controlling but 
relatively weak or even further reduction in financial performance, e.g. profitability (Zhang 
et al., 2002; Sun and Tong, 2003; Wei et al., 2003; Wang, 2005; Chen et al., 2006; Zhang 
et al., 2012). Such divergence between real and financial performances may indicate the 
non-profit maximizing strategy of SOEs during the reform. If a firm’s output bias is 
sufficiently strong, an increase in productivity can lead to even lower profit and hence 
lower efficiency (Bai et al., 1997). Besides, the incomplete partial privatization resulted in 
strong agency conflicts, i.e. the separation between ownership and control. SOEs were 
easily immersed in a vicious cycle of policy burdens, subsidies, agency problems, and 
political interventions. 
 
New directions of SOEs reform are presented in several recent notable studies. Liu et al. 
(2015) look at the implications of both full and partial privatizations of SOEs. They argue 
that different ownership structures have different advantages. For instance, privately-
controlled scenario performs better in terms of profitability while partially privatized firms 
are more effective in improving labor productivity. Meanwhile, private ‘insider-controlled’ 
firms are more willing to take investment intensive strategy for the future. Therefore, given 
a gradually improving corporate governance mechanism in China, it is possible for the 
policy makers to achieve different objectives by drawing the advantages of different 
ownership structures in the process of ongoing economic transition. More rigorously, 
Hsieh and Song (2015) find that the fast growth of SOEs’ total factor productivity can be 
attributed to the dramatic improvement of their labor productivity. However, SOEs’ capital 
productivity remained significantly lower than that of POEs. The intrinsic reason should be 
                                                          
4 National Bureau of Statistics of China 
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that many capital intensive industrial SOEs were established in China’s history when the 
capital was actually very scarce (Lin et al., 1998). Such model helped the forming of the 
initial industrial sectors but it also created a sort of twisted capital pricing system which 
was inherited by the economy over many subsequent years. This emphasizes the 
importance of developing a capital market which can more effectively balance the 
requirements of state and non-state sectors. 
 
1.2.2 Raise of private sector 
Chinese private businesses arose and survived in the seam created by the SOEs reform 
at the end of 1980s and quickly became prosperous over the last two decades. The 
implementation of ‘contracting to households’ in rural areas over 1979 - 1984 greatly 
improved the agriculture productivity and released a huge amount of labour force available 
for development of urban private sectors (Sachs and Woo, 1997). According to the official 
data published by NBSC (2016), the number of registered POEs increased from 443000 in 
19965, only around 25% of total registered firms, to 8656494 in 2015, around 68.7% of 
total registered firms. In industrial sectors, the number of registered POEs increased from 
14600 in 1999 to 216506 in 2015 and the share of industrial output rose from 4.4% to 34.8% 
over the same period. Furthermore, at the end of 2015, 61.2% and 46.3% of the domestic 
retail and catering 6  firms were registered under the private category and respectively 
generated more than 30% and 34.1% of total major operating income in the industry. The 
situation is even more astonishing in terms of employment. For instance, Lardy (2014) 
argue that since 1978, almost all of the growth of urban employment in China is due to the 
expansion of private businesses and the increase in private urban employment, almost 
entirely the result of the formation of new POEs, accounts for 95% of the growth of the 
urban labor force. The NBSC (2016) shows that there were only 0.15 million employees in 
urban POEs and individual businesses at the end of 1978 but the number quickly reached 
20.4 million in 1995 and further soared into 189.8 million in 2015, i.e. almost 79% of total 
urban employment. Nevertheless, the official database has obvious weaknesses that only 
the ‘above scale’ ‘registered’ firms are considered7, which can significantly understate the 
actual contribution of private sectors. For example, the 2004 national economic census 
revealed that there were 947000 registered private industrial firms, including the below 
                                                          
5 The National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) record available online started at 1996. 
6 The catering category includes catering, accommodation and tourism. 
7 Before 2011, the NBS used the cut-off point 5 million RMB annual sales revenue. After 2011, the threshold 
was raised to 20 million RMB. 
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scale ones, whose output occupied 22.4% of total registered industrial firms in 2004 (only 
16.5% from NBS data). Furthermore, Dougherty et al. (2007) show that privately 
registered and privately controlled (but registered as non-POEs) domestic industrial firms 
together accounted for 33.1% of value added in industry even at year 2003. Therefore, the 
economic importance of private businesses over the past few decades is expected to be 
larger than what has been presented in NBSC (2016) once we consider those below scale 
POEs and those POEs that registered under other non-private categories. 
 
1.2.3 Regulations and Legal Evolution 
The natural question is: why does private sector grow so fast? The common answer can 
be the greater efficiency of private firms. However, people may prefer to further ask: how 
did private sector grow so fast given such strong constraints, especially between mid-1980s 
and early 2000s? The answer is probably beyond all expectations: the evolution of state 
policy toward the private sector explains almost every major shift. Although such 
institutional evolution may be described as the (passive) decisions made by authorities who 
are simply motivated by the requirements of SOEs reform, it is undeniable that these 
government policies have substantially promoted the growth of private business in China.  
 
The policy environment for private businesses in the early years was basically hostile, 
but this changed (very) gradually. The National People’s Congress in March 1978 adopted 
a constitutional amendment allowing “individual laborers” to operate “within the limits 
permitted by law” (Tsai, 2007). The state Council followed up in 1981 with detailed 
regulations governing individual businesses in urban areas. The society however still 
showed an inhospitable attitude to private firms8. The government did not promulgate the 
Provisional Regulations on Private Enterprises until 1988. Therefore, to overcome the 
pervasive market failures and the volatile business environment, many private 
entrepreneurs chose to seek a crucial helping hand from local government by registering 
their firms under the collective category (Liu and Sun, 2006). Nevertheless, the ambiguous 
property rights arrangements between local governments and entrepreneurs resulted in 
large agency costs that the government owner in the worst case can regard the firm as a 
‘cash cow’ and can transfer its cash assets for public uses, especially when the firm grows 
                                                          
8 Entrepreneurs were described as exploiters of the working class at that time. 
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large or obtains public offering9. In 1994, the provisions for Limited liability companies 
and shareholding limited companies were available along with the adoption of the 
Company Law in China. This indicates that the size of private business will be no longer 
limited. Although the law established high minimum capital requirements from becoming 
companies10, the private entrepreneurs were still enormously enthusiastic. For example, the 
number of collective firms fell from 1.5 million in 1996 to 0.26 million in 2004. 
Meanwhile, the number of POE soared from 0.44 million to 3.6 million11. In March 1999, 
the Ninth People’s Congress approved a constitutional amendment identifying the non-
state economy as ‘an essential component’ of a mixed economy, a clear improvement from 
its previous designation as ‘an important component’ of a state-dominated economy 
(OECD, 2000). In 2001, the party officially clarified that it would no longer discriminate 
against POE but would embrace them because of their contributions to China’s economic 
development (Nee and Opper, 2012). In 2005, the state council launched the 36 Articles 
and encouraged POE to enter the industry previously exclusive for SOE 12 . It also 
encouraged financial institutions to lend to non-state firms. Lastly, the company law was 
revised in 2006. The minimum capital requirements for establishing companies were 
substantially reduced13. The establishment of single-person limited liability firm can finally 
be approved by Law.  
 
1.2.4 Soft Budget Constraints and Capital Misallocation 
Soft budget constraints represent a major incentive problem. An enterprise is said to 
have a soft budget constraint when it expects to be bailed out in case of financial trouble 
(Kornai, 1980; 1986). Under a soft-budget constraint, Kornai observed, eastern European 
SOEs did not have to worry about survival, and therefore were subject to various moral 
hazard problems, thus being lax about firm costs, sales, revenues, and ultimately profits. 
After the tremendous reforms since mid-1990s, most of the corporatized SOEs in China 
still remain under control of the state, where they have the explicit or implicit government 
support. More specifically, Lin and Tan (1999), Cull and Xu (20003) and Megginson et al. 
                                                          
9 For more details about the ambiguous property rights of collective firms, please see Li (1996) and Tian 
(2000). 
10 To establish a limited liability company, 0.5 million RMB was required. 10 million RMB was required for 
a shareholding limited company. In 1994, the average worker wage was only 4500 RMB (NBS, 1995). 
11 Sometimes, it referred to as ‘Taking off red hat’. 
12 However, the implementation was slow. For example, Airline approval for private business was suspended 
after 2007 July and only resumed after May 2013. To further overcome regulatory obstacles for POE, the 
State Council issued follow-on guidelines in May 2010, i.e. the ‘New 36 Articles’. 
13 For limited liability company, only 30,000 RMB is required. For shareholding limited liability company, 5 
million RMB is required.  
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(2014) document that Chinese (listed) SOEs have better access to credit in state-owned 
banks and can expect to receive financial help in times of distress.  
 
Nevertheless, such ‘privileges’ are often regarded as the root of the low efficiency in 
Chinese SOEs, especially for their financial performance (Movshuk, 2004). For recent 
example, Li et al. (2010) use a census dataset containing most of unlisted Chinese 
manufacturing firms over 2000 – 2005 and find that SOEs are indeed less efficient that 
POEs and pay less attention to costs, inventories, accounts receivables, investment, 
employee welfare, financing, and administration. For publicly listed firms over 2003 – 
2013, Chang and Jin (2016) show that a firm controlled by government ministries (SOEs) 
has a ROA 2.08% (0.98%) points, on average, lower than the reference firms controlled 
mainly by private investors. These suggest that either direct or indirect government 
ownership has a detrimental impact on firm (financial) performance. Furthermore, Lam et 
al. (2017) present that between 2011 and 2015, SOEs occupied more than 50% of total 
bank credit and almost 40% of total assets but generated only around 22% of total 
industrial output, more than 50% of total corporate losses and merely 7% return on equity. 
Lardy (2014) shows that the ROA of industrial SOEs has been less than their cost of 
capital since 2007 and it was around 8% lower than the ROA of industrial POEs in 2012. 
According to the data from People’s Bank of China in 2014, the proportion of bank loans 
towards private sector was increasing over the past decade but it still only occupied 16.37% 
of total bank loans even at the end of 2012.  
 
Plausibly, SOEs with low productivity take a larger share of credit while POEs with 
high productivity usually have limited access to credit resources (Boyreau-Debray and Wei 
2005; Song et al., 2011). Therefore, a more worrisome capital misallocation problem 
attracts researchers’ attention in recent years. Brandt et al. (2013) show that over 1985-
2007, the resources misallocation in China lowers aggregate non-agricultural TFP by an 
average of 20%, which was almost exclusively driven by the increasing misallocation of 
capital between state and non-state sectors within provinces. Song and Wu (2015) further 
show that the capital misallocation implies aggregate revenue losses of 20% for Chinese 
firms over 2004 – 2007. Pan et al. (2016) explain the excess liquidity from the angle of 
credit inefficiency and use China as an example to show that credit misallocation between 
SOEs and POEs leads to a decline in credit efficiency and hence a higher M2/GDP ratio. 
The situation is likely to deteriorate after the implementation of the 4 trillion RMB fiscal 
stimulus plan (2009 – 2010). Huang et al. (2017) detect that between 2006 and 2013, local 
10 
 
public debt crowded out the investment of Chinese POEs by tightening their funding 
constraints, while leaving SOEs’ investment unaffected. Cong et al. (2017) match 
confidential loan-level data from the 19 largest Chinese banks with firm-level data on 
manufacturing firms and document that the credit expansion favored SOEs and firms with 
lower average product of capital, reversing the process of capital reallocation towards 
POEs before 2008. 
 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
In China, the phenomenal GDP growth rates (9.4% per annum, average value 2000-
2016) are closely associated with the high fixed capital accumulation (almost 40% of GDP 
per annum on average) which is largely undertaken (more than 65% on average in 
manufacturing for example) by POEs. Nevertheless, it is universally recognized that POEs 
in China are strongly financially constrained. One possible explanation for this firm-level 
finance-growth puzzle in past literature is that Chinese POEs have abundant internal funds 
(Guariglia et al., 2011 and Ding et al., 2013). This argument, on the other side, implies that 
the private sector in China may not be able to sustain high growth rates once the 
competitive advantages used to maintain high profits are eroded. Thus, to maintain 
continuous prosperity, measures must be taken ensuring a more widespread access to 
external finance for the private sector. The most straightforward way should be improving 
the financing environment through institutional and financial developments. More 
interestingly, if the presence of state assets can crowd out private sectors in the local 
capital markets, then market-oriented reforms in institutions and the financial market are 
required to alleviate such credit misallocation caused by the political pecking order 
mechanism. Given the lower degree of external financial constraints, the growth potential 
of private sectors can be further released. These inferences motivate us to find answers for 
the following question: 
 
Q1: Can institutions and financial developments in China reduce the credit 
misallocation in the domestic capital market? 
 
 
Corporate financing decisions in China can be affected by government intervention. The 
Chinese government is usually the largest shareholder of SOEs as well as the owner of the 
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‘big four’ state owned banks (Li et al., 2009). The explicit or implicit government support 
plus the relatively preferential treatment in the debt market may easily push the 
indebtedness of SOEs into the levels far beyond their sustainable boundaries. After almost 
four decades’ reform, it is interesting for us to explore whether SOEs behave similarly to, 
or still differently from, POEs in response to the deviations from their optimal capital 
structures. Additionally, weak legal protections of minority investors and poor corporate 
governance mechanisms result in highly concentrated ownership structure of Chinese firms. 
Given these conditions, the major agency costs in China’s capital market should be 
generated by the conflicts between corporate insiders, e.g. managers or shareholders, and 
outsiders, e.g. creditors or investors. The spread of such agency costs may substantially 
increase the premium required by external creditors, which in turn impedes firms pursuit of 
their ideal capital structures. 
 
Generally speaking, ownership structure is an important determinant of a firm’s capital 
structure decisions (Pindado and La-Torre, 2011). Due to costs of adjustment, firms cannot 
always maintain their optimal capital structure policies (Fischer et al., 1989). The special 
characteristics of ownership structures of Chinese firms are closely associated with the 
variation of adjustment costs faced by firms. However, the connection between capital 
structure changes and a firm’s ownership structure is relatively less explored in past 
literature. Therefore, we would like to fill this gap by taking China as an interesting 
example and to answer the following question:  
 
Q2: How do state ownership and the degree of ownership concentration affect a firm’s 
capital structure decision dynamically? 
 
 
The Chinese economy has a bank dominated financial system, in which official lending 
activities are largely controlled by the credit supply from the banking sector. Therefore, the 
first choice of debt financing for firms is usually bank loan. It is common knowledge that 
banks prefer to lend short-term debt (Custodio et al., 2013). Also, poor creditor protection, 
and low legal and institutional efficiency can result in higher costs but fewer choices for 
long-term financing (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998). Besides, China’s corporate 
bond market is poorly developed and the major source of long-term debt available for most 
of non-financial firms is still bank loan. Although banks have an advantage in minimizing 
costs of financial distress, they face their own intermediation costs that are passed on to the 
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borrower, so bank long-term debt is nominally more expensive than public long-term bond 
(Cantillo and Wright, 2000).  
 
Therefore, the relatively immature capital market together with a bank dominated 
financial system results in the prevalence of heavy reliance on short-term debt financing 
among Chinese non-financial companies. For instance, Cai et al. (2008) firstly notice the 
abnormally low ratio of long-term debt to total debt for Chinese (listed) firms, i.e. 0.23 on 
average, comparing to the firms in developed economies, e.g. 0.72 in US and 0.59 in 
German. Although short-term debt can provide relatively low interests advantage at current 
time, over reliance on it can make firms suffer from high rollover risk which will in turn 
substantially increase costs of future borrowing (Goplalan et al., 2014 and Wang et al., 
2016). The following question then arises: 
 




1.4 Methods and Major findings 
Our results are largely generated by using regression models. Although we do not 
exclude the possibility that the above three questions can be explored through other 
(empirical) approaches, given the existing conditions, we believe that we have chosen the 
optimal ones. In this section, for each research question, we will firstly introduce the basic 
empirical methods and then summarize the major findings. 
 
In Chapter 2, we explore Q1 by using the large Chinese unlisted firms’ dataset (2000 - 
2007).14 First, we use the investment cash flow sensitivity to infer the degree of financing 
constraints faced by firms. Fazzari et al. (1988) argue that the investment of more 
financially constrained firms should be more sensitive to the variation of internal funds, i.e. 
cash flow. Due to credit misallocation, for example, we see that the coefficient on cash 
flow variable in the investment regression is larger for POEs than for SOEs. This indicates 
that POEs are more financially constrained than SOEs. After that, we create an interaction 
term between the measurement to province-level institutions and financial development 
                                                          
14 The details of dataset used in this thesis will be introduced in each chapter. 
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and cash flow variable. If institutions and financial development can lower firm-level 
financing constraints, then the coefficient for the interaction term should be negative and 
statistically significant.  
 
The basic results indicate that institutions and financial development in China can 
reduce financing constraints for the investments of private firms, while increasing the 
financing constraints for the investments of state and collective firms. Furthermore, we use 
political affiliation as the complementary classification criterion for ownership types to 
capture the status of a firm’s government connection. Our results show that the private 
firms without clear political background seem to benefit more from developments than the 
private firms with such connection. These results suggest that the market-oriented reforms 
in China may reduce capital misallocation between state and non-state sectors. Lastly, in 
more detailed analyses, we also find that the benefits of financial development should be 
easier for domestic private firms to capture, once the development of the institution has 
reached a certain level. 
 
In Chapter 3, we explore Q2 by using the Chinese listed firms’ dataset (1998 - 2010). 
We build our tests on the trade-off theory of capital structure. Ideally, a value maximizing 
firm should borrow towards an optimal point which is defined by balancing the bankruptcy 
costs of debt and the tax advantages of debt (Myers, 1984). Given market imperfections, 
however, firms cannot always stay at their optimal leverage levels. Instead, they take 
positive steps to offset deviations from optimums. Empirically, the standard partial 
adjustment model has been widely applied to estimate the speed of leverage adjustment 
towards the optimal leverage (Fama and French, 2002). We firstly classify firms into 
different groups, according to the nature of their ultimate controller, i.e. state, non-state and 
private. We further classify firms in each ownership type category into high or low 
ownership concentration group. After that, we estimate the one-step reduced partial 
adjustment model (Flannery and Rangan, 2006) by using the data of firms in each category 
and then compare the calculated adjustment speed coefficient cross groups. 
 
The results of sample separation tests show that SOEs present lower overall adjustment 
speed of leverage than private firms. The possible explanation is that the relatively low 
costs of adjustment due to better access to debt market may not motivate SOEs to adjust 
their leverage ratios towards optimal levels more actively but instead reduce the 
importance of eliminating deviations from optimal leverage levels in their financing 
14 
 
decisions. Also, we find that the firms with higher level of ownership concentration present 
higher leverage adjustment speed. This positive relation is stronger in POEs than in SOEs. 
Simply speaking, the increasing level of ownership stakes should make the benefits of 
approaching optimal leverage levels become larger for the non-state controlling 
shareholder than for the state controlling shareholder. 
 
In Chapter 4, we explore Q3 by using the updated Chinese listed firms’ dataset (1998-
2016). We study the impact from short debt maturity on capital expenditures through the 
channel of rollover risk. We measure short debt maturity as the ratio of short-term debt to 
total debt and estimate a classical investment regression augmented by leverage and short 
debt maturity (Lang et al., 1996 and Aivazian et al., 2005b). Our results are clear. Firms 
invest less when they have shorter debt maturity as they face higher rollover risks. This 
overhang effect generated by short-term debt is more significant when firms have lower 
financial health since the rollover risks are likely to be more serious when firms’ assets-in-
place deteriorate. Besides, we find that the negative effect of shorter debt maturity on 
investment becomes much smaller after the year 2008 than before it. This indicates that the 
rollover risk faced by firms may be temporarily reduced by the injection of more long-term 
bank loans due to the implementation of a 4 trillion fiscal stimulus package. Lastly, we 
find that the investments of SOEs are negatively affected by shorter debt maturity but the 
corresponding marginal impact from short debt maturity on the investments of SOEs is 
much lower than that of non-SOEs. Therefore, to be consistent with the argument in many 
previous Chinese studies, we conclude that soft budget constraints may reduce the 




This thesis contributes to literature in several aspects. First, using a very representative 
Chinese firm-level dataset, our study examines whether or not the degree of financing 
constraints can be associated with the cross-province differences in institutions and 
financial development. Many previous studies on the relation between finance and growth 
in China do not fully consider the fact that China is a large and diversified country with 
significant regional differences in institutions and financing environments (Demurger et al., 
2002; Allen et al., 2005). On the aggregate level, ignoring such regional disparities can 
easily generate the misleading conclusion that developments of official financial sectors 
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are trivial for economic growth. After controlling such regional differences, however, our 
micro-evidence conveys a positive attitude towards the efforts taken to improve the local 
institution and financial market, in terms of alleviating firm-level credit constraints. 
 
Second, we provide systematic analyses of heterogeneous leverage adjustment 
behaviors of firms with different ownership status. More specifically, differing from 
previous capital structure studies using Chinese listed firms’ dataset, we consider the 
effects of state ownership on firms’ optimal leverage converging decisions rather than on 
their static leverage choices in level. Also, we explore the effects of ownership 
concentration on firms’ capital structure decisions. Contrasting with the rather diffused 
ownership structure of US firms, in many other developed and developing economies, 
ownership is commonly concentrated in hands of a few large shareholders, e.g. Western 
Europe (La porta et al., 1999 and Faccio and Lang, 2002) and East Asia (Claessens et al., 
2000). We find that the presence of such concentrated ownership structure can result in the 
different dynamic capital structure decisions of Chinese firms from those of US firms.  
 
Lastly, we extend the empirical literature on the relation between debt maturity and 
firm’s investment decision. Using the datasets of US and UK firms, past studies find a 
negative coefficient on long-term debt maturity in the investment regressions (Aivazian et 
al., 2005b and Dang, 2011). This is consistent with the conventional argument in Myers 
(1977) that firms holding risky debt with longer maturity are more likely to have lower 
investment incentives since their shareholders are unwilling to transfer returns from 
projects to debtholders. In other words, firms can reduce the underinvestment issue by 
using more short-term debt. Nevertheless, such a working mechanism of debt maturity 
policy may only be valid in economies with mature capital markets in which firms largely 
rely on long-term debt financing. In most emerging economies, such as that of China, the 
high degree of asymmetric information plus a bank dominated financial system can easily 
result in high risk premium of the debt contract with longer maturity. Therefore, the exact 
positions of long-term and short-term debt in the financing decisions of Chinese firms may 
be different from that of US firms. Our results show a negative coefficient on short debt 
maturity, i.e. a positive coefficient on long-term debt maturity, in the investment regression. 
This indicates that the rollover risk plays a more important role than expected in shaping 
the real decisions of firms with heavy reliance on short-term debt financing. Our empirical 
results may reconcile the conflicts from the recent several theoretical works (Moyen, 2007 
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Chapter 2                           
Institutions, Financial Development 
and Financing constraints: Micro-






Financing constraints on real activities of enterprises are believed to be very present in 
China (Poncet et al., 2010). Lending activities are substantially controlled by the inefficient 
banking sector that is dominated by four state-owned banks, reducing the importance of 
other financing channels, such as equity, trade credit, and leasing (Ayyagari et al., 2010). 
Even worse, these state-owned banks prefer to offer easier credit to state enterprises while 
strongly discriminating against those private enterprises (Boyreau-Debray and Wei, 2005). 
From the World Business Environment Survey of the investment climate, over 1999–2005, 
80% of private enterprises in China consider financing constraints as a major obstacle. 
Nevertheless, private enterprises still present high investment rates and are regarded as the 
engine of the fast growth of the Chinese economy.  
 
This firm-level finance-growth puzzle motivates past literature on financing constraints 
to find answers from the aspect of the self-financing capability of Chinese private firms, 
e.g. plentiful cash flow (Guariglia et al., 2011) and efficient working capital management 
(Ding et al., 2013). Their results imply that private enterprises in China may not be able to 
sustain their high investment and growth rates once their competitive advantages used to 
generate high profits are eroded (Guariglia et al., 2011). Thus, to maintain the continuous 
prosperity of the Chinese economy, measures are required to ensure more widespread 
access to external finance for the private sector. One most straightforward way should be 
improving the financing environment through institutional and financial development. 
 
Unfortunately, the main stream literature on the direct relationship of external financing 
conditions with growth in China usually suggests that the improvement of a relatively 
undeveloped legal and financial system should be a long-term project and its effectiveness 
may not be very significant in the short run (Allen et al., 2005; 2011). However, these 
studies often do not fully consider the fact that China is a large and diversified country 
with significant regional differences in institutions and financing environments (Demurger 
et al., 2002 and Guariglia and Poncet, 2008). For instance, each province or region in this 
relatively decentralized economy can be considered as an autonomous economic entity 
(Liu and Siu, 2006). Also, financial markets in China are severely segmented since cross-
region bank lending has been relatively rare (Boyreau-Debray and Wei, 2005). It is 
reasonable to conjecture that the counterintuitive relationship between finance and growth 
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in China may not still be the case once these dramatic differences of institutions and 
financial development among regions are controlled. 
 
To best of our knowledge, there is no systematic research using very representative 
Chinese firm-level dataset to examine whether or not the degree of financing constraints 
can be associated with the cross-province differences in institutions and financial 
development. This paper fills this gap. Specifically, we use a panel of more than 95,000 
Chinese firms of different ownership types over the period 2000-2007 and estimate the 
linearized regression model driven from the conventional Euler equation model of 
investment and use the investment cash flow sensitivity to infer the degree of financing 
constraints faced by firms. We use the Marketization Index for China’s provinces from 
2000-2007, published by the National Economics Research Institute (Fan et al., 2009), to 
control for cross-regional differences in institutions and financial development. An 
interaction term between cash flow variable and marketization index is added into the 
regression model. If institutional and financial development can lower firm-level financing 
constraints by improving efficiency in the local capital markets, then the coefficient for the 
interaction term should be negative and statistically significant. 
 
The basic results show that institutional and financial development in China can reduce 
financing constraints for the investments of private firms and partly for foreign firms, 
while increasing the financing constraints for the investments of state and collective firms. 
Using private firms as an example, we find that the firms in the provinces with average 
levels of development of institutions and finance, such as Anhui, Chongqing or Shandong, 
present an investment-cash flow sensitivity around 0.28 while this sensitivity jumps to 0.43 
for the firms in the provinces with lower than average level, such as Shanxi, Yunnan or 
Neimenggu. These results suggest that the investments of the firms located in the regions 
with better institutions and financial development are less constrained by the availability of 
internal funds since they have better access to external financial resources. Our main 
conclusion remains unchanged after considering many potential issues, such as the uneven 
distribution of firms across provinces and industries; time variant effects of development 
and measurement bias on investment opportunities.  
 
Apart from ownership types, we also use political affiliation (Lishu) as the 
complementary classification criterion to further capture the status of firms’ government 
connections. Our results indicate that market-oriented reforms and developments in China 
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may reduce the degree of financing constraints more for the private firms without specific 
political background than the private firms with such background. Besides, our results 
show that large-sized private firms are more financially constrained in China. Cull et al. 
(2014) argue that this should be caused by the crowding out effect in external financing 
faced by those large firms without government connections. Motivated by this 
phenomenon, we further classify the large-sized private firms into groups with or without 
political affiliation. The results show that institutional and financial development may 
reduce financial obstacles for the large-sized private firms without political connections 
but not for the large-sized private firms affiliated with the government. These results may 
indicate that the crowding out effect in external financing, mainly generated by the 
political pecking order effects, can be gradually eliminated with the process of 
marketization in China. 
 
Lastly, the marketization index contains five major sub-indices. Each of them separately 
measures the development of institutions or the financial market. To detect which aspect of 
these market-oriented reforms affect the status of financing constraints for Chinese firms 
most, we estimate the coefficient on the interaction between cash flow and each sub-index. 
Although the coefficients on all interactive terms are highly statistically significant, the 
absolute values of the institution related coefficients are much larger than those of the 
financial market related coefficients. The corresponding implication could be that the 
benefits of financial development should be easier for domestic private firms to fully 
capture once the development of institutions has reached a certain level. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature 
review for financing constraint. Section 3 describes our firm-level dataset and the province 
level marketization index. Section 4 presents the theoretical framework, empirical 
specifications, main hypothesis and estimation methodology. Section 5 presents our 









2.2 Literature review 
2.2.1 Investment and financing constraint 
In a world with perfect capital market, finance should be irrelevant for real decisions of 
firms as internal and external funds are perfect substitutes (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). 
Nevertheless, this M-M proposition has been challenged by a large amount of literature 
based on the assumption that external finance is more costly than internal finance since the 
existence of asymmetric information and agency issues causes creditors to impose a 
relatively high premium on non-collateral borrowing (to see: e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Mryers, 1977; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Therefore, the pecking order model 
indicates that firms prefer to firstly choose internal funds or risk-free debt, then risky debt, 
and finally equity (Myers and Majluf, 1984). In other words, firms are considered to be 
financially constrained if their investments are limited by the availability of relatively 
inexpensive internal funds (Hubbard, 1998).  
 
The empirical examination of financing constraints comes from the seminal work by 
Fazzari et al. (1988), who use US manufacturing firms’ panel data and introduce the 
investment cash flow sensitivity (ICFS) as a measure of the degree of financing constraints 
after controlling for the investment opportunity by using average q. They split the sample 
into ‘financially constrained’ and ‘unconstrained’ firms, according to the different levels of 
dividend pay-out ratios, arguing that firms facing a high cost premium for external finance 
tend to choose a low dividend pay-out ratio since they have to retain more internal funds 
for future investment. Their results indicate that financially constrained firms have higher 
ICFS than that of unconstrained firms. 
 
Many subsequent studies largely support the results from Fazzari et al. (1988). For 
example, Devereux and Schianterelli (1989) use the data of manufacturing firms in the 
United Kingdom to estimate the modified Q based investment model and find that cash 
flow matters more for young firms, since their information asymmetries are likely to be 
larger and they need to finance a higher level of investment rate. Similarly, Hoshi et al. 
(1991) detect that the bank tied firms in Japan tend to present lower ICFS than that of the 
independent firms. This indicates that a close bank relationship is likely to mitigate 




Nevertheless, several apparent limitations of the framework used by Fazzari et al. (1988) 
have aroused heated debate on the validity of ICFS as a measurement of the degree of 
financing constraints. First, cash flow may capture the investment opportunities that 
average Q fails to capture (Alti, 2003). Theoretically, very strict assumptions are required 
to equalize marginal Q and average Q (Hayashi, 1982) which can be easily violated if 
firms have market power (Cooper and Ejarque, 2003). Empirically, noisy share prices can 
generate measurement errors in average Q (Erickson and Whited, 2000). These systematic 
problems shift the explanatory power away from fundamental terms, i.e. Tobin’s Q, 
towards cash flow, hence showing spurious conclusion of financing constraints (Gilchrist 
and Himmelberg, 1995).   
 
Second, Kaplan and Zingales (hereafter KZ, 1997) argue that dividend pay-out ratios 
may be endogenous with investment decisions and tend to classify firms incorrectly. They 
combine the qualitative and quantitative information from firms’ annual reports and 
reclassify the 49 financially constrained firms defined by Fazzari et al. (1988) and find that 
ICFS is actually lowest for the most constrained firms. The reconciliation of this debate is 
provided by Cleary et al. (2007) who argue that the opposite results from those of Fazzari 
et al. (1988) and KZ (1997) can be obtained by using the same dataset but with different 
sample classification methods. If firms are classified on the basis of their internal funds, U-
shaped ICFS will be obtained, e.g. as in KZ (1997) and Cleary (1999). If firms are 
classified on the basis of indicators of the degree of asymmetric information in the capital 
markets, the results are consistent with Fazzari et al. (1988). This inference is further 
confirmed by the empirical work from Guariglia (2008) using a UK unlisted firm-level 
dataset.  
 
For Chinese unlisted firms, Cull et al. (2015) argue that ICFS is a valid measurement of 
the degree of financing constraints. In this Chapter, we use political and institutional 
related factors to do a priori classification of firms. As mentioned by Ayyagari et al. 
(2010), government connection can help Chinese firms to obtain bank loans. Institutional 
factors are similar to business groups in which members have lower ICFS than non-
members (Hoshi et al., 1991). The variations of these factors are less likely to be affected 
by the variations in firms’ financial conditions. Furthermore, financing constraints should 
be more present in an economy with a relatively undeveloped capital market. Specifically, 
Moshirian and Vadilyev (2013) find that the ICFS is more pronounced in emerging 
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markets than in those of developed countries. It is a well-known fact that China is the 
biggest developing country with a relatively poor financial system (World Bank, 2013).  
 
2.2.2 Financial development and financing constraint 
If financial development can improve the efficiency of the financial market, such as 
reducing transaction costs, optimizing capital allocation and enhancing monitoring, then 
the degree of financing constraint faced by firms should be reduced as well. The within 
country studies tend to treat developing countries as the natural experimental samples in 
which financial liberalizations are usually taken to improve the efficiency of an immature 
financial system. For instance, Harris et al. (1994) find that the market-oriented financial 
liberalization in Indonesia increased borrowing costs but widened access to external 
finance for smaller firms. The net effect appears to have been positive. Gallego and Loayza 
(2000) report that the investment of firms became less sensitive to cash flow or debt but 
more sensitive to Tobin’s Q after financial liberalization in Chile. Gelos and Werner (2002) 
use Mexican data to estimate a simple accelerator model with cash flow variable. They 
find that the ICFS is higher for smaller firms and decreases significantly after financial 
liberalization. Nevertheless, the indicator of financial liberalization is just a time dummy in 
the regression model, so the effects from financial liberalization on financing constraints 
are usually difficult to separate from the effects of changes in business cycles. Also, 
financial reforms may not be able to benefit firms immediately but need a certain level of 
financial infrastructure to be reached in the economy. 
 
To overcome these potential problems, another group of studies attempts to measure the 
level of financial development more directly and compare the behaviours of firms across 
countries with different levels of financial developments. Specifically, Love (2003) uses 
cash stock to parameterize the stochastic discount factor of managers within a structural 
framework and finds that high financial development and legal efficiency can dramatically 
reduce the cost of capital for firms, especially for smaller firms. Using the same method, 
Harrison et al. (2004) find that the increase of FDI can also lower firm-level financing 
constraints. Laeven (2003) constructs a cross-country comparable time varying index for 
financial liberalization and creates an interaction between it and cash flow variable in the 
investment regression. The results show that higher level of financial liberalization can 
reduce the degree of financial constraints for smaller firms but increase the financing 




2.2.3 Institutional effects 
Discussion of the effects of institutional factors on financing constraint starts with the 
relationship between institutions and financial development. Generally speaking, finance is 
a set of contracts which are closely related to legal rights and enforcement mechanisms. A 
well-functioning institutional system should be able to facilitate the operation of both 
markets and intermediaries (Beck et al., 2003b; 2005b). One growing group of studies 
examines the effects of laws and regulations on the operations of the financial sector. For 
example, La Porta et al. (2000) argue that the differences in legal institutions are 
fundamental sources of international differences in financial development. Levine et al. 
(1997; 1998) show that the laws and enforcement mechanisms which protect the rights of 
outside investors tend to foster financial development.  
 
Several studies have investigated the effects of institutional changes on the real side of 
the economy by using firm-level datasets. For example, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1998) find that a greater proportion of firms use long-term external financing in countries 
with more efficient legal systems. This is because an effective legal system can better 
protect the interest of creditors by deterring violations and enforcing compensation for 
infractions. Using a cross-country firm-level survey dataset, Beck et al. (2005) argue that 
institutional development can reduce the constraining effects of financial, legal, and 
corruption obstacles especially for the growth of small firms. In addition, political 
institutions have been shown to have strong power in shaping the design and the operations 
of corporations, credit and securities markets in a centralized economy (Byod and Smith, 
1996; Pagano and Volpin, 2002 and Haber, 2004).15 For instance, Bertrand et al. (2007) 
document sharp changes in capital structure and bank lending decisions after the 
elimination of government intervention in the banking industry in France in 1985. Their 
results indicate that, after the reform, banks improved their monitoring and screening 
functions and the cost of capital was increased significantly for worse performing firms. 
 
                                                          
15 E.g. the level of market interest rates, the existence of various taxes, and of various subsidies, are all 
factors that can determine the cost of external funds. 
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2.2.4 Financing constraints in China 
Most empirical literature on financial constraints in China follows the ICFS framework. 
Chow and Fung (1998) firstly confirm the existence of lending bias in the manufacturing 
sector of Shanghai. They find that the investments of private enterprises are more sensitive 
to the availability of cash flow than those of state-owned enterprises. Meanwhile, 
international joint ventures are the least constrained in terms of liquidity. Using the same 
dataset and a very similar method, Chow and Fung (2000) detect a counter intuitive 
relationship between firm size and liquidity constraints for those manufacturing firms, i.e. 
larger firms present higher ICFS than smaller firms. They attribute this finding to some 
institutional features that are common among transition economies. Chen (2008) uses the 
Chinese listed firm-level dataset and finds that non-state firms located in the central 
regions suffer the strongest financial constraints. Hericourt and Poncet (2009) and Poncet 
(2010) use the firm-level survey data conducted by the World Bank and large 
manufacturing firm-level data from the Oriana dataset, respectively, and find similar 
results: the decline of the state economic predominance and the increase of liberalization to 
foreign capital can reduce dependence of investment on internal funds for private firms. 
Furthermore, using listed firms’ dataset, Chan et al. (2012) find that the firms with a 
politically connected CEO or Chair display no financing constraints whereas the firms 
without such connection experience significant constraints. Besides, Cull et al. (2015) use 
survey data to construct proxies for the relative severity of information and liquidity 
problems faced by the Chinese manufacturing firms. Their results indicate that the firms 
with higher perceived financial obstacles by managers indeed present higher level of ICFS.  
 
Based on the assumption that financing constraint is present in China (Allen et al., 
2005), the sensitivity of firms’ real decisions to changes in financial variables is often 
interpreted as the evidence that firms use the corresponding financing channels to 
overcome financing constraints and maintain high growth rates. In detail, Long and Zhang 
(2011) argue that smaller firms located in the areas with industrial clusters are more likely 
to use trade credit to mitigate financial obstacles.16 Guariglia et al. (2011) connect the 
private enterprises’ remarkable assets growth with their amazing ability to generate 
abundant internal funds, e.g. cash flow. More recently, Ding et al. (2013) find that the 
effective management of working capital can help Chinese private firms to alleviate credit 
constraints by mitigating the negative shock in cash flow. These studies may also leave an 
                                                          




impression that the financial environment in China is too poor to support the growth of 
non-state firms. 
 
Although China is usually considered as a counter intuitive case in the finance-growth 
literature, several studies in the last decade provide somewhat positive assessments for the 
development of Chinese financial system from different aspects. For instance, one direct 
examination of the relationship between China’s financial development and its economic 
growth is conducted by Guariglia and Poncet (2008) who find that market driven financing 
in the economy tends to promote GDP and TFP growth at province-level. Also, Ayyagari 
et al. (2010) argue that the undeveloped formal financial system is still more important 
than informal financing channels for the fast growth of private enterprises. Besides, Chong 
et al. (2013) find that increased competition in the banking market and lower market 
concentration in the banking industry can alleviate financing constraints for small and 
medium sized firms in China. However, these studies often do not consider the full scope 
of financial development and may suffer also from a sample representative problem.17  
 
Lastly, some studies consider the institutional effects on firm performance in China but 
most of them only concentrate on the role of government in exerting political power on the 
economy. Tan (2007) argues that soft budget constraint is usually regarded as the most 
direct benefit from building institutional ties with governments in China, even for private 
firms. Nevertheless, Li (2004) finds that the positive effects should be U-shaped as the 
middle-level local governments usually do not have the superior access to resources of the 
central government and they also do not have the incentives to do ‘mirco-management’ for 
firms as the lowest-level local governments do. Besides, Li et al. (2008) find that political 
connections afford more confidence for private enterprise in the Chinese legal system. 
Overall, government connection can be a ‘double-edged sword’. The obtained priority in 
capital or product market may help firms overcome the frictions caused by undeveloped 
legal and financial systems. However, these benefits may be at the expense of future long-
run growth of the firms or even that of the whole economy. We further discuss this issue in 




                                                          




2.3.1 Firm-level dataset 
We use data drawn from the annual accounting reports filed by industrial firms with the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) over the period 2000-2007. All firms with 
annual sales of five million yuan (about $650,000) or more are covered. These firms 
operate in the manufacturing and mining sectors and come from 30 provinces or province-
equivalent municipal cities. We exclude observations with negative values of sales; total 
assets minus total fixed assets; total assets minus liquid assets and accumulated 
depreciation minus current depreciation. In addition, we exclude observations with the 
ratio of fixed investment to capital stock larger than one and observations with the ratio of 
sales to capital stock greater than 3. We also exclude the firms without complete records on 
our main regression variables. To control for the potential influence of outliers, we exclude 
observations in the one percent tails of each of the regression variables. Finally, in order to 
perform first-differenced GMM, we exclude all firms with less than 4 years of consecutive 
observations. Our final panel covers 94,673 mainly unlisted firms, which corresponds to 
538,207 firm-year observations. It is unbalanced, with number of observations ranging 
from a Minimum of 36,697 in year 2000 to a maximum of 85,448 in 2003. In columns (1), 
(2) and (3) of Table 2.1, at province (region)-level, we present the average firm-level 
variables used for estimation. 
 
2.3.2 Proxy for institutions and financial development 
In this paper, we use the Marketization index for China’s provinces from 2000-2007, 
published by the National Economics Research Institute (NERI) (Fan et al., 2009), to 
proxy the Province-level institutions and financial development in China. The index uses a 
zero to ten score system to measure the relative progress in marketization of China’s 31 
provinces (including five autonomous minority ethnic regions and three municipalities 
directly under the control of the central administration)18. Marketization is assessed in five 
fields: Government-market relations; Development of the non-state enterprise sector; 
Development of the commodity market; Development of factor markets and Intermediate/ 
legal framework. Data are either from statistics or enterprise and household surveys.  
 
                                                          
18 In this paper, we have only used the index for 30 regions, since our firm-level dataset does not contain the 
















 Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Average Obs. Firms 
Guangdong 0.28 0.35 0.09 0.39 5.82 5.25 1.96 63540 11022 
Zhejiang 0.29 0.30 0.13 0.35 5.98 4.73 1.94 86789 15194 
Shanghai 0.36 0.44 0.10 0.31 5.61 4.91 1.92 32922 5515 
Jiangsu 0.28 0.33 0.10 0.36 6.57 5.30 1.40 70374 12314 
Fujian 0.30 0.36 0.10 0.36 5.57 5.06 1.31 28446 4889 
Tianjin 0.30 0.43 0.08 0.35 5.15 4.95 0.97 11005 1841 
Beijing 0.24 0.37 0.10 0.31 4.37 4.60 0.93 12146 2038 
Shandong 0.32 0.39 0.09 0.40 5.47 5.04 0.69 43391 7723 
Liaoning 0.21 0.34 0.08 0.38 4.32 4.40 0.53 19262 3403 
Chongqing 0.23 0.34 0.10 0.33 4.52 4.37 0.36 6975 1216 
Sichuan 0.21 0.31 0.08 0.37 4.47 4.51 0.07 16352 2840 
Anhui 0.18 0.28 0.09 0.38 4.43 4.31 -0.03 11982 2190 
Hebei 0.28 0.40 0.07 0.37 4.60 4.67 -0.05 22328 3929 
Hubei 0.20 0.31 0.06 0.43 4.71 4.69 -0.16 12025 2260 
Hainan 0.18 0.36 0.02 0.39 3.34 3.95 -0.24 1266 224 
IK = Investment/Capital Stock; SRK = Sales/Capital Stock; CFK = Cash flow/Capital Stock; 
Market = Marketization Index measures development in institutions and finance in each province. 



















 Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Average Obs. Firms 
Henan 0.35 0.45 0.08 0.38 5.21 4.89 -0.27 21761 3995 
Hunan 0.26 0.37 0.08 0.45 4.96 4.77 -0.28 13045 2562 
Jiangxi 0.18 0.30 0.05 0.42 4.14 4.58 -0.30 5993 1132 
Jilin 0.17 0.30 0.06 0.40 3.27 3.86 -0.44 5841 1050 
Guangxi 0.15 0.29 0.05 0.35 3.55 4.19 -0.45 6927 1256 
Neimenggu 0.22 0.35 0.08 0.35 3.93 4.14 -0.67 3824 688 
Heilongjiang 0.15 0.29 0.07 0.35 3.19 3.71 -0.68 5506 1013 
Yunnan 0.17 0.29 0.05 0.31 2.81 3.23 -0.76 6282 1036 
Shanxi 0.13 0.24 0.11 0.35 2.54 3.08 -0.76 9490 1688 
Shaanxi 0.13 0.29 0.05 0.36 2.86 3.38 -1.01 6867 1191 
Xinjiang 0.16 0.29 0.07 0.33 2.59 3.07 -1.04 3360 596 
Ningxia 0.15 0.25 0.09 0.32 2.78 3.12 -1.07 1200 215 
Gansu 0.11 0.23 0.03 0.40 2.99 3.86 -1.08 3399 621 
Guizhou 0.12 0.30 0.06 0.35 2.97 3.65 -1.14 5152 894 
Qinghai 0.13 0.27 0.04 0.42 2.16 2.85 -1.67 757 138 
Mean 0.22  0.08  4.16  0.00   
Std. 0.07  0.02  1.17  0.98   
Total        538207 94673 
IK = Investment/Capital Stock; SRK = Sales/Capital Stock; CFK = Cash flow/Capital Stock; 





We are motivated by the following reasons to use the marketization index as proxy to 
institutions and financial environment in China. First, the financial market development 
sub-index directly measures the share of non-state financial institutions in total deposits 
and the share of bank loans credited to non-state enterprises. In the cross-country studies 
on the finance-growth relationship, these two share factors are widely used as indicators to 
measure the level of financial development (see: e.g. King and Levine, 1993a; Love, 2003; 
Levine, 2006). In the Chinese financial system, bank loan is the major official financing 
resource. For example, in a province, if its banking sector offers a share of total credits to 
private sectors larger than the average value of this share across all provinces, then the 
privately owned firms in this province should face lower than average level of constraints 
in terms of bank loan borrowing. Furthermore, banking industry is controlled by the state. 
The higher share of non-state financial institutions in total deposits not only means the 
higher competition within the banking industry but also means higher competition in the 
whole local capital market. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that the regions with higher 
values of these two factors can have better financing conditions.19 
 
Second, the marketization index effectively measures the development of institutions 
that closely relate to the efficiency of resource allocation in China’s capital market. 
Specifically, the Chinese government has played a much greater role in China’s transition 
than other Asian countries’ governments have in their transitions (Lu et al., 2014). The 
capitalization of political power and social relationship give the people who participate in 
those relationships greater negotiating power in the market. Therefore, firms with these 
relationship based advantages can easily take control of market mechanisms. Nevertheless, 
Kranton (1996) argues that the specialized markets will remain thin and the search costs 
will remain high if relationship-based transactions make up the majority of economic 
transitions in society. This indicates that benefits from a relationship-based system do not 
come without cost. In the long-term, this system continuously imposes a high cost on 
public transactions and aggravates the misallocation of resource in the capital market, 
which will in turn restrict the growth of the Chinese economy (Li, 2000). Therefore, the 
core of economic reforms in China aims at gradually separating the political sector from 
the business sector. A province or region with a lower level of crowded state-owned capital 
as well as lower level of government intervention tends to have a more active local 
                                                          
19 Although banks in China can technically finance across provincial lines, the majority of their activities take 
place within provinces (Guariglia and Poncet, 2008). For instance, a positive and significant correlation 
between provincial bank deposits and loans was detected by the World Bank (2005) report on market 
integration in China. 
35 
 
financial market where local firms are more likely to compete fairly for credits at market 
price. The NERI marketization index has explicitly recorded the evolving government-
market relationship and reduction (or growth) of state (or non-state) enterprise sector in 
each region.20 
 
Lastly, the marketization index also records the development of legal environment for 
business, which is regarded as one of the most important aspects of institutions 
determining financial development in previous cross-country studies. A better legal 
environment for businesses should be able to enhance the confidence of creditors in 
signing contracts with private enterprises that do not have political backup. Overall, the 
marketization index is expected be better than the single index of financial development at 
capturing the outside financing environment for enterprises in China. Given the close 
relation between institutions and finance in the Chinese economy, we prefer to mainly rely 
on the weighted overall index in the analyses. 
 
In column (4) of Table 2.1, we present the province-level average marketization index 
and rank it in descending order. Geographically, the provinces in the coastal region have 
the most developed economies while those in the western region suffer most from under 
development. The situations of the provinces in the central area lie between that of the 
western and coastal areas. The cross-province distribution of the index largely captures this 
feature of the Chinese economy. 21  For instance, the standardized marketization index 
varies dramatically from the most developed eastern province Guangdong (1.96) to the 
least developed western province Qinghai (-1.67). 
 
In Appendix A, we also present the province-level average values of the five 
standardized sub-indices of the marketization index in Table A.14. When we compare the 
values of the overall index with the values of each sub-index across regions, there is an 
obvious information overlap. In other words, the provinces with higher values in the 
overall index also tend to present higher scores in most sub-categories. Nevertheless, this 
does not necessarily mean that the specific rankings of provinces remain the same across 
                                                          
20 The Chinese government tends to subsidise these state-owned firms. State-owned banks prefer to provide 
easy credit to government-related firms. Once the amount of state capitals decreases dramatically in a 
province or region, it is reasonable to believe that credits previously crowded to support inefficient as well as 
unprofitable state-owned firms will flow into fast growing and efficient private sectors. In other words, the 
degree of external financing constraints for those firms will finally be reduced. 
21 China’s openness reform proposed by Xiaoping Deng in 1980s, leading to the unbalanced economic 
development among coastal, central and western areas, which results in the serious provincial segmentation 
of both product and financial markets in the Chinese economy. 
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all sub-indices. For example, Tianjin is a relatively extreme case. It has a sub-index value 
measuring the development of the local financial market equal to 1.43, ranked as No.2 in 
this category, but a sub-index value measuring the degree of separation between 
government and business equal to 0.13, ranked as No.13 in this category. Therefore, except 
for the overall index, we will also consider the potential differential impacts from different 
sub-indices on firm-level financing constraint. 
 
 
2.4 Empirical specifications 
2.4.1 Investment model and financing constraint test 
The Euler equation investment model is widely used in studies of financing constraints 
and investment (see: e.g. Whited, 1992; Bond and Meghir, 1994; Love 2003). There are at 
least two advantages for us to choose the Euler equation investment model as our 
benchmark. First, this method avoids the use of noisy share price data. Theoretically, 
Tobin’s Q contains all the relative information of future profitability for investment (Tobin, 
1969). As the unobservable Q should summarize expected future value of a firm, many 
researchers use the price from forward looking markets (e.g. stock markets) to calculate the 
average q. Unfortunately, the applications of average q are proved disappointing. The 
investment regression fits poorly and leaves large residuals correlated with cash flow 
(Hassett and Hubbard, 1997 and Caballero, 1999). Besides, our Chinese dataset contains 
mainly unlisted firms who do not have market information. It is impossible for us to 
construct the average q based on market evaluation. The Euler equation implicitly 
incorporates the optimal investment path into every pair of optimal inter-temporal 
investment decision. There is no necessity for us to pursuit a Q analogous summation of 
discounted future values. Second, the effects from liquidity constraints can be conveniently 
modelled within the Euler framework. Previous studies often use a reduced form of the Q 
based regression model and add cash flow term intuitively into the model without any 
theoretical justification.22 With measurement error in average q, the interpretation of the 
cash flow coefficient becomes even more problematic. In contrast, the presence of cash 
flow in the linearized Euler equation comes from a structural framework associated with 
liquidity constraints. Therefore, our ICFS interpretation should be more convincing and 
                                                          
22 Similar issue exists in accelerator model and error correction model.  
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suffer less from mismeasurement of investment opportunities. We introduce this model in 
the latter part of this section. 
 
In this chapter, we closely follow the specification in Laeven (2003) and firstly assume 
that the firm value is given by: 
 
 







 𝐷𝑡 = Π𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡 − (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1)𝐵𝑡−1 (2.2) 
 
 𝐾𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑡 (2.3) 
 
 𝐷𝑡 ≥ 0 (2.4) 
 
where 𝐷𝑡  is the dividend pay-out, Π𝑡 = Π(𝐾𝑡, 𝐿𝑡 , 𝐼𝑡) is the profit function, 𝛿  is the time 
invariant depreciation rate. The evolution procedure of capital stock 𝐾𝑡 does not 
incorporate the ‘time to build’ assumption and assumes that the fixed investment 
𝐼𝑡 becomes productive immediately (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995). Also, 𝐵𝑡−1 is the 
long-term debt, 𝑟𝑡−1 is the interest rate equal to the risk-free interest rate, 𝐸𝑡  is the 










The 𝑗-period discount factor for 𝑗 ≥ 1, and 𝛽𝑡
𝑡 = 1. Following Whited (1992), let 𝜆𝑡 be 
the Lagrange multiplier for the non-negativity constraint on dividends (2.4). This 
multiplier can be interpreted as the shadow cost of external financing. Combining the first-
order condition for the end of period 𝐾𝑡 in equation (2.1) with the envelope condition and 
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This expression indicates that the marginal profits generated by investing today plus the 
marginal profits of capital should be equal to the discounted marginal profits generated by 
investing tomorrow. If the former term is smaller than the latter term, then the firm will 
prefer to invest tomorrow rather than today, and vice versa. In the Q model, the marginal q 
covers the expectation of future profitability in each subsequent period. In the Euler 
equation, however, this integral governance is split into the optimal inter-temporal 
investment decisions determined by the one-step ahead forecast of discounted marginal 
product of investment.  
 
The first-order condition for debt equals: 
 
 
1 + 𝜆𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 [(1 + 𝜆𝑡+1) (1 + 𝜂𝑡 +
𝜕𝜂𝑡
𝜕𝐵𝑡
𝐵𝑡)]    (2.7) 
 
which indicates that the marginal cost of external funds determines the relationship 
between 𝜆𝑡 and 𝜆𝑡+1. If 𝐷𝑡 > 0, sufficient internal funds are available for investment and a 
part of rest earnings can be used to pay positive dividends. In this situation, the Lagrange 
multiplier 𝜆𝑡 should be zero as the shadow value of internal funds is negligible. 
 
To obtain the empirical regression model of investment from equation (2.6), several 
assumptions have to be imposed. First, Bond and Meghir (1994) define the net revenue 
function as:  
 
 𝛱𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡𝐹(𝐾𝑡, 𝐿𝑡) − 𝑝𝑡𝐺(𝐼𝑡, 𝐾𝑡) − 𝑝𝑡
𝐼𝐼𝑡 (2.8) 
 
where 𝐹(𝐾𝑡, 𝐿𝑡) is a constant returns to scale production function, 𝑝𝑡 is the price of output, 
𝑝𝑡
𝐼 is the price of investment goods, 𝐺(𝐼𝑡, 𝐾𝑡) is the standard convex adjustment cost 













Second, to allow for imperfect competition, we assume that 𝑝𝑡 is the function of output 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝐹𝑡 − 𝐺𝑡  which is homogeneous in both 𝐾𝑡  and 𝐿𝑡  and donate the constant price 
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elasticity of demand > 1 . Given these assumptions, setting 𝜆𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡+1 , the empirical 







































𝐽𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡+1 
(2.10) 
 
where  𝜃𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝜌𝑡+1) (1 − 𝛿⁄ ), 𝜌𝑡+1 = (1 +  𝑟𝑡+1)(𝑝𝑡 𝑝𝑡+1⁄ ) − 1  is the real discount 
rate, GP = ptYt − wtLt is the gross profit which can be replaced by the cash flow variable, 
Jit = (pt
I/pt)(1 − pt+1
I (1 − 𝛿)/(1 + 𝑟𝑡)pt
I)  is the user cost of capital which can be 
captured by including time and firm specific effects, the output 𝑌𝑡 can be replaced by real 
sales,23 𝛾 = 1 − (1⁄ ) > 0 and 𝑢𝑡+1 reflects forecast errors. Using firm-level panel dataset, 






























+𝑓𝑖 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝑑𝑗 + 𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡. 
(2.11) 
 
The theoretical model behind equation (2.11) implies that the coefficient 𝛽4 should be 
negative, under the assumption that the firm can raise as much finance as it desires at an 
endurable cost. If this assumption is incorrect then the cash flow term may reflect liquidity 
constraints and 𝛽4 should be positive. To further control the investment opportunities as 
well as making the interpretation to the ICFS more robust, we also include the industry 
factor 𝑑𝑗  interacted with year dummy 𝑇𝑡 to capture the shifts or expectations of investment 
demand (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002).24 Therefore, in the presence of market frictions, 
the larger the positive value of 𝛽4 is, the higher the degree of financing constraints faced by 
firms should be.  
 
                                                          
23 Under perfect competition, the elasticity of demand goes to infinity and the output term is eliminated from 
the Euler investment regression model. In contrast, when the competition is imperfect, the coefficient on this 
term is positive as 1 < < ∞.  
24 Firms are allocated to one of the following nine industrial sectors: Metals and metal goods; Other minerals 
and mineral products; Chemicals and man-made fibres; Mechanical engineering; Electrical and instrument 
engineering; Motor vehicles and parts, and other transport equipment; Food, drink and tobacco; Textiles, 
clothing, leather and footwear; Others (Blundell et al., 1992).  
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Although tests in using Euler equation for financial market imperfections have many 
benefits, they also have several drawbacks. The theoretical model rests on several 
simplifying assumptions, e.g. smooth differentiable production function and adjustment 
technologies, capital homogeneity, within period delivery lags, and perfect capital market 
(Whited, 1992). The violation to any of these assumptions may result in rejection to the 
model. Nevertheless, we are only interested in the overall excessive sensitivity of 
investment to financial variables here. Therefore, instead of doing structural estimation to 
the parameters contained in framework (2.6), we choose to directly estimate the 
coefficients comprised by those parameters in a linearized regression (2.10). Although this 
can help us to mitigate the problem caused by the fragility of Euler equation to some extent, 
it on the other hand generates new misspecification problems in the estimation. Intuitively, 
the violation to those theoretical settings can be repacked as the inappropriate measurement 
of investment opportunities in the empirical regression. This is the major reason for us to 
further include industry dummies, year fixed effects and the interaction term between them 
in equation (2.11). We expect that such treatment can at least reduce the mismeasurement 
problem which may cause spurious positive relation between investment and cash flow 
variable. Furthermore, the Euler equation estimates tend to have poor small-sample 
properties in a time series context (Fuhrer et al., 1993; West and Wilcox, 1993 and Oliner 
et al., 1993). In our specification, however, we mainly relay on the cross-sectional 
variation rather than the within firm variation. Besides, Euler equation merely imposes 
inter-temporal restriction obtained from the first order conditions. It may fail to detect 
capital market imperfections for agents whose overall level of investment is limited by 
capital market frictions, but who are more constrained today than they expected to be 
tomorrow (Zelds, 1989; Attanasio, 1994 and Bond et al., 2003). We indirectly address such 
problem by doing sample classification analyses. For instance, private firms are believed to 
be overall more financially constrained that state firms. Lastly, the most counter-intuitive 
implication from linearized Euler equation of investment (2.10) is the negative relation 
from internal funds to investment expenditures. Although Euler equation of investment is 
more likely to hold when the firms are in the regime without liquidity constraints (Bond 
and Meghir, 1994), it should at most present a statistically insignificant coefficient on cash 
flow variable, according to the implication from the standard pecking order theory, rather 
than a negative one. Unfortunately, it is difficult for us to directly solve this theoretical 
limitation here. Instead, we choose to do a robustness test in section 2.6.4 of this chapter by 
estimating another sort of investment regression, i.e. accelerator model. If the results are 
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consistent with our major inference, then this artificial negative sign of cash flow variable 
should not impose strong effects on our application of Euler equation of investment. 
 
2.4.2 Regional developments and financing constraints 
To test the effects of institutional and financial development on firm-level financing 
constraint, we follow Laeven (2003) and use cash flow variable to interact with the index 
𝐷 which measures the level of development in the equation (2.11). Basic Inference: If 
higher level of institutions and financial development can lower financing constraints for 
the investment of firms, then coefficient 𝛽5 should be negative and statistically significant. 
The intuition is that the dependence of investment on internal funds will be reduced given 



































∗ 𝐷 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐷 + 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝑑𝑗 + 𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡. 
(2.12) 
 
Following Love (2003), we normalize the province-level marketization index over our 
sample period with mean zero and standard deviation one. In equation (2.12),  𝑫 is 
redefined as 𝑫𝑷 , a time-invariant indicator of province-level institutions and financial 
development. The implicit assumption is that the level of institutions and the level of 
financial development are relatively constant. Although this is a strict assumption, the 
setting itself should be reasonable. First, our estimation period contains only six years data 
from 2002 to 2007.25 The benefits from reforms may require a few more years for firms to 
capture, as they need a certain level of financial infrastructure to be reached. Second, the 
dataset used for estimation is very unbalanced with a large proportion of entry and exit. 
Both newly established firms and firms near bankruptcy are likely to be seriously 
financially constrained. If a province at one year presents a large number of new firms, for 
example, then the actual effects of development on firm-level financing constraints can be 
weakened or even be twisted in the estimation. Besides, many overwhelming changes to 
the Chinese institutions and financial markets, such as the stock market establishment in 
                                                          
25 To keep our final dataset as representative as possible, we maintain the firms with 4 years consecutive 
observations. After sacrificing two years observations as instruments, the actual time length used in 
estimation is just two years for these firms. Comparing the time effects of development on these firms should 
not be as meaningful as comparing the cross-sectional effects. 
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1990s, as well as the restructuring of the economy, such as the reform and opening up in 
1987, were already in operation for many years before 2002. This indicates that the 
disparities of the regional developments among different provinces should be relatively 
stable over our short sample period. Lastly, due to the regional policy shock or 
measurement errors, indices in some provinces vary strangely between two adjacent years, 
i.e. either change dramatically or are unchanged. These outliers may seriously affect the 
stability of our regression coefficients. Therefore, we prefer to put more weight on the 
cross-province variations of institutions and financial development rather than on their 
time variations.26 
 
2.4.3 Ownership structure and political affiliation 
Analysing the differential effects of institutional and financial development on firms 
with different characteristics should help us understand the working mechanisms behind 
the reduction effects of those developments on firm-level financing constraints. For 
example, we can firstly classify firms into different groups in which firms should face 
different costs of external funds. The group of firms having relatively high costs of 
external financing should present higher ICFS. In this chapter, we focus on firms’ 
government connection. The intuition is straightforward. If developments in institutions 
and financial markets can separate political intervention from business sectors and create a 
more active as well as a competitive financing environment for all firms, then we shall see 
that the initially more financially constrained firms present more significant reduction in 
ICFS since they are likely to benefit more from developments. The main working 
hypotheses and corresponding justifications are presented below. 
 
First, we use ownership structures as proxy for firms’ government connections. The 
NBS data contains a continuous measure of ownership, which is based on the fraction of 
paid-in-capital contributed by six different types of investors, namely: the state; foreign 
investors; investors from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan; legal entities; individuals; and 
collective investors. Following Guariglia et al. (2011) and Ding et al. (2013), we group all 
non-domestic investors into a single category labelled ‘foreign’; and all firms owned by 
legal entities, and individuals into a single category labelled ‘private’. We then classified 
our firms into ‘state owned’, ‘foreign’, ‘private’, and ‘collective’,27 based on the majority 
                                                          
26 The time variant property of marketization has been considered in our robustness test. 
27 Collective firm is usually controlled by local governments. 
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average shares of paid-in-capital contributed by our four types of investors in each year 
(Ayyagari et al., 2010).  
 
As what have been discussed in section 4.2 of this chapter, the intrinsic feature of 
marketization reflects that either the development of financial market or the evolution of 
institutional and legal systems in China is in fact aiming at diminishing the dominant role 
previously played by state-owned and government related sectors. In terms of financing 
constraints, the overwhelming political intervention results in the well-known ‘political 
pecking order effect’, which is usually regarded as an important cause of the serious 
discrimination against privately owned enterprises in the domestic capital market since 
governments prefer to channel a large amount of credit into those inefficient firms that 
have mutual benefits with governments. Nevertheless, in the regions with higher level of 
marketization, state-owned firms are required to demonstrate behaviour that is more 
market-oriented. For instance, further separation between government and business should 
reduce both direct subsidises from government and easy credits from state-owned banks, 
which in turn constrains the budget of state-owned firms and forces them to use resources 
more efficiently. 
 
In terms of the non-state sector, however, institutional and financial development should 
be able to loosen their tight budget constraints by offering better external financing 
conditions. First, geographical or sectoral presence of state firms aggravates financing 
constraints for Chinese private firms (Poncet et al., 2010). Regional marketization can 
significantly reduce the amount as well as the intensity of state owned capital in the local 
economy. Second, the higher level of financial openness stimulates the development of 
non-bank financing channels, e.g. private equity and venture capital. Better legal protection 
for investors can also encourage creditors to sign long-term contracts with private 
borrowers. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that the institutional and financial 
development measured by the marketization index can reduce the level of external 
financing constraints for those non-state owned firms, especially for private firms.28  
 
Hypothesis I: If institutional and financial development can reduce external credit 
constraints for non-state owned firms but increase the financing constraints for state 
                                                          
28 This is the main reason for us to firstly use ownership structure to classify firms and to do sample 
separation tests for the effect of institutional and financial development on financing constraints. When we 
estimate the model (2.12) using the full sample, the interaction coefficient becomes statistically insignificant, 
simply because the state and non-state firms tend to have very different characteristics in financial activities. 
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owned firms, in the sample separation tests by ownerships we shall see that coefficient 
𝛽5 in model (2.12) is negative for private and foreign firms but positive for state and 
collective firms. 
 
The other variable used in this chapter measuring firms’ government connection is 
political affiliation (Lishu). This is a proxy for the involvement of governments at different 
levels in firms’ operations; government functions include offering credit guarantees and 
political protection in return for ‘administrative fees’ (Huang, 2003).29 We classify firms 
into two groups: the firms with and without political affiliations. Differently from 
ownership structures, we are unwilling to treat political affiliation as a fixed and time 
invariant factor. Instead, we prefer to classify firm-year observations into those that are 













































∗ (1 − 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡) ∗ 𝐷𝑃 + 𝐷𝑃 + 𝑇𝑡+𝑑𝑗 + 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡.   (2.13) 
 
In model (2.13), we define 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 as a dummy variable 𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡  equal to one if firm 
𝑖 is affiliated with government at year 𝑡30. Similarly, the firm-year observations without 
political affiliations are defined as (1 − 𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡). In our case, 𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡 is time variant, since some 
politically affiliated firms became unaffiliated during our sample period.31 This is mainly 
because that the decentralization is continuously weakening the dependence of Chinese 
economy on its political sector.  
 
                                                          
29  Actually, the Chinese firms are affiliated with different levels of government, e.g. central, regional, 
prefecture and town levels. More specifically, government control of firms through Lishu affects the naming 
of firms, regulating their structures, reviewing their feasibility studies and business plans, approving their 
licenses, determining the amount of taxes and fees they should pay, approving major projects, issuing bank 
loans, and monitoring bank transactions (Li, 2004). 
30 We have classified firms with political affiliations into high and medium levels. Nevertheless, neither the 
ICFS nor the reduction effects from financing constraints are different between these two groups. Therefore, 
to keep our regression model as simple as possible, we merely classify firms into the groups with and without 
political affiliations. 
31 If we use Lishu as the main classification criterion and do the sample separation test, then a large number 
of firm-year observations will be dropped. Details are provided in Appendix A. 
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There are several other reasons for us to treat political affiliation as the complementary 
classification criterion to that of ownership. Firstly, in our dataset, many private firms 
actually were previously state-owned but were privatized during the economic reform and 
finally controlled by private investors. Therefore, it is very difficult for us to say that this 
sort of private firm does not benefit from the inherited political relationship built when 
they were still directly controlled by governments. Political affiliation can help us to 
mitigate this potential issue as almost all privatized state firms still keep the affiliated 
relationship with governments to some extent. Furthermore, we can also take advantage of 
the feature of political affiliation to directly test whether or not the increasing efficiency of 
resource allocation can reduce the ‘political discrimination’ on those private firms without 
government connections. Li et al. (2008) find that political relationship can help private 
firms in China to get access to bank loans. Nevertheless, Wu et al. (2010) emphasize that, 
unlike state-owned firms, private enterprises with government connections are usually less 
likely to suffer from policy burdens, as it is difficult for government to intervene in their 
operations directly. Correspondingly, governments will not support those connected 
private firms as strongly as they do state-owned firms, since they cannot obtain enough 
benefits from being supportive if they are not allowed to intervene in the operation of these 
connected private firms. Therefore, although the private firms with government connection 
can enjoy flexible budget constraints to some extent, they are still financially constrained 
but at lower degree than the private firms without such connection. Intuitively, if the 
private firms with and without connections are both financially constrained and are 
sensitive to the changes of outside economic and financial conditions, then both of them 
should be able to benefit from institutional and financial developments.  
 
Hypothesis II: Assuming institutional and financial development can reduce financing 
constraints for both private firms with and without political affiliations, we expect that 
both coefficients 𝛽6 and 𝛽7 in model (2.13) are negative and statistically significant.  
 
In terms of marginal effects, however, the private firms without connection should 
benefit more from reginal development than the privates firm with connection. Specifically, 
if the level of marketization can effectively measure the degree of government intervention 
in local business sectors, then the advantages of political connection should be lower in the 
regions with higher level of marketization. Meanwhile, a private firm without connection 
should have better financing condition if it is located in a region with a better level of 
development. In other words, for connected private firms, their external financing 
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situations are affected by developments from two opposite directions, i.e. reduction of 
government support and improvement of the financing environment. For non-connected 
private firms, however, the effects should stay on the positive side brought by regional 
development in institution and finance.  
 
Hypothesis III: If the private firms without political affiliations can benefit more from 




) should be larger than (
|𝛽6|
𝛽4
) . 32 
 
Lastly, in our dataset, almost all state and collective firms have political affiliations, so 
it is not meaningful for us to compare the behaviours of state or collective firms with and 
without political affiliations. In contrast, the main body of our dataset is constituted by 
private firms who are much more market-oriented than state and collective firms. 
Considering the corresponding sample size, only half of them have political affiliations. 
Therefore, the estimated differences between the financing behaviours of the private firms 
with and without political affiliations should not only be statistically more significant but 
also economically interpretable.  
 
In Appendix A, we list the definition of variables and plot the relationship between 
averaged province-level investment rates and the marketization index for four different 
ownership types. Obviously, private, foreign and collective firms located in the provinces 
with better institutions and financial environment tend to present higher investment rates. 
However, the investment behaviours of state-owned firms may not be sensitive to the 
outside market conditions. Similar phenomenon can also be detected in the cross-province 
correlations of the province averages of other firm-level variables reported in Table 2.2.  
                                                          
32 Using the framework (2.13) as example, the magnitude of the coefficients for the interaction term should 
be related with the magnitude of the coefficient for each individual term in the regression model. In our case, 
the absolute value of coefficient on the interaction term of cash flow variable with development index should 
also be larger if the coefficient of cash flow variable itself is larger. If two groups of firms are all financially 
constrained but with different degrees, then the coefficients on cash flow variable for these two types of firms 
should also be different. In this situation, we cannot simply compare the absolute values of the coefficients 
on two interaction terms and conclude that one group of firms benefit more or less from regional 
developments. Instead, we compare the relative importance of the reduction effects brought by reforms on 
financing constraints for firms facing different levels of financial obstacles. Using model (2.13) as example, 
we can construct the following hypothesis: 







which is the equality between two ratios of the coefficients for the interaction terms to the coefficients for 
cash flow variable. If we can reject this null hypothesis, then we can conclude that one group of firms benefit 





Table 2.2: Cross-province correlations of firm level variables (Province Means) 
State Firms Private Firms 
 D IK CFK  D IK CFK 
IK 0.072   IK 0.65***   
CFK 0.76*** 0.39**  CFK 0.67*** 0.43***  
SRK 0.88*** 0.04 0.81* SRK 0.85*** 0.51*** 0.82*** 
        
Collective Firms Foreign Firms 
 D IK CFK  D IK CFK 
IK 0.31   IK 0.62***   
CFK 0.59*** 0.45**  CFK 0.43** 0.20  
SRK 0.77*** 0.07 0.70*** SRK 0.76*** 0.54*** 0.57*** 
Correlations of province-level means of the firm level variables and province’s institutional and financial 
development (Marketization index).  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
2.4.4 Firm size effects 
Kumar et al. (1999) argue that the estimated financial development effect could be 
attributed to differences in firm size rather than financial development, since regions with a 
higher level of financial development may also have more large firms who are less likely 
to be financially constrained and may display a lower level of investment cash flow 
sensitivity. Therefore, we also use the firm-level variable size, defined as the logarithm of 
the firms’ total assets, to re-classify firms. Following Guariglia (2008), we consider a 
firm’s size relative to the situation of other firms in the industry in which that firm operates 
in each year. In other words, we allow firms to shift among different size categories. If the 
firms have the sizes in year t in the highest 25 percentile of the distribution of the sizes of 
all the firms in that particular industry and year, then these firms are defined as large firm-
years (𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡  = 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 1).
33 Similarly, we define medium-sized firm-years (1 −
𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 1) within an industry as those firms of a size in year t falling below the 75 
percentile of the distribution. The main reason for us not to define small firms is that the 
NBS dataset only records firms with total assets above 5 million RMB (approximately 8 
hundred thousand dollars). The real small and micro firms in the economy are discarded by 
this dataset. Therefore, merely grouping the firms in our dataset into large and medium 
sized categories can help us provide more representative policy implications according to 
the estimation results. If the estimated institutional and financial development effect is not 
driven from size effect, then both coefficients  𝛽6 and  𝛽7  in equation (2.13) should be 
negative and statistically significant. 
                                                          




2.4.5 Differential effects from institutions and financial development 
In all the above analyses and hypotheses, we simply group institutions and financial 
development together and use the marketization index to proxy with their overall effects. 
Naturally, it is interesting for us to see whether institutions or financial development are 
more important in determining the efficiency of resource allocation in China’s capital 
market. As mentioned in section 4.2 of this chapter, the marketization index is constructed 
by using five different indicators. For instance, the factor market sub-index closely 
measures the development of the financial market. The legal framework and commodity 
market sub-indexes are associated with legal and business environments. We can replace 
𝐷𝑃 term in regression (2.12) with all these province-level sub-indices and test the 
corresponding effects on firm-level financing constraints. Although relatively extensive 
discussions about the differential effects of developments in institutions and finance on 
efficiency of resource allocation have been provided in sections 2.2 and 2.3 in this chapter, 
it is still difficult for us to make plausible hypotheses about which is more important in the 
Chinese economy. Previous Chinese studies also have not clearly answered this question. 
Therefore, we prefer to draw our conclusion after obtaining the empirical results. 
 
2.4.6 Estimation Methodology 
Equation (11) is the dynamic panel data model with lagged dependent variable at the 
right hand side of the regression. These features create two main issues, heterogeneity and 
endogeneity, leading to biased OLS estimation results. In this chapter, we prefer to use the 
first-differenced GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). 34  This 
technique can solve the heterogeneity problem. More specifically, there are three possible 
sources for the presence of heterogeneity in our case. First, we assume that each firm has 
its own time invariant individual effect. Second, the possible province-level fixed effects 
may determine the coefficient of the interaction term of cash flow variable with 
marketization index. Lastly, firms located in different provinces may have different 
abilities to capture the benefits from development in institutions and finance. All these 
                                                          
34 There are two reasons for us not to use system GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998). First, Dang et al. (2015) 
found that system GMM could be more useful only when regressions do not have unobserved heterogeneity, 
endogeneity, and autocorrelation. In corporate finance, however, these conditions are rather restrictive and 
unlikely to be met. Second, our dataset contains almost 100,000 firms. The Monte Carlo evidence of Blundell 
et al. (2000) show that, when using system GMM on a large panel data to estimate a production function, the 
Sargan test tends to over-reject the null hypothesis of instrument validity.  
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factors are difficult to measure accurately and are even difficult to interpret reasonably. 
Therefore, we believe that first-differencing the model (2.12) can help us bypass all these 
issues. Besides, some other sources for the existence of the endogeneity problem, such as 
simultaneity and measurement errors, can be controlled by using the model variables 
lagged two or more periods as instruments.  
 
The Hansen test (J-test) and the test for the second-order serial correlation of the 
residuals in the first differenced equation (AR(2)) are used to evaluate the specification of 
our model. If the model is correctly specified, the instruments used to identify parameters 
should be uncorrelated with the error term in equation (2.12). This is the null hypothesis 
behind the J test. The J statistic is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with degrees 
of freedom equal to the number of instruments less the number of parameters. The m2 test 
is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal under the null of no second-order serial 
correlation of the differenced residuals, and further checks the specification of the model as 




2.5.1 Baseline model 
Table 2.3 contains the results from regression model (2.11) based on the Euler equation 
approach (2.10). We have provided OLS, fixed effects and first-differenced GMM 
estimators. The theoretical model predicts that the coefficient for the lagged dependent 
variable is positive and close to one. This reflects the persistence of adjustment cost. 
However, in our case, for all three estimators, this coefficient is always negative and 
statistically significant. The main reason is that around 40% of the firm-year observations 
in our dataset disinvest. We treat this as one of the important features of the Chinese 
unlisted firms during the sample period, so we are unwilling to delete these observations 
with negative investment rates (Ding and Guariglia, 2010).36 Suffering from endogeneity 
as well as unobservable heterogeneity issues, the OLS estimator of the coefficient for the 
                                                          
35 The only cost for using first differenced GMM in our case is that the level term of 𝐷𝑃 will be eliminated 
since we follow Love (2003) and use the time invariant cross-province index. However, we are not interested 
in the coefficient for 𝐷𝑃  itself, so this cost should be negligible. Details are provided in section 5.2. 
36 If we only use the firms with positive investment rates, the coefficients for the lagged IK are positive and 
statistically significant. However, the number of firms shrank dramatically after eliminating the firm-year 
observations with negative investment rates. 
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lagged dependent variable is likely to be upward biased while the fixed effects estimator of 
this coefficient tends to be lower biased. After solving these two problems, the coefficient 
for the lagged dependent variable generated by the first-differenced GMM estimator lies 
between the results from OLS and fixed effects, indicating that our preferred first-
differenced GMM estimator is valid (Bond et al., 2001).  
 





































R-Square 0.056 - - 
Rho  0.415*** - 
AR(2) - - 0.609 
J-test - - 0.199 
Observation 348861 348861 348861 
Firms - 94673 94673 
This table reports the results for equation (2.12). FD-GMM means first-
differenced GMM estimators. In column (3), all regression variables lagged 
twice and more are used as instruments. P-values of both AR(2) and Hansen 
tests are provided. Rho is fraction of variance due to the presence of fixed 
effects. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies are 
included in all specifications. To make the results more comparable, we use the 
same sample periods to run FD-GMM, OLS and FE estimators, since GMM 
estimator will discard two years data as instruments. Standard errors are 
provided in parentheses, * P<0.10 ** P<0.05 *** P<0.01. 
   
 
Besides this, the theory predicts that the coefficient for the square of lagged investment 
rate should be negative and statistically significant. However, this is the only case for the 
OLS estimator. Although this coefficient is indeed negative for the first-differenced GMM 
estimator, it is statistically insignificant. This is probably caused by the fact that we have 
grouped firms with all types of ownership to estimate the regression model. In our latter 
sample separation tests, this coefficient not only remains negative but also becomes 
statistically significant in most of the specifications. Furthermore, the positive and 
statistically significant coefficients for the sales term reflect the existence of imperfect 
competition in the Chinese product market. As we expected, the cash flow coefficients are 
positive and statistically significant for all three types of estimators. Referring to the results 
from the first-differenced GMM, the cash flow coefficient is 0.12 and the corresponding 
elasticity evaluated at sample medium values is 0.40. This indicates that financial 
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constraint is present in the Chinese capital market. Lastly, the p-value of over-
identification and AR(2) tests is 0.61 and 0.20, respectively. This means that our 
instruments are valid and there is no second order serial correlation in the error term.   
 
2.5.2 Sample separation tests by ownerships 
Table 2.4 represents the estimated results of regression model (2.12) for firms with 
different ownership types. In this specification, we have added an interaction term of cash 
flow with the standardized marketization index in the regression model, so the coefficient 
on cash flow variable itself should be interpreted as a measure of the dependence of 
investment on cash flow for the firms located in the provinces with average level of 
institutions and financial development, i.e. 𝐷𝑃 = 0. According to the results for private and 
foreign firms presented in columns (2) and (3) of table 2.4, the two coefficients on the 
interaction terms are both negative. However, the only statistically significant coefficient is 
for private firms. The specific interpretation is that the private firms in the provinces with 
average level of institutions and financial development, such as Anhui, Chongqing or 
Shandong (assume 𝐷𝑃 = 0), present an ICFS around 0.28 (0.28-0.15*0). For foreign and 
collective firms located in the same regions, the ICFS is 0.21 and 0.06, respectively. 
Additionally, the private firms in the provinces with lower level of institutions and 
financial development, such as Shanxi, Yunnan and Neimenggu (assume 𝐷𝑃 = −1 or one 
standard deviation below the mean), have an ICFS equal to 43% (0.28-0.15*(-1)). In 
contrast, for the private firms in the provinces with higher level of institutions and financial 
development, such as Shanghai, Guangdong, Zhejiang, the combined coefficient on the 
cash flow is very small, e.g. 0.28-0.15*1.7 = 0.03 and may be also statistically insignificant.  
 
For state firms, however, the coefficient on cash flow variable is small in magnitude and 
statistically insignificant. This indicates that the firms uncontrolled by governments, e.g. 
private and foreign firms, are more financially constrained than those controlled by 
governments, e.g. state and collective firms. In columns (1) and (4) of table 2.4, the 
coefficients for the interaction terms are likely to be positive but statistically insignificant 
for state and collective firms. This indicates that regional development in institutions and 
finance may increase the financing constraints for state and collective firms. Nevertheless, 
such a budget binding effect is unlikely to be important. Furthermore, in all columns, 
neither the over-identification test nor the m2 test for second-order autocorrelation of the 
differenced residuals is rejected, indicating correct specifications of the models and 
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validity of the chosen instruments. Overall, these results are partly consistent with our 
hypothesis I that institutional and financial development can reduce financing constraints 
for Chinese firms but this reduction effect is more significant for private firms.  
 
























































AR(2) 0.674 0.201 0.849 0.953 
J-test 0.426 0.174 0.470 0.739 
Observation 33787 204532 64383 30501 
Firms 8915 57641 15929 8365 
This table reports the results for equation (2.12). All regression variables lagged twice and more are used as 
instruments. Time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry dummies, are included in all 
specifications. P-values of both AR(2) and Hansen tests are provided. 𝐷𝑝 is the province-level average value 
of marketization index. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 𝐼𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 = Investment𝑖𝑡−1/Capital Stock𝑖𝑡−1; 𝑆𝑅𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 = Sales𝑖𝑡−1/Capital Stock𝑖𝑡−1 ; 𝐶𝐹𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 =
Cash flow𝑖𝑡−1/Capital Stock𝑖𝑡−1  
 
In terms of financing constraints analysis, our results are comparable with those of 
Hericourt and Ponect (2009), Poncet et al. (2010) and Ding et al. (2013) who find that state 
and collective firms are the least financially constrained as they can enjoy subsidies from 
governments and easier credit from banks, while private firms are often discriminated 
against by the official financing channels and appear to be most financially constrained. 
Besides, Guariglia et al. (2011) analyze the relationship between firm growth and internal 
funds and find that real activities of foreign firms should be affected by the availability of 
cash flow. Chen and Guariglia (2013) detect a high correlation between total productivity 
and cash flow for foreign firms as well. They emphasize that foreign firms operating in 
China often enjoy a more favorable environment, such as lower tax rates, but they still 
share many features with domestic private firms. The World Bank (2005) documents that 
                                                          
37  We have tried different combinations of instrument sets. For instance, to control the heterogeneous 
behaviours of firms caused by regional differences, Love (2003) used the lagged interactions of index with 
all regression variables as instruments. We have also created a dummy variable to classify firms into high 
and low development provinces and interacted this dummy with each variable to use as instruments. 
Nevertheless, none of them changes the results significantly. Therefore, we only use the lagged variables 




fully foreign owned firms operating in China have, in fact, limited access to domestic 
direct finance.  
 
Lastly, there is another way for us to obtain a similar conclusion that institutional and 
financial development can lower financing constraints. At the cross-province level, our 
dataset is very unbalanced with almost 45% firms located in the coastal area, especially in 
Jiangsu, Guangdong and Zhejiang. Therefore, the results obtained from regression (2.12) 
may be affected by this problem since provinces with more number of firms may impose 
higher weight on the coefficient for the interaction term. To further justify our main results, 
we have separately estimated regression (2.11) for the firms located in the provinces with a 
value of standardized marketization index above and below zero. Results are presented in 
Table 2.5. From columns (1) to (4), we can clearly see that the ICFS for state and 
collective firms located in provinces with low development is small and statistically 
insignificant, while it is positive and statistically significant for those firms located in 
relatively developed provinces. This confirms the rest of our hypothesis I that institutional 
and financial development can increase the financing constraints for government controlled 
firms. From columns (5) to (8), private and foreign firms in low development regions 
indeed present much a higher level of ICFS than firms in regions with better institutions 
and financial markets. In summary, these findings indicate that our main results from 
regression (2.12) do not seriously suffer from the uneven distribution of firms at province-
level and further approve the reasonability of our main hypothesis.  
 
2.5.3 Political affiliation 
Table 2.6 contains the results for the effects of political affiliations of private firms. In 
column (1), we firstly report the simplified version of regression model (2.13) without a 
marketization index interaction term. Private firms with and without political affiliations 
present ICFS at 0.10 and 0.21, respectively. According to the F-test results, the null 
hypothesis, that the firms with and without political affiliations present the same level of 
ICFS, can be rejected at 1% significant level. This indicates that the private firms affiliated 
with governments are likely to enjoy better protection and more privileges of access to 






Table 2.5: Region separation analysis (High and low developments) 























































































AR(2) 0.309 0.565 0.969 0.908 0.664 0.260 0.294 0.896 
J-test 0.253 0.236 0.582 0.216 0.520 0.263 0.322 0.499 
Obs. 19984 13803 11491 19010 53332 151200 4117 60266 
Firms 5432 3483 3261 5104 15726 41915 1064 14865 
This table reports the results for equation (2.11). HD (LD) means that firms located in the provinces with the value of 
standardized marketization index larger (smaller) than zero. All regression variables lagged twice and more are used as 
instruments. Time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry dummies, are included in all specifications 𝐼𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 =
Investment𝑖𝑡−1/Capital Stock𝑖𝑡−1 ; 𝑆𝑅𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 = Sales𝑖𝑡−1/Capital Stock𝑖𝑡−1 ; 𝐶𝐹𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 = Cash flow𝑖𝑡−1/Capital Stock𝑖𝑡−1 . P-
values of both AR(2) and Hansen tests are provided. Standard errors are reported in parentheses,*p<0.10,**p<0.05,***p<0.0 
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Nevertheless, we are unwilling to conclude that private firms can mitigate negative 
effects from financing constraints by proactively choosing to be affiliated with 
governments. Except for ownership and political affiliation, the NBS dataset also provides 
registration information for each firm. However, this register code may not be able to 
describe the government connections for firms accurately, since many firms have changed 
their ownership types during the process of economic reforms. In Appendix A, Table A.13 
presents the political affiliation status of private firms as an example. There are two very 
distinct features. First, firms registered as purely private firms account for more than 70% 
of all the firms labelled as ‘private’. Second, the private firms with political affiliations are 
mainly privatized state and collective firms and the firms with other kinds of liabilities. 
These firms may have had government connections at the beginning of construction. It is 
highly doubtful that political affiliation is still an active option for newly established purely 
private firms in China. In this chapter, therefore, we only regard political affiliation (Lishu) 
as a result caused by unaccomplished decentralization and expect that the corresponding 
effects on firm performance will diminish gradually with the process of marketization.  
 
In column (2) of Table 2.6, we present the results from regression model (2.13) for 
private firms. The coefficients for the triple interactive term, which examine the effects of 
institutional and financial development on the dependence of investment on cash flow for 
the firms with and without political affiliations, are all negative and statistically significant 
(Hypothesis II). In the provinces with average level of development, if the standardized 
marketization index increases by one standard deviation above the mean zero, then the 
ICFS for the local private firms with political affiliations will reduce by 47% from 0.17 to 
0.09. Similarly, the regional developments can reduce the ICFS for the private firms 
without political affiliations by almost 60% from 0.42 to 0.15. Besides, the results from the 
non-linear test of the null hypothesis, that the firms with and without political affiliation 
can benefit from regional development at the same level, can be rejected at 5% significant 
level. Since 60% is larger than 47% in magnitude, we conclude that private firms without 
political affiliations may benefit more from developments in institutions and finance. 
These results confirm our hypothesis III that market-oriented reforms should gradually 
reduce the political pecking order effects in China’s capital market. 38 Lastly, in columns (3) 
and (4), we again separate private firms into low and high development regions and re-
                                                          
38 For foreign firms, similar patterns of ICFS can be also detected but the difference of the changes of cash 
flow related coefficients between the firms with and without political affiliations is statistically insignificant. 
This may be caused by the unbalanced cross-province distribution of foreign firms in China, as almost 93% 
of foreign firms were constructed in the provinces with a value of marketization index above zero. Therefore, 
in the size and sub-index estimations, we only use private firms. 
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estimate regression model (2.13) without a marketization index interaction term. Obviously, 
the ICFS (for both private firms with and without political affiliations) declines from the 
low to the high development regions. 
 
Table 2.6: Political affiliation analysis 
 
































































(None)-Linear Test 0.000*** 0.021** 0.036** 0.001*** 
AR(2) 0.151 0.262 0.695 0.140 
J-test 0.162 0.112 0.625 0.317 
Observations 204532 204532 53332 151200 
Firms 57641 57641 15726 41915 
This table reports the results for equation (2.13). All regression variables lagged twice 
and more are used as instruments. Time dummies, and time dummies interacted with 
industry dummies, are included in all specifications. P-values of both AR(2) and Hansen 
tests are provided. 𝐼𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 = Investment𝑖𝑡−1/Capital Stock𝑖𝑡−1 ; 𝑆𝑅𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 =
Sales𝑖𝑡−1/Capital Stock𝑖𝑡−1 ; 𝐶𝐹𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 = Cash flow𝑖𝑡−1/Capital Stock𝑖𝑡−1 . HD (LD) 
means that firms located in provinces with the value of standardized marketization index 
larger (smaller) than zero. 𝐷𝑝 is the province-level averaged marketization index. 𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡is 
the time variant dummy variable to indicate that a firm is affiliated with government in 














⁄ . Standard errors are reported in parentheses, * p<0.10, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
2.5.4 Size Classification 
In column (1) of Table 2.7, replacing 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 with size dummies, we report the 
results for the simplified version of regression model (2.13) without marketization index 
interactive terms. For the firms with private ownership, large-sized firm-year observations 
present higher ICFS than medium-sized firm-year observations do. The null hypothesis, 
that size does not affect the dependence of firms’ investment on cash flow variable, can be 
rejected at 1%, indicating that larger firms in China are actually more financially 
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constrained than smaller firms. Nevertheless, this result is opposite to the conventional 
impression that small firms should be more financially constrained than large firms 
(Kashyap et al., 1993). This could be the result of a crowding out effect in external 
financing faced by large firms without government connections when the government 
provides privileged access to credit to large firms that have political backgrounds (Cull et 
al., 2015). Larger private firms are likely to be important for economic growth. Our 
findings warn of severe misallocation of credit in China. 
 
In column (2) of Table 2.7, the marketization index is interacted with size dummies and 
cash flow variable. The coefficient on this triple interaction term of private firms with 
medium size is negative and statistically significant but it is very small in magnitude and 
statistically insignificant for large-sized private firms. Given the result from the nonlinear 
test, the null hypothesis, that firms with different sizes can benefit from regional 
development at the same degree, can be rejected at 1% significant level. This indicates that 
institutional and financial development may merely reduce financing constraints for 
medium-sized firms but not for large-sized firms. These results are further confirmed by 
the results obtained from regional separation tests presented in columns (3) and (4). 
Previous literature on cross-country analysis usually finds that smaller firms can benefit 
more from development (Love, 2003 and Harrison et al., 2004).  
 
Nevertheless, these results have not directly answered the question of whether regional 
development can mitigate the crowding effects in external financing caused by political 
discrimination against large firms, since the coefficient on the triple interactive term for 
large-sized firms is statistically insignificant. One possible issue is that ownership structure 
itself may not be able to fully capture large-sized firms’ government connections. To 
address this issue, we firstly classify private firms into the regions with higher or lower 
level of development. Then, further classify firm-years according to the status of political 




                                                          
39 The results should be more convincing than comparing the firms with and without state ownership. The 
government controlled and uncontrolled firms tend to work under two different systems in China. 
Nevertheless, private firms themselves have choices to build relationship with governments or behaviour 
strictly according to market mechanisms. Loosely speaking, our tests aim at detecting whether or not the 
benefits from political connections are diminished with the marketization process in China. In other words, is 




Table 2.7: Size classification analysis 
































































(None)-Linear Test 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.050** 0.000*** 
AR(2) 0.189 0.211 0.618 0.172 
J-test 0.411 0.288 0.747 0.010** 
Observations 204532 204532 53332 151200 
Firms 57641 57641 15726 41915 
This table reports the results for equation (2.13). All regression variables lagged twice and 
more are used as instruments. Time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry 
dummies, are included in all specifications. P-values of both AR(2) and Hansen tests are 
provided. 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡  is a dummy variable equal to one if the log of the total assets of the firm 
above the 75 percentile of the log of the total assets in the corresponding industry i at the 
year t. Similarly, (1 − 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡)  are medium-sized firm-years lying below the 75 
percentile. Firms are allowed to shift among size categories. 𝐼𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 = Investment𝑖𝑡−1/
Capital Stock𝑖𝑡−1 ; 𝑆𝑅𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 = Sales𝑖𝑡−1/Capital Stock𝑖𝑡−1 ; 𝐶𝐹𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 = Cash flow𝑖𝑡−1/
Capital Stock𝑖𝑡−1 . 𝐷𝑝  is the province-level averaged marketization index. 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the 
time variant dummy variable to indicate that a firm is classified into the group with large 
size in that year. In columns (1), (3) and (4), P-values are provided for linear tests to the 
null hypothesis: 𝛽4 = 𝛽5. In column (2), P-value is provided for non-linear test to the null 
hypothesis: − 𝛽6 𝛽4⁄ = − 𝛽7 𝛽5⁄ . HD (LD) means that firms located in provinces with the 
value of standardized marketization index larger (smaller) than zero. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
The results are presented in Table 2.8. In the provinces with either lower or higher level 
of development, the large-sized firm-year observations affiliated with governments always 
presents lower ICFS than the large-sized firm-year observations without political 
affiliations. The difference between the two corresponding cash flow coefficients is 
statistically significant for the private firms located in the provinces with lower level of 
development, but becomes statistically insignificant for the private firms located in the 
provinces with relatively high level of development. This is mainly because the ICFS for 
the large-sized private firms without political affiliations has changed from 0.38 to 0.30, 
while the ICFS for the large-sized firms affiliated with governments almost remains the 
same. Therefore, although the large size of institutions and high level of financial 
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development may not be able to increase the financing constraints for the large private 
firms with political affiliations, they at least reduce the financing constraints for the large 
private firms without government connections. This indicates that the marketization 
process is creating a better business environment for the firms without political privileges. 
These results are partly consistent with the implication of our hypothesis III and suggest 
that institutional and financial development may eliminate the crowding out effects, mainly 
generated by political pecking order effects, in China’s capital market.40 
 
Table 2.8: Size and political affiliation analysis 
 









































H0: 𝛽4 = 𝛽5 0.031** 0.43 
H0: 𝛽6 = 𝛽7 0.504 0.33 
AR(2) 0.601 0.121 
J-test 0.200 0.091* 
Observations 53332 151200 
Firms 15726 41915 
This table reports the results for equation (2.13) without the 𝐷𝑝term. HD (LD) means that 
firms located in provinces with the value of normalized marketization index larger (smaller) 
than zero. All regression variables lagged twice and more are used as instruments. Time 
dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry dummies, are included in all 
specifications. P-values of both AR(2) and Hansen tests are provided. 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡  is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the log of the total assets of the firm above the 75 percentile of the log 
of the total assets in the corresponding industry i at the year t. Similarly, (1 − 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡) are 
medium-sized firm-years lie below the 75 percentile. Firms are allowed to shift among size 
categories. 𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡is the time variant dummy variable to indicate that a firm is affiliated with 
government in that year. 𝐼𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 = Investment𝑖𝑡−1/Capital Stock𝑖𝑡−1 ; 𝑆𝑅𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 =
Sales𝑖𝑡−1/Capital Stock𝑖𝑡−1;𝐶𝐹𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 = Cash flow𝑖𝑡−1/Capital Stock𝑖𝑡−1. In columns (1) and 
(2), P-values are provided for linear tests. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, * 




                                                          




2.5.5 Sub-categories of marketization index 
The marketization index is constructed by using five different sub-categories covering 
both institutional development and financial development. As the above results indicate 
that private firms may benefit most from developments, we use private firms as the target 
sample to re-estimate the regression model (2.12) for each sub-index. The results are 
presented in Table 2.9. In column (1), we use cash flow variable interacted with the sub-
index for financial market development. The corresponding coefficient for the interaction 
term is -0.054, which is statistically significant, indicating that one standard deviation of 
the level of financial market development above the mean zero can reduce the ICFS by 
15%. In columns (2) and (3), the sub-indexes of non-state enterprises sector growth and 
government-market relations are more related with developments in political institutions. 
The corresponding coefficients on the interactive terms are all negative and statistically 
significant, indicating that expansion of private sectors and reduction in government 
intervention can reduce the ICFS for private firms by 45% and 72%, respectively (at index 
= 1). In columns (4) and (5), the legal framework and commodity market developments are 
associated with the business protection. The former measures the status of legal protection 
to both the investors and consumers, while the latter mainly concentrates on the conditions 
of cross-province trade barriers caused by government protection of the local/ provincial 
economy. Legal development can only reduce the ICFS for private firms by 14% but the 
reduction of trade barriers can reduce by 71%.  
 
Furthermore, we incorporate the interaction terms of all sub-indexes with cash flow 
variable into the regression model and see which ones still retain their significances. The 
results are presented in column (6) of Table 2.9. Except for the coefficient on the 
government market relationship, all other statistically significant coefficients maintain the 
same signs as well as similar values in magnitudes with those of coefficients in columns (1) 
to (5). The insignificance of government market relationship coefficient is probably 
because its explanatory power has been absorbed by the sub-index measuring the 
development of the local non-state economy which mainly also reflects the diminishing of 
state capital in a region. From Table A.13 in Appendix A, we can see that provinces are 

















































































𝐶𝐹𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑝 
-0.054*** 
(0.021) 
   
 -0.046*** 
(0.013) 






















AR(2) 0.227 0.196 0.181 0.207 0.186 0.217 
J-test 0.099* 0.167 0.141 0.174 0.156 0.089* 
Observation 204532 204532 204532 204532 204532 204532 
Firms 57641 57641 57641 57641 57641 57641 
All regression variables lagged twice and more are used as instruments. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies are included in 
all specifications. P-values of both AR(2) and Hansen tests are provided. 𝐼𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 = Investment𝑖𝑡−1/Capital Stock𝑖𝑡−1 ; 𝑆𝑅𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 = Sales𝑖𝑡−1/
Capital Stock𝑖𝑡−1;𝐶𝐹𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 = Cash flow𝑖𝑡−1/Capital Stock𝑖𝑡−1. 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑝  is the measure to the developments of financial markets. 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑝  indicates 
the government market relationship. 𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑝  measures the legal environment for businesses. 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑝 indicates the market pricing and degree of local 
trade protection. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Overall, these results indicate that both market related developments (e.g. financial and 
legal sectors) and government related developments (e.g. reduction of intervention and 
diminishing of regional protection) should be able to reduce financing constraints for 
private firms by increasing the efficiency of resource allocation in China’s capital market. 
Nevertheless, the latter plays a much more important role than the former, indicating that 
the political pecking order effect is one of the main causes of credit misallocation in China. 
In addition, the functions of development of factor markets and the improvement of legal 
protection to private businesses are important but limited. Without the widening separation 
between government and business sectors, the benefits from financial reforms and 
liberalizations may be difficult for firms and agencies in the economy to fully capture. 
 
 
2.6 Robustness Check 
2.6.1 Sampling issue 
Since the sample used to do estimation is very unbalanced, the key results of the 
changing pattern of ICFS may be sample driven. Therefore, we re-estimate the regression 
model (2.11) for the firms located in each province or region. Although some coefficients 
are statistically insignificant due to small sample issue, both signs and magnitudes of those 
coefficients are very consistent with predictions. We collect all the cash flow coefficients 
and plot them along the province-level marketization index. According to Figure 2.1, there 
should be a negative relationship between development and the degree of financing 
constraint in China. It seems that this relationship has a nonlinear feature, which may be 
caused by the geographical segmentation. If we exclude those provinces presented at the 
right top angle of the Figure, then we shall be able to see a much more obvious linear 
pattern. Generally, the estimated causal relationship that institutional and financial 
development can reduce financing constraints for firms should be an intrinsic fact rather 









Figure 2.1: Investment cash flow sensitivity for private firms 
 
2.6.2 Industry clarification    
In China, firms distribute unevenly in different industries both across and within regions. 
Although we have included the interaction of industry dummies and time dummies into the 
regression model, there is still the possibility that our main results suffer from this uneven 
distribution issue, e.g. some industries heavily depend on external finance while others do 
not. Therefore, we classify the provinces and regions into seven groups according to 
different levels of development index. The first column of Table A.12 in Appendix A 
presents the average level of marketization index for each group. There is an obvious 
declining tendency. For each group, we have calculated the averaged proportions of all 
nine industries (in each row). We can detect that regions with higher level of development 
have more firms involved in the electrical and textile industries while less firms are 
involved in the mining industry. For other industries, the declining or increasing pattern is 
not obvious. Therefore, we exclude these three industries from the dataset and re-estimate 
the regression model (2.11) for private firms only. The results are reported in column (1) of 
Table 2.10. The coefficient on the interaction between cash flow and development index is 
still negative and statistically significant. This further proves that this sort of uneven 






































































AR(2) 0.198  0.380  0.404 
J-test 0.202  0.335  0.000*** 
Obs. 136215  58044  195538 
Firms 38759  9675  44072 
In column (1), firms in electrical, textile and mining sectors are excluded from the sample. 
In all columns, regression variables lagged twice and more are used as instruments. In 
column (2), 𝐷𝑝𝑡 is the time variant marketization index. ∆𝑆𝑖𝑡  is the change of real sales. 
Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies are included in all 
specifications. P-values of both AR(2) and Hansen tests are provided. 
 
 
2.6.3 Time variant index 
China is a big country with many provinces and regions. Our main results have only 
considered the cross-province variations of institutions and financial development. It is 
reasonable for us to ask whether or not the improvement of the business environment 
within a province can continuously increase the efficiency of resource allocation in the 
local capital market. Nevertheless, our original dataset contains very frequent entry and 
exit. If there are many newly constructed firms in a given year, then the reduction effects 
from regional development on the overall status of financing constraint in that year may be 
cancelled out by the fact that young and newly established firms are usually very 
financially constrained. This is similar for the outcome of a large number of exits. Besides, 
after applying a first-differenced GMM estimator, the time effects will be further 
diminished, as the estimated sample periods will be further reduced due to the use of 




Therefore, to bypass all these potential issues and to use the time variant marketization 
index, we have excluded all the firms without consecutive observations during the whole 
sample period from 2000-2007. The results for private firms are presented in column (2) of 
Table 2.10. The coefficients on the cash flow variable and the interaction term are 0.15 and 
-0.07, respectively, indicating that one standard deviation above the sample average of 
marketization index across province-years implies a 47% decline in ICFS. The p-values of 
both Hansen and AR(2) test are larger than 10%. Therefore, our model should be correctly 
specified and the chosen instruments should be valid. Although the estimated sample size 
becomes relatively small, this result still has very strong policy implications. For instance, 
it is usually difficult for firms to change their locations from an undeveloped province to 
the developed province. Our results indicate that if the local authority can consistently 
increase the business environment in the province, then the local firms will also be able to 
benefit from the development.   
 
2.6.4 Model selection 
The theoretical prediction from the Euler equation to the coefficients for the lagged 
investment rate should be positive. However, in our case, it is negative. Possible reasons 
and statistical justifications have already been provided in section 5.1 of this chapter. The 
main reason for us to insist on using the linearized Euler equation model is that the 
presence of cash flow term is associated with a theoretical justification of financing 
constraints. In the robustness check, we change the baseline specification into the modified 
accelerator model and add the cash flow variable intuitively into the right hand side of the 
regression. The results for private firms are presented in column (3) of Table 2.10. As we 
expected, the interaction term of cash flow with marketization index is negative and 
statistically significantly. Although the Hansen test is rejected, the AR(2) test is passed. 
Therefore, our main results should not suffer from the model selection issue. This is also 
consistent with the statement from D’Espallier and Guariglia (2013) who argue that the 










Table 2.11: Cash flow separation analysis 




























































AR(2) 0.139 0.839 0.528 0.919 
J-test 0.741 0.320 0.792 0.882 
Obs. 108696 95836 38001 26382 
Firms 29952 27689 9141 6788 
High (Low) cash flow: dummy variable equals if the average value of a firm’s cash 
flow above (below) sample medium. Regression variables lagged twice and more are 
used as instruments. 𝐷𝑝  is the province-level averaged marketization index. Time 
dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies are included in all 
specifications. P-values of both AR(2) and Hansen tests are provided.  
 
2.6.5 Internal financial constraints 
According to the first column of Table 2.1, we can see that the province-level mean 
values of cash flow differ dramatically among provinces from 0.11 in Gansu to 0.35 in 
Henan. According to previous literature, such as KZ (1997), Cleary et al. (2007) and 
Guariglia (2008), the investment cash flow relationship may be nonlinear. In other words, 
the institutional and financial development effects detected in our results may simply be 
driven by the possible situation that firms within different provinces have different degrees 
of internal financial constraints. For instance, in our dataset, firms located in the provinces 
with higher level of institution and financial development also have higher value of cash 
flow, indicating that their lower investment cash flow sensitivity may simply be driven by 
the fact that they already have a large amount of internal funds and their real activities are 
not sensitive to the variations of cash flow. To see whether this is the case or not, we define 
the firms as internal (non-) financially constrained firms if they have average value of cash 
flow below (above) the sample average value of cash flow. Simply speaking, we have 
created two cross-province subsamples, one contains the firms with high level of cash flow 
and the other contains the firms with low level of cash flow. We re-estimate equation (11) 
for each subsample separately for private and foreign firms. Results are reported in Table 
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2.11. As we expected, investment of firms with low level of cash flow is much more 
sensitive to the variation of cash flow than that of firms with high level of cash flow. 
Meanwhile, three out of four coefficients on the interaction between cash flow and 
marketization index are negative and statistically significant. This indicates that the effects 
of institutional and financial development on financing constraints are not fully driven by 
the average financial status of firms in different provinces. 
 
2.6.6 Alternative arguments  
Our major hypothesis is that institutional and financial development can mitigate 
financing obstacles for private firms and hence reduce the sensitivity of their investments 
to cash flow variations. At the first glance, our results indeed support such inference. 
Nevertheless, it is still undeniable that there are several alternative arguments which can 
provide opposite predictions to the effects of regional development on the firm-level 
investment cash flow sensitivity. For instance, with more market-based environment, 
private firms shall be more confident on market and institutions, and therefore, they shall 
be more willing to invest their profits or cashes earned from business into the tangible 
assets with more irreversibility. This sort of ‘encourage’ argument suggests a positive 
effect, rather than a negative one, of institutional and financial development on firm-level 
investment cash flow sensitivity. It is difficult for us to provide direct evidence to check 
the rationality of this hypothesis but we can further discuss about the mechanism behind it.  
 
Intuitively, this hypothesis involves three points. First, given better business 
environment, (private) firms can earn more profits from the more opening market and have 
higher level of internal funds. Guariglia (2008) detects a U-shaped relationship between 
investment and cash flow if the sample is split on the basis of the level of internal funds 
available to the firms. If the development index merely captures the variation of cash flow 
variable across firms and provinces, then the significant coefficient for the interaction term 
between cash flow and development index may simply reflect the differential marginal 
effects of different levels of cash flow. More straightforward, it may have nothing to do 
with the reduction of external financing constraints. This issue is considered in section 
2.6.5 of this chapter. The results presented in Table 2.11 show that this inference is 




Second, there are roughly three regimes in the conventional pecking order theory of 
financing, i.e. only internal funds, internal funds plus external debt, and finally new equity 
issuances. The ‘encourage’ argument describes a situation in which private firms are on 
average unable to pursue the highest investment level which should be attainable given the 
availability of their internal funds. The market oriented reform can release such inhibited 
amount of investment incentives up to the level suggested by the increasing profits. 
However, why do our results show a negative impact from regional development on the 
investment cash flow sensitivity? The reasonable explanation could be that most of private 
firms in our sample lie between the first and second regimes described by the pecking 
order theory. Furthermore, it is unlikely that cash flow is the only resource for fixed capital 
investment of Chinese private firms. Meanwhile, the institutional and financial 
development is most likely to improve the external credit availability for those private 
firms and such external credit augmenting effect may dominate the ‘encourage’ effect.  
 
More intrinsically, this ‘encourage’ argument is somewhat against the key assumption, 
applied through the whole chapter, that investment cash flow sensitivity is a valid 
measurement to the degree of financing constraints faced by Chinese private firms. 
According to the ‘encourage’ logic, what has been mitigated is not financial constraints but 
the high uncertainty in a relatively centralized economy, e.g. government expropriation and 
policy shocks. Nevertheless, one missing segment in the argument is the role played by the 
measurement of investment opportunities. Empirically, if the investment opportunities can 
be correctly measured and the capital market is perfect, then the coefficients for financial 
variables should not be statistically insignificant. This indicates that the suppression of 
investment incentives, which is associated with uncertainty, should be reflected by the 
reduction in the casual connection from investment opportunity measurement to actual 
investment expenditures rather than the variation in investment cash flow sensitivity. In 
other words, a positive effect, suggested by the ‘encourage’ argument, from institutional 
and financial development on cash flow coefficient may simply indicate that our 
measurement of investment opportunities is problematic. The reason is simple. Higher 
level of profitability may indicate higher investment opportunities of firms, which can 
result in an endogenous issue.  
 
The above discussion again leads us to the fundamental question aroused by empirical 
testing of financial constraint effect. Can we sufficiently capture firms’ investment 
opportunities? Is investment cash flow sensitivity a meaningful measurement to degree of 
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financial constraint for Chinese unlisted manufacturing firms? The answer should be 
positive. We use the Euler equation to address the problem of non-applicable of Tobin’s Q. 
We incorporate the industry, year dummies and their interaction term into the regression 
model to further capture the fluctuation of aggregated demand. Besides, if people still 
believe that firms in different provinces/regions can have very different investment 
opportunities/incentives and such difference cannot be eliminated by first-differencing the 
investment regression, then we probably must move outside a single regression framework. 
In the robustness test, section 2.6.1, we estimate the investment model by using the data of 
firms in each province separately and plot all the cash flow coefficients in one graph along 
with the Marketization index. A negative relation still exits. If we incorrectly measure 
investment opportunities, then it is unlikely that we made the mistakes for all firms in all 
provinces. Lastly, D’Espallier and Guariglia (2012) find that the investment opportunities 
bias does not affect the variation of investment cash flow sensitivity for small and medium 
firms. Cull et al. (2015) uses Chinese firms’ CEO survey data and finds that the sensitivity 
of investment to internal cash flows is higher for the unlisted firms that report greater 
obstacles to obtaining external funds. Therefore, although it is problematic under certain 
circumstances, investment cash flow sensitivity should still be a valid measurement of 
degree of financing constraints for Chinese unlisted manufacturing firms.  
 
Another plausible argument is that more profits may attract more institutional 
corruption which can reduce confidence of private firm on long term commitment for 
business via investment. A private firm in a province with better development should have 
higher chance to earn more profits and hence be more reluctant to invest. This ‘discourage’ 
argument can be regarded as an alternative hypothesis relative to the ‘encourage’ argument, 
which predicts a negative effect from development on investment cash flow sensitivity. 
Nevertheless, this ‘discourage’ argument ignores one important point. First, the formatting 
procedure of the development index itself has already incorporated the government 
intervention/corruption factor. In Table A.14 in Appendix A of this chapter, we can see 
that a province with relatively good product and financial markets is unlikely to also have a 
very bad political sector full of government intervention or serious corruption issue. This is 
the main reason that we so frequently use the phrase ‘institutional and financial 
development’. In section 2.3.2, we have explicitly discussed about the motivation for us to 
concentrate on the overall index rather than any other single sub-index. Therefore, this 




Lastly, it is reasonable for us to believe that the institutions in China is not worsening 
during our sample period as time goes by. If investment cash flow sensitivity is indeed a 
valid measurement of the degree of financing constraints, then we shall see that cash flow 
coefficient decreases over time when we run regression (2.11) year by year. The results are 
reported in the Appendix A. In Table A.15, A.16, A.17 and A.18, the cross year OLS 
estimators for private, state, collective and foreign firms are presented respectively. For 
private firms, the results in Table A.15 show a slight declining tendency of cash flow 
coefficient from 0.10 in year 2001 to 0.08 in 2005. However, it increases again after 2005. 
For state firms, there is no clear moving tendency. More embarrassingly, the investment 
cash flow sensitivities of state firms are always larger than that of private firms, which 
probably means that state firms are more financially constrained than private firms. For 
collective and foreign firms, no specific patterns of cash flow coefficients across years are 
detected. According to the discussion in section 2.4.6 of this chapter, OLS estimator can 
produce very biased results due to its inability to capture time invariant unobservable 
individual effects. The large cross-sectional variation of variables in our sample can make 
OLS results very unreliable. Therefore, we further report the fixed effects estimator for 
private, state, collective and foreign firms respectively in Table A.19, A.20, A.21 and 
A.221. The minimum number of observations required by fixed effects estimator is two 
years, so we estimate the regression (2.11) by rolling the estimation period starting with 
2001-2002 and then 2002-2003 for example. Although there is no necessary to be 
monotonic, this time, the cash flow coefficient for private firms presents a more obvious 
declining tendency from 0.08 in sub-period 2001-2002 to 0.02 in sub-period 2006-2007. 
For state firms, the cash flow coefficient become small in magnitude and statistically 
insignificant in all sub-periods, though it presents a slightly increasing tendency. For 
collective firms, the cash flow coefficients also become statistically insignificant in all sub-
periods except for sub-period 2002-2003 and there is no clear tendency. For foreign firms, 
the cash flow coefficient declines from 0.04 in sub-period 2002-2003 to 0.01 in sub-period 
2005-2006. Overall, the fixed effects results are largely consistent with the implication 
from across province analyses in Table 2.5. Therefore, these rough results may indirectly 
show that the ‘discourage’ argument is unlikely to be valid here. 
 
 
                                                          
1 We have attempted to use LSDV and Bias-corrected estimators. However, the number of firms is too large 
in our case, given the current hardware of computer, Stata 13 is always stuck in some point during the 
estimation. The Bias-corrected estimator usually requires the averaged sample period not less than 10 years. 
When we only use 3 three years rollover, the final Bias-corrected estimators become very unstable. Therefore, 




Can market-oriented reforms and developments reduce the inefficiency of credit 
allocation in China’s capital market? To answer this question, we analyse the effects from 
institutional and financial development on firm-level financing constraints in China. We 
combine a panel of over 95,000 Chinese manufacturing firms of different ownership types 
over the period 2000-2007 with the Index of Marketization for China’s Provinces (NERI) 
during the same time period to investigate whether or not and how cross-regional 
differences in institutions and financial development can affect the dependence of firms’ 
investment on internal funds (Fazzari et al., 1988). Our main results and the corresponding 
policy implications are presented below.  
 
Institutional and financial development in China can reduce financing constraints 
significantly for private firms and partly for foreign firms, while strengthening the 
financing constraints for state and collective firms. Furthermore, our results indicate that 
market-oriented reforms and developments in China can promote the investment of firms 
without government connections more than that of firms with political backgrounds, 
through the channel of external financing. More specifically, previous literature supports 
the view that there is a crowding out effect in external financing faced by the large firms 
without government connections in China (Cull et al., 2015). Using domestic private firms 
as an example, we firstly confirm this general result and then further discover that 
institutional and financial development can help medium-sized firms, but not for large-
sized firms, to mitigate financing constraints. Nevertheless, after controlling the degree of 
government connections for those large-sized private firms, we find that regional 
marketization can reduce financial obstacles for the large-sized private firms without 
political connections but not for those large-sized firms affiliated with central or local 
governments. In other words, the crowding out effect in external financing, mainly 
generated by the political pecking order effects, should be gradually eliminated with the 
process of marketization in China.  
 
Additionally, we have separately tested the effects from institutions and financial 
development on the status of financing constraint for the Chinese private firms. Overall, 
our results indicate that both market related developments and reduction of government 
intervention in the local economy can lead to decline in the degree of financing constraints 
faced by private firms. Nevertheless, the former plays a much less important role than the 
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latter. This means that without deepened separation between government and business 
sectors, the benefits from financial reforms and liberalizations may be difficult for firms 
and agencies in the economy to fully capture. 
 
Our empirical results suggest that market-oriented reforms can increase the efficiency of 
resources allocation in China’s capital market. First, this indicates that authorities in China 
have already begun to shift policies from target-related measures (such as tax favourable to 
small private firms) towards policies levelling the playing field between firms with and 
without political privileges, i.e. creating a better business environment with fair 
competition. Second, previous literature in institution, finance and growth usually holds 
negative attitudes towards the poor financial and legal systems in China. Most previous 
studies actually overemphasize the insufficiency, however they overlook the accumulated 
positive effects presented in the process of gradual reforms. Our paper has filled this gap 
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Appendix A  
 
Definitions of the variables used 
 
Fixed capital stock: book value of tangible fixed assets (which include land and building; 
fixtures and fittings; plant and vehicles).  
 
Fixed investment: difference between the book value of tangible fixed assets at end of year 
t and at end of year t-1 adding depreciation at year t. 
 
Cash flow: net income plus depreciation. 
 










Table A.12: Industry proportions in groups (combined regions) with different levels of development 
 
We have separated all provinces and regions into 7 groups. Level is the averaged marktization index for this group. Firstly, 
we ordered the provinces based on the value of marketization index from largest to smallest. Specifically, we start with the 
province Guangdong which has the value of index at 1.63. We stop at the region Shanghai where has the value of index at 
1.59, since the province right after Shanghai is Jiangsu where has the value of index at 1.16. There is a relatively large 
difference between 1.59 and 1.16. We treat it as a gap. Therefore, provinces and regions, Guangdong, Shanghai, Zhejiang are 
treated as the first group. The second group starts at province Jiangsu, so on. For each row, there are proportions of different 
industries within each group. The sum of the proportions in each row is 100%. We have labeled the industries into the above 
nine categories. This does not mean that we have only considered these nine industries. These nine industries are just the 














Table A.13: Registration code and Political affiliations 
 
 
Register: registration information 
NPA: number of firms without political affiliation 
PA: number of firms with political affiliation 
PA%(R): percentage of PA to (PA+NPA) 
 
Chinese private firms can be classified into three groups: 
1. Firms privatized from State and collective firms. 
Registration code: 110, 120, 151 
 
2. Firms registered as pure private firms. 
Registration code: 171, 172, 173, 174 
 
3. Firms registered as other kinds of liabilities. 


























Guangdong 1.96 1.43 1.46 1.02 1.73 1.29 
Zhejiang 1.94 1.40 1.69 1.02 1.60 1.20 
Shanghai 1.92 1.92 0.85 1.01 2.66 0.23 
Jiangsu 1.40 0.96 1.28 1.23 0.91 0.75 
Fujian 1.31 1.18 1.18 0.77 0.34 1.26 
Tianjin 0.97 1.43 0.58 0.13 1.03 0.12 
Beijing 0.93 1.53 0.53 0.59 1.09 -0.66 
Shandong 0.69 0.35 0.93 0.39 0.17 0.77 
Liaoning 0.53 0.65 0.37 -0.03 0.27 0.65 
Chongqing 0.36 0.90 0.24 0.48 -0.38 0.24 
Sichuan 0.07 -0.30 0.17 0.53 -0.17 0.31 
Anhui -0.03 -0.50 0.17 0.71 -0.35 0.20 
Hebei -0.05 -0.51 0.17 0.27 -0.24 0.25 
Hubei -0.16 -0.13 -0.25 -0.02 -0.25 0.21 
Hainan -0.24 -0.19 -0.01 0.12 -0.37 -0.56 
Henan -0.27 -0.46 0.20 -0.02 -0.38 -0.29 
Hunan -0.28 -0.06 -0.07 -0.12 -0.56 0.01 
Jiangxi -0.30 -0.47 -0.32 -0.03 -0.51 0.61 
Jilin -0.44 -0.96 -0.33 -0.53 -0.21 0.58 
Guangxi -0.45 -0.75 -0.24 0.64 -0.51 -0.52 
Neimenggu -0.67 -0.86 -0.39 -1.08 -0.32 0.09 
Heilongjiang -0.68 -1.04 -0.74 -0.51 -0.04 0.15 
Yunnan -0.76 -0.29 -0.80 -0.03 -0.61 -0.74 
Shanxi -0.76 -0.67 -0.65 -0.90 -0.35 -0.29 
Shaanxi -1.01 -0.55 -1.04 -0.45 -0.64 -0.99 
Xinjiang -1.04 -0.83 -0.93 -1.33 -0.27 -0.72 
Ningxia -1.07 -0.66 -0.41 -1.14 -0.77 -1.43 
Gansu -1.08 -0.72 -1.52 -0.55 -0.93 -0.32 
Huizhou -1.14 -0.86 -1.16 -0.63 -0.85 -0.41 















Table A.15: Private Firms (OLS-Cross Year) 











































































R-square 0.068 0.067 0.068 0.061 0.072 0.064 0.056 
Obs. 16562 23482 34689 40360 52196 49489 45406 
Industry and Province effects are controlled in all specifications. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
Table A.16: State Firms (OLS-Cross Year) 











































































R-square 0.050 0.047 0.040 0.046 0.053 0.061 0.063 
Obs. 6315 7364 8100 6429 5801 4943 3759 
Industry and Province effects are controlled in all specifications. 













Table A.17: Collective Firms (OLS-Cross Year) 











































































R-square 0.072 0.069 0.056 0.061 0.085 0.090 0.071 
Obs. 5067 6196 7144 5712 5672 4911 4167 
Industry and Province effects are controlled in all specifications. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
Table A.18: Foreign Firms (OLS-Cross Year) 











































































R-square 0.042 0.053 0.056 0.059 0.056 0.050 0.049 
Obs. 6407 8918 11188 12525 14681 13903 12690 
Industry and Province effects are controlled in all specifications. 


























































































R-square 0.351 0.332 0.306 0.442 0.345 0.367 
Obs. 40035 58165 75049 92556 101685 94895 
Year dummies and the interaction between year and industry dummies are controlled  
in all specifications. Standard errors are reported in parentheses,  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 












































































R-square 0.312 0.279 0.309 0.387 0.333 0.308 
Obs. 13672 15460 14529 12230 10744 8702 
Year dummies and the interaction between year and industry dummies are controlled  
in all specifications. Standard errors are reported in parentheses,  























































































R-square 0.332 0.336 0.281 0.476 0.362 0.380 
Obs. 11261 13339 12856 11384 10583 9078 
Year dummies and the interaction between year and industry dummies are controlled  
in all specifications. Standard errors are reported in parentheses,  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 












































































R-square 0.356 0.321 0.325 0.429 0.341 0.327 
Obs. 15325 20106 23713 27206 28584 26593 
Year dummies and the interaction between year and industry dummies are controlled  
in all specifications. Standard errors are reported in parentheses,  











Table A.23: Multicollinearity test for specification in Table 2.4 
Panel A 
Variables VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R-Squared 
𝐼𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 1.34 1.16 0.743 0.256 
𝐼𝐾𝑖𝑡−1
2  1.34 1.16 0.745 0.254 
𝑆𝑅𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 1.30 1.14 0.771 0.229 
𝐶𝐹𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 2.01 1.42 0.497 0.503 
𝐶𝐹𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝑝 1.80 1.34 0.554 0.445 
Mean VIF 1.56    
     
Panel B 
Dimension Eigenvalue Cond Index 
1 3.0496 1.0000 
2 1.3967 1.4776 
3 0.6708 2.1322 
4 0.4318 2.6576 
5 0.2405 3.5607 
6 0.2105 3.8062 
Condition Number 3.8062  
 
 
Table A.24: Multicollinearity test for specification in Column (2) of Table 2.6 
Panel A 
Variables VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R-Squared 
𝐼𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 1.35 1.16 0.743 0.256 
𝐼𝐾𝑖𝑡−1
2  1.34 1.16 0.745 0.254 
𝑆𝑅𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 1.30 1.14 0.769 0.230 
𝐶𝐹𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡 1.70 1.30 0.587 0.412 
𝐶𝐹𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ (1 − 𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡) 2.63 1.62 0.380 0.619 
𝐶𝐹𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑝 1.50 1.22 0.667 0.333 
𝐶𝐹𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ (1 − 𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡) ∗ 𝐷𝑝 2.41 1.55 0.416 0.584 
Mean VIF 1.75    
     
Panel B 
Dimension Eigenvalue Cond Index 
1 2.9928 1.0000 
2 1.6478 1.3477 
3 1.3962 1.4641 
4 0.7714 1.9697 
5 0.4507 2.5768 
6 0.3239 3.0398 
7 0.2344 3.5734 
8 0.1829 4.0456 







Table A.25: Multicollinearity test for specification in Column (2) of Table 2.7 (Private firms) 
Panel A 
Variables VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R-Squared 
𝐼𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 1.35 1.16 0.742 0.258 
𝐼𝐾𝑖𝑡−1
2  1.34 1.16 0.745 0.255 
𝑆𝑅𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 1.35 1.16 0.743 0.257 
𝐶𝐹𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ (1 − 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡) 2.19 1.48 0.4576 0.5424 
𝐶𝐹𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ (1 − 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡) ∗ 𝐷𝑝 1.89 1.37 0.5295 0.4705 
𝐶𝐹𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 2.47 1.57 0.4050 0.5950 
𝐶𝐹𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑝 2.42 1.55 0.4138 0.5862 
Mean VIF 1.86    
     
Panel B 
Dimension Eigenvalue Cond Index 
1 3.0498 1.0000 
2 1.8016 1.3011 
3 1.3830 1.4850 
4 0.6694 2.1344 
5 0.4282 2.6687 
6 0.2517 3.4811 
7 0.2093 3.8173 
8 0.2070 3.8387 


















Further sample description: 
In this Chapter, we mainly rely on the dataset drawn from the annual accounting reports 
filed by industrial firms with the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) over the period 2000-
2007. There are at least three advantages for us to use this unique dataset. First, this NBS 
dataset is very representative to actual situation of Chinese non-financial firms. Almost 
100,000 unlisted firms operate in the manufacturing and mining sectors and come from 30 
provinces or province-equivalent municipal cities. Second, heterogeneity in behaviours 
among different types of firms can be intensively investigated, since this micro-dataset 
elaborately contains the cross-sectional variation of variables. Lastly, it includes a large 
proportion of medium and young firms which are particularly likely to suffer from 
constraints in external financing.  
 











2000 36697 6315 16562 5067 6407 
2001 48894 7364 23482 6196 8918 
2002 64403 8100 34689 7144 11188 
2003 77175 8544 44108 7733 13194 
2004 85448 6801 53894 6345 15260 
2005 81301 5801 52196 5672 14681 
2006 75892 4943 49489 4911 13903 
2007 68397 3759 45406 4167 12690 
We classify the firms into ‘state owned’, ‘foreign’, ‘private’, and 
‘collective’42, based on the majority average shares of paid-in-capital 
contributed by our four types of investors in each year. 
 
 





4 31385 33% 
5 16870 18% 
6 15915 17% 
7 11197 12% 
8 19306 20% 
The number 4 in first columns 




                                                          




Table A.28: Industry distributions (by observations) 







Metal and Metal products 44,376 2,707 28209 4,813 6893 
Non-metal products 53,452 5,868 33969 6,678 4444 
Chemical and Plastic 89,105 6,898 54,414 7,664 15999 
Machinery and Equipment 61,175 6,764 39,877 5,151 7114 
Electrical equipment 65,961 3,934 3,5500 4,036 19828 
Transport equipment 25590 3,254 14,948 2,311 3702 
Food and Tobacco 23270 3,798 12,352 1,415 4407 
Textile 80696 2,922 49,085 5,222 20184 
Leather and Timber 51154 5,871 28,476 4,529 10224 
Mining and Logging 43392 9,600 22,977 5,413 3446 
 
 





































































































































































Observations 538207 51627 319826 47235 96241 
Total assets and sales are expressed in RMB million. Leverage is defined as total 
liabilities divided by total assets. No information about financial debt is available. All 
variables are deflated back to year 2000 by using CPI index. The sample average 











Chapter 3                           
Ownership structures and Leverage 












In 2014, China has one of the highest corporate debt-to-GDP ratios in the world, even 
compared to major developed economies such as the United States (Huang and Bosler, 
2014). Many studies argue that government support has driven the increase in China’s 
corporate indebtedness and has channelled a large amount of credits into inefficient state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). 43  Therefore, it is worrisome that the asymmetric credit 
expansion may further push the leverage of these firms into levels far beyond a sustainable 
boundary. Furthermore, weak legal protections for investors result in severe expropriation 
behaviours of controlling shareholders towards minority shareholders in China’s stock 
market. The spread of such agency costs may substantially increase the premium required 
by external creditors in the whole economy, which in turn impedes firms to quickly 
optimize their capital structures through large securities issuances. In this chapter, 
therefore, using the Chinese listed firms (CLFs) dataset, we explore the exact role played 
by state ownership and controlling shareholders in determining firms’ dynamic capital 
structure decisions. 
 
The classical trade-off theory of capital structure suggests that a value maximizing firm 
should borrow towards an optimal point which is defined by balancing the bankruptcy 
costs of debt and the tax advantages of debt (Myers, 1984). Given market imperfections, 
however, firms cannot always stay at their optimal leverage levels. Instead, they take 
positive steps to offset deviations from optimums. Empirically, the standard partial 
adjustment model has been widely applied to estimate the speed of leverage adjustment by 
using the US firms dataset. Nevertheless, the unexpectedly low adjustment speed, ranging 
from 7% (Fama and French, 2002) to 36% (Flannery and Rangan, 2006) per year, has 
aroused researchers’ attention to the existence of possible large leverage adjustment costs 
which can result in a longer refinancing cycle and hence a slower adjustment speed (e.g., 
Fischer et al., 1989; Leary and Roberts, 2005; Strebulaev, 2007). Therefore, western 
literature usually anticipate that firms with lower costs of adjustment tend to adjust their 
leverage ratios towards optimal levels faster. 
 
In this chapter, we argue that the costs of leverage adjustment are likely to vary across 
firms with different ownership types. More specifically, opposite to the prediction in the 
dynamic trade-off theory, the relatively low costs of adjustment brought by the preferential 
                                                          
43 See, e.g. Standard Chartered (2014); Zhang et al. (2015) 
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treatment in the banking sector as well as the debt market may not motivate SOEs to adjust 
their leverage ratios towards optimal levels more actively but instead reduce the 
importance of eliminating deviations from optimal leverage levels in their financing 
decisions. Additionally, SOEs may lower incentives to use interest expenses of debt to 
shield against corporate income tax (Chen, 2004). Therefore, SOEs should on average have 
lower leverage adjustment speed towards the optimal level than the firms with other 
ownership types, e.g. privately owned firms. 
 
Furthermore, we argue that managers’ incentives to adjust the firms’ capital structures 
can also be associated with the controlling power of the firms’ dominating shareholders. 
The monitoring benefits (expropriation risks) brought by a controlling shareholder should 
be positively (negatively) correlated with the amount of ownership stakes concentrated in 
his or her hands (La Porta et al., 1999 and Betrand et al., 2002). Perceiving the risks of 
being expropriated, poorly protected creditors may avoid lending to firms with complex 
ownership structures (La Porta et al., 1997; 2002). Consequently, a firm with complex 
ownership structures or lower ownership concentration should face higher costs of 
leverage adjustment and present lower converging speed towards its target ratios. In 
contrast, a firm with less complex ownership structure or higher ownership concentration 
is likely to be offered more flexible choices in terms of external debt financing as it may be 
considered a much safer borrower. Besides, if optimal leverage converging behaviour is a 
sort of value maximizing policy, then the large controlling shareholders who own a higher 
level of ownership stakes are more likely to adjust the firm’s leverage ratio from deviations 
towards optimal levels, thereby maximizing their own values.  
 
Additionally, we argue that the incentives of large shareholders are likely to vary 
between SOEs and non-SOEs, e.g. privately-owned enterprises (POEs). Generally 
speaking, the increasing level of ownership stakes should make the benefits (costs) of 
approaching optimal leverage levels become larger (lower) for the non-state controlling 
shareholder than for the state controlling shareholder. In other words, the positive 
connection between leverage adjustment speed and ownership concentration should be 
more significant in POEs than in SOEs. First, private shareholders have higher incentives 
to be involved in the firms’ value maximizing decisions than the state shareholders. 
Owning a higher level of cash rights, they should take the deviations from optimal leverage 
more seriously as the systematic deviations may dampen their own value. On the other 
hand, the benefits from expropriation of minority shareholders should also be higher for 
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private controllers than for state controllers, since the state is not literally a person who can 
directly or personally benefit from tunnelling (Jiang et al. 2010). If the private controllers 
having lower cash rights are believed to have stronger built-in incentives to perform 
expropriation, then they should face higher costs of being excessively levered as well as 
higher costs of increasing leverage through large borrowing, and hence encounter more 
difficulty in adjusting their leverage ratios. 
 
In regression analysis, we estimate a one-stage reduced dynamic leverage model 
(Flannery and Rangan, 2006). The prominent part of our empirical work is that we apply 
five different advanced estimators in order to solve the endogeneity, unobservable 
heterogeneity, instrument manipulation and fractional dependent variable issues in the 
dynamic panel data model, using financial variables. Therefore, our estimated range of 
adjustment speed (25% - 30% per year) for CLFs should be very reliable. Generally, our 
results indicate that the trade-off theory has reasonable explanatory power for the leverage 
changes of CLFs. In terms of the ownership effects, we use the sample separation tests to 
discover the variations of the overall adjustment speed across the groups of firms with 
different ownership types as well as different concentration levels. Our results show that 
SOEs present lower overall adjustment speed of leverage than POEs. Also, the firms with 
higher level of ownership concentration present higher leverage adjustment speed towards 
optimal leverage. This positive relation is stronger in POEs than in SOEs. Our major 
hypotheses are still valid in robustness check. 
 
Our research contributes to previous literature in several aspects. First, previous studies 
using Chinese listed firms dataset have tested whether or not state ownership can affect 
firms’ leverage choices but have obtained very mixed results (e.g. Chen, 2004; Huang and 
Song, 2006; Liu et al., 2011). The major limitation of these studies is that they merely 
concentrate on the leverage level. In China’s capital market, it is common sense that the 
costs of capital can vary dramatically across firms with different ownership types. Given 
low costs of debt, for example, it is natural for SOEs to use more debts and maintain a 
relatively high level of leverage ratio. This indicates that the observed higher or lower 
value of leverage for a Chinese firm with a certain type of ownership, e.g. a SOE, at 
normal times, may itself convey limited information about the actual efficiency of the 
firm’s financial decisions. Based on this implication, we choose to focus on the firms’ 
leverage adjustment behaviours rather than on their static leverage in levels. The intuition 
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is simple. A more efficient and value maximizing firm should be more active in 
eliminating deviations from its optimal leverage. 
 
Second, we explore the effects of ownership concentration on a firm’s capital structure 
decisions. More specifically, studying firms in the US and UK with quite diffused 
ownership structures, traditional literature focus on the effects of manager-shareholder 
conflicts on firms’ financing behaviours (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Grossman and 
Hart, 1980; Jensen, 1986). In many other developed and developing economies, however, 
ownership is commonly concentrated in hands of a few large shareholders, e.g. Western 
Europe (La porta et al., 1999 and Faccio and Lang, 2002) and East Asian (Claessens et al., 
2000). Before our research, it was still unclear whether or not the presence of such 
concentrated ownership structure for the firms in the developing economy can result in 
some particular capital structure decisions different from those of the US firms.  
 
Lastly, we reconcile the debate about whether or not CLFs should maintain the 
ownership structure with blockholders. The expropriation behaviours from controlling 
shareholders to minority shareholders are found to be very severe in China’s stock market. 
Nevertheless, it is still difficult for scholars to conclude that large shareholders are harmful 
to the performances of CLFs. Based on the opinion of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), large shareholders can monitor managers’ behaviours in an 
economy that has weak legal protection for investors. This affords a possible value 
enhancing role for those large shareholders in CLFs, since the poor legal institutions in 
China are almost universally recognized. Some previous literature has attempted to answer 
this question by analysing the relationship between large shareholders and firm 
performances. Nevertheless, different measurements of ‘performances’ can lead to 
opposite results. To bypass this issue, we choose to directly analyse the impact of the 
largest shareholder on a firm’s value maximizing behaviour, i.e. optimal leverage targeting 
behaviours. The results show that the presence of the largest shareholders may be able to 
enhance the value of both SOEs and POEs, but their influence should be larger for POEs. 
 
The structure of this paper follows: Section 2 is the literature review. Section 3 
describes the Chinese background. Section 4 develops our working hypotheses. Section 5 
explains the standard partial adjustment model, our empirical designs and the 
corresponding estimation methods. Section 6 provides data descriptions and some stylized 
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facts. Section 7 reports the regression results. Section 8 conducts robustness tests. Section 
9 concludes our main findings. 
 
3.2 Literature review 
3.2.1 Trade-off theory and leverage adjustment 
In the conventional static trade-off theory of capital structure, the costs of debt include 
financial distress (Scott, 1976); personal taxes (Miller, 1977); debt overhang (Myers, 1977) 
and agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), while the benefits of debt primarily 
include tax savings (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973) and forcing mangers to operate 
efficiently (Jensen, 1986). Choosing the optimal leverage ratio by balancing these costs 
and benefits of debt can enhance the value of firms, (Frank and Goyal, 2007). Due to costs 
of adjustment, however, firms cannot always stay at their optimal leverage levels.44 Instead, 
they take positive steps to offset deviations from optima. To estimate the converging speed 
of leverage for an average firm, the mainstream literature applies the standard partial 
adjustment model using the deviations from optimal leverage levels to explain the 
variations of actual leverage ratios (Fama and French, 2002 and Flannery and Rangan, 
2006). Nevertheless, using the US firm-level dataset, the estimated speed of adjustment is 
unexpectedly low, ranging from 7% to 36% per year (Chang and Dasgupta, 2009).  
 
One important explanation is that adjustment costs may have a much larger impact on 
firms’ dynamic capital structure decisions than the seminal theory expected. For examples, 
Fischer et al. (1989) argue that even small recapitalization costs can lead to wide swings in 
a firm’s debt ratio over time. Leary and Roberts (2005) find that adjustment costs can 
substantially reduce the probability of active rebalancing towards optima after large equity 
and debt shocks. Strebulaev (2007) proves that firms only adjust their capital structures at 
refinancing points and, the larger the adjustment costs are, the longer the refinancing 
cycles should be.45 Byoun (2008) notices that over-levered firms with financial surplus and 
under-levered firms with financial deficits tend to adjust their leverage ratios towards 
optimal levels more quickly, since the adverse selection/ transaction costs are higher for 
                                                          
44 In the static trade-off theory, costs of adjustment are not a first-order concern. Nevertheless, in reality, 
firms are usually forced into long excursions away from their optimal ratios (Myers, 1984). One highly 
possible explanation to the observed wide variation in actual debt ratios is the existence of large adjustment 
costs. The standard partial adjustment model is intuitively supported by the effects from adjustment costs. 
45 That is to say, if the firm faces very large adjustment costs, its manager will wait a longer time before 
adjustment until the benefits of movement can finally offset the costs of movement. 
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equity than they are for debt. Byoun also indicates that the low overall adjustment speed 
obtained by previous studies may be the outcome of ignoring asymmetric adjustment 
behaviours caused by the variations of adjustment costs when firms are being over and 
under-levered. 
 
3.2.2 The role of ownership structures 
3.2.2.1 Manager-shareholder conflicts 
Ownership structures are characterized by degrees of conflicts among different 
stakeholders. Studying firms in the US and the UK with quite diffused ownership 
structures, traditional literature concentrates on manager-shareholder conflicts, since 
managers usually have considerable discretion and are likely to pursue their own interests 
rather than the interests of owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and Grossman and Hart, 
1980). Jensen (1986) shows that corporate debt can be an internal mechanism restraining 
the empire building incentives of managers, since bonding interest payments can prevent 
managers from wasting free cash flow on unprofitable projects or organizational 
inefficiencies. Friend and Lang (1988) suggest that self-entrenched managers have 
incentives to lower their own non-diversifiable risks46 by decreasing the firms’ debt levels 
which therefore cannot be increased without the non-managerial principal shareholder’s 
participation.47 These results indicate that large shareholders can increase firms’ operating 
efficiency by raising leverage ratios. If such benefits of debt can offset the costs of losing 
advantageous investment choices, then there will be an optimal capital structure 
maximizing value of shareholders (Stulz, 1990).  
 
In terms of leverage adjustment, Morellec et al. (2012) develop a dynamic model to 
show that increasing manager-shareholder conflicts can widen the rebalancing range of 
leverage ratios and hence reduce adjustment speed of leverage. Their calibration results 
show that the cost of debt to managers is three times the cost of debt to shareholders, with 
more than half of this cost coming from the disciplining effect of debt. Although the 
manager-shareholder conflict may not necessarily increase refinancing/ adjustment costs, it 
instead lowers managers’ target leverage levels and reduces their incentives to adjust. In 
their empirical part, Morellec et al. use the index measuring quality of corporate 
                                                          
46  Amihud and Lev (1981) show that corporate managers have undiversified human capital investment 
specific to the firms. 
47 This intuition has been further confirmed by Morellec (2004). 
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governance to proxy severity of firm-level agency conflicts and find that the firms with 
weak corporate governance tend to adjust their leverage ratios slower. 
 
3.2.2.2 Controlling-minority shareholder conflicts 
In many other developed and developing economies, however, ownership is commonly 
concentrated in hands of a few large shareholders, e.g. Western Europe (La porta et al., 
1999 and Faccio and Lang, 2002) and East Asian (Claessens et al., 2000). The manager-
shareholder conflicts can be addressed by the presence of large shareholders who both 
have a general interest in profit/ value maximization and enough control over the assets of 
the firm to have their interest respected (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Nevertheless, if large 
shareholders own equity with superior voting rights or they control the firm through a 
pyramid structure, it is possible for them to expropriate other/ minority investors (see, e.g. 
Stulz, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Ellul, 2008). Especially in the countries with weak 
legal protection of creditors, a greater separation of cash flow rights from control rights can 
encourage controlling shareholder at the upside of the pyramid system to use excessive 
debts to expropriate resources from downside debt-holders (Faccio et al., 2010).48 In this 
situation, the controlled firms do not share any upside gains but have to endure all the 
default risks caused by over indebtedness. Perceiving such risks of expropriation, poorly 
protected creditors may avoid lending to firms with complex ownership structures (La 
Porta et al., 1997, 2002). Based on this statement, Lin et al., (2011) find that the cost of 
debt financing, measured by loan spreads, is significantly higher for the company with a 
largest ultimate owner having greater excess control rights. Therefore, such firms may be 
more reluctant to adjust their leverage ratios towards optimal levels due to higher costs of 
adjustment, including higher costs of entering debt markets and higher variant costs of 
borrowing.49 
 
In addition, literature in price information argue that concentrated ownership structure 
with large shareholders can increase information asymmetries in the stock market by 
reducing liquidity (Holmstrom and Tirol, 1993 and Bhide, 1993). Those large shareholders 
                                                          
48 Using data in G7 countries, Paligorova and Xu (2012) confirm that ultimate owners inflate debt in their 
affiliates for the purpose of expropriation. Unlike Faccio et al. (2010), they reject some other possible 
explanations for the existence of higher leverage in pyramids, such as disciplining mechanism, tax-reduction 
and risk-diversification. 
49 Although large creditors such as banks may have abilities of monitoring, the moral hazard activities by the 




are usually believed to be privately informed traders. Differences in the composition of 
information between public and private information increase the cost of capital since 
uninformed investors demand higher return to hold stocks with greater private information 
(Easley and Ohara, 2004). This is also associated with the adverse selection effect, 
described by Myers and Majluf (1984), on the costs of equity financing. Therefore, the 
firms with ownership structure dominated by blockholders may find it more difficult to 
reduce leverage ratio through large equity issuance. Based on this inference, Kasbi (2009) 
find that the firms in Western Europe countries with a single majority shareholder adjust at 
a slower rate. 
 
3.2.2.3 Capital structure decisions of Chinese listed firms 
Studies of capital structure for Chinese firms have been few until the last decade. Using 
CLFs dataset (1994 – 2000), Chen (2004) firstly finds that conventional firm-specific 
factors determining capital structure in developed economies are also relevant in China but 
present coefficients with ambiguous signs. Huang and Song (2006) extend the sample size 
to 1200 listed firms (1994 – 2003) and conclude that the trade-off theory dominates 
pecking order theory in explaining capital structures of Chinese firms. Taking advantage of 
the updated dataset (2002 – 2009) with more detailed corporate governance information, 
Liu et al. (2011) systematically test the effects from ownership structures on leverage 
decisions of CLFs. They find that state ownership is positively associated with leverage 
and political connections are important for non-state owned firms to obtain bank loans. 
Furthermore, the relation between the largest shareholding and leverage ratios is negative 
for SOEs and it becomes non-linear in non-state owned firms. Besides, they find that 
institutional development can reduce government intervention as well as diversify the 
financial resources for CLFs.50  
 
The leverage adjustment behaviour of CLFs has aroused scholars’ attention only in very 
recent years. For example, using a small dataset (1999 – 2004), Qian et al. (2009) firstly 
estimate a standard partial adjustment model and find an average adjustment speed equal to 
18% per year. Jiang et al. (2013) find that higher local bank competition in China can 
increase leverage adjustment speed of under-levered firms by improving their access to 
bank debt. This phenomenon should be more prominent for small and non-state owned 
                                                          
50 They adopt the marketization index for China’s provinces, complied by Fan et al. (2009), to measure the 
degree of institutional development. 
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firms. Guo et al. (2015) test the effects of China’s Split-share Structure Reform in 2005-
2006 on financing behaviours. They interpret the increasing leverage adjustment speeds of 
CLFs as the outcome of agency conflicts reduction after the reform.51 Jin and Kumbhakar 
(2015) apply a semi-nonparametric model to predict individual specific adjustment speed 
as a function of firm-level characteristics. 52  They find that the CLFs with higher 
managerial compensations are more likely to adjust leverage ratios faster towards optima. 
The firms with higher adjustment speed of leverage also tend to have better performance, 
but it is unclear whether or not there is a casual relationship.  
 
There are several limitations in the above mentioned studies on leverage adjustment 
using the CLFs dataset. First, the insufficient consideration of potential econometric issues 
in estimating the dynamic panel data model using financial variables can result in biased 
calculation of the leverage adjustment coefficient. Therefore, the implications from the 
results of these Chinese studies can be problematic. Second, there is no coincident result 
about the effects of state ownership on leverage adjustment behaviours. The most likely 
reason is that the previous literature uses inappropriate measurement of the presence of 
state ownership in CLFs. Lastly, to best of our knowledge, no study provides systematic 
analysis about the role played by large shareholders in determining firms’ dynamic capital 
structure decisions. We further discuss these issues in the following sections. 
 
 
3.3 Ownership structure of CLFs 
Contrasting with publicly listed firms in developed economies, CLFs are established 
and grow up in totally different legal, social and institutional environments. Therefore, it is 
necessary for us to firstly introduce the major characteristics of ownership structures of 
CLFs. 
 
3.3.1 Government intervention 
                                                          
51 Guo et al. (2015) indicate that Chinese listed firms have tended to use less debt to finance their financial 
deficits after the reform in 2007. Nevertheless, 2007-2008 was also the global financial crisis period when 
the concurrence of Chinese government’s financial stimulation and the credit tightening in the local capital 
market may have forced the external financing choices of listed firms to vary dramatically. 
52  Although there is no significant difference between the averaged values of constant speed and their 
parametrized speed, the kernel density of their estimator is substantially right allocated near 0.20 comparing 
with the position of the conventional estimator. 
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Privatization of state-owned sectors in the Chinese economy began in the late 1980s. 
The slogan adopted by the Communist Party to describe the proposed reforms was “Grasp 
the large, let go of the small”. Many unprofitable, inefficient small and medium sized 
SOEs were sold to non-state investors or directly went into bankruptcy while the major 
businesses of the very largest SOEs were partially privatized through share issue along 
with the establishment of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (1990) and the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (1991). Therefore, almost all of listed firms were former SOEs before 2000 (Sun 
and Tong, 2003). 
 
During this process, the shares of listed firms were classified into different categories, 
mainly state shares, legal person shares, and A-shares.53 To avoid loss of state assets, the 
Chinese government occupied all state shares and most legal person shares through its 
bureaucratic agencies and, by law, these shares were restricted from trading on the 
secondary market. In contrast, A-shares were widely traded and held by all other public 
and individual investors (minority shareholders). At the end of 2004, 64% of the total 
shares in the stock markets were non-tradable and almost 80% listed firms had 
governments, either central or local, as their ultimate controllers. 
 
3.3.2 Concentrated ownership 
Another distinct feature of CLFs is that they often have a single dominant shareholder 
whose ownership far exceeds that of the second largest shareholder. During 1999 – 2004, 
on average, the first largest shareholder owned shares exceeded those of the second largest 
shareholder by around 36% (Chen et al., 2009). The median percentages of shares held by 
the first largest shareholder and the first five largest shareholders are 36% and 49%, 
respectively. La Porta et al. (1999) use a 20% share ownership cutoff to identify the 
existence of controlling shareholders since they note that a controlling shareholder does not 
need to be a majority owner. Given this definition, most listed firms in China are likely to 
have controlling shareholders. 
 
Although there has been a growing tendency towards managerial ownership in recent 
years, at the end of 2012, the median value was still extremely low, i.e. 0.00% for SOEs 
                                                          
53 More specifically, there were: 1. State shares; 2. State owned legal person shares; 3. Promoter legal person 
shares (domestic); 4. Promoter legal person shares (foreigner); 5. Legal person shares raised; 6. Other non-
tradable shares; 7. A-shares (RMB common shares); 8. B-shares (domestically listed common shares quoted 




and 0.01% for Non-SOEs. This result is not unexpected, however, since managers of SOEs 
are usually government officials appointed by the state and managers of Non-SOEs often 
have a close relationship with founders. It is well known that large controlling shareholders 
in Chinese firms can easily fire the manager no matter how many shares the manager owns 
(Yang et al., 2011). In other words, differently from US firms, the manager-shareholder 
conflict should not be a prevalent issue in most of the CLFs nowadays (Pistor and Xu, 
2005). 
 
Nevertheless, a concentrated ownership plus the split-share structure resulted in very 
severe agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders in the Chinese stock 
markets. Although governments and legal persons were the large shareholders, they could 
not directly benefit from stock price appreciations since their shares were non-tradeable 
and were evaluated by book assets of firms. Therefore, those controlling shareholders had 
very limited incentives to pursue share value maximization but had high incentives to use 
their controlling power to practice expropriation at the expense of minority shareholders. 
During 1996 – 2006, tens of billions of RMB, around 5.4% of total market capitalization, 
were siphoned from hundreds of firms by controlling shareholders (Jiang et al., 2011). The 
weak internal and external corporate governances had further aggravated such problems 
(Jiang and Kim, 2015). 
 
Finally, on April of 2005, the central government initiated the split-share reform aiming 
to transfer all non-tradeable shares into tradeable shares and to increase market efficiency 
by reducing political intervention. The reform was implemented quickly. The median 
percentage of non-tradable shares in the markets was reduced dramatically from 58% in 
2005 to just 4.5% at the end of 2012. Many scholars believe that the split-share reform has 
mitigated the structural problems of CLFs and reduced the controlling-minority 
shareholder conflicts.54 Nevertheless, even at the end of 2012, the Chinese governments 
still maintained strong influence on the markets through controlling around 47% listed 
firms. Meanwhile, the ownership remains to be concentrated. After a drop in 2006, the 
median percentages of shares held by the first largest shareholder (35%) and the first five 




                                                          




3.4.1 Ownership type and leverage adjustment 
A group of studies in financial constraints describe a political pecking order theory, that 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have priority in obtaining bank credits while the firms with 
other types of ownership, especially privately owned enterprises (POEs), are strongly 
discriminated against by the official financing channels (Allen et al., 2005 and Cull et al., 
2009). The Chinese government has dual roles in corporate financing decisions of SOEs, 
as it is usually the largest shareholder of SOEs as well as the owner of state owned banks 
(Li et al., 2009). Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that the Chinese 
governments, especially at the local levels, can have the explicit channels of intervening 
the lending decisions of state owned banks. Over the past four decades, the banking sector 
in China has already been transferred from the passive ‘policy lending machine’ into the 
biggest financial institution with strong commercial motivations in the financial system (Si, 
2015 and Yao and Jiang, 2017). If banks maximize profits, they will tighten credit more 
vis-a-vis riskier borrowers, such as those with less collateral to pledge and higher 
monitoring costs (Broner et al., 2014). Comparing with non-state sectors, the remaining 
SOEs in the economy are much larger in size and tend to have preferential treatment from 
government policy. Besides, given the relatively weak institutional environment in China, 
the low transparency of non-state businesses can substantially increase the monitoring 
costs of banks to lend to POEs. If government ownership can serve as indicators of high 
creditworthiness or even government guarantees, then lending to SOEs will generate very 
low monitoring costs for state-owned banks. Moreover, Chinese corporate bond is issued 
overwhelmingly by the enterprises whose majority shareholder is an organ of the central or 
local government (Lin and Milhaupt, 2016). This indicates that SOEs often have more 
alternatives for debt financing than non-SOEs. Lastly, Fan et al. (2013) find that both listed 
and unlisted SOEs tend to recover much slower than POEs from financial distress and their 
debt bargaining power towards banks may make the threat of bankruptcy non-credible. All 
this evidence suggests that SOEs should still have considerably low pressure to eliminate 
excessive debt, i.e. lower costs of being over-levered, even if their budgets are indeed 
harder than the pre-reform periods. 
 
According to the above argument, SOEs should face both lower sunk costs of entering 
the debt market as well as lower variant costs of increasing the amount of borrowing. The 
low costs of adjustment to the debt part of leverage can allow under-levered SOEs to 
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increase their leverage ratios more easily towards optimal levels from below. Nevertheless, 
having low adjustment costs does not necessarily mean that SOEs also have the 
corresponding incentives to increase their leverage ratios from the positions below through 
external borrowing. In the trade-off theory, firms should be eager to use interest expenses 
of debt to shield against income tax, especially when there is substantial debt capacity or 
large positive cash flow shock. Nevertheless, some empirical evidences about taxation of 
SOEs suggest that SOEs may not closely follow such value maximizing strategy associated 
with exploiting tax advantage of debt. For example, Wang et al. (2010) use the 
implementation of the new Enterprise Income Tax Law 2008 as an experimental lab to 
study CLFs’ debt-related tax shields exploitation as well as capital structure decisions. 
Their results show that the changes in level of borrowing (whether increases or decreases, 
in accordance with whether the firms were initially high-taxed or low-taxed), were more 
pronounced in POEs than in SOEs. Nevertheless, this certainly does not indicate that SOEs 
nowadays also do not have the corresponding incentives for engaging in tax evasion. In 
contrast, SOEs, particularly at the central level, constitute by far the most powerful and 
effective tax lobby and are even able to use their political clout to bargain with the 
government regarding tax matters55. In other words, the tax evasion strategy of Chinese 
(central) SOEs may put more weights on direct policy exemption rather than the balance 
sheet (tax-shielding) approaches. Furthermore, several careful studies show that local 
SOEs in China have significantly higher effective tax rates than central SOEs and non-
SOEs56.  Liu and Li (2012) suggest three reasons why local SOEs are expected to bear 
higher tax burdens and be less tax sensitive. First, local governments require local SOEs to 
help them to absorb the costs of fiscal competition. Second, the relatively low level of 
information asymmetry between local governments and local SOEs makes hiding income 
to avoid tax become difficult. Lastly, the compensation of local SOE managers may not be 
tied sufficiently to firm performance and value. Generally, both central and local SOEs in 
China should be relatively less eager to use interest expenses of debt to shield against 
income tax, though their motivations behind the seemly coincident choices are likely to be 
very different. Therefore, taking tax advantages of debt may not be the first priority for 
SOEs to increase their leverage ratios when under-levered. 
 
                                                          
55 For more details about taxation of SOEs, please refer to the comprehensive review by Cui (2015). 
56 The underlying assumption in taxation research at firm-level is that the firms with lower effective tax rates 
should be more tax sensitive since they are likely to devote more effort to tax reduction (to see, Cao et al., 
2009; Liu and Li, 2012) 
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In contrast, POEs are financially constrained and face much higher costs of defaults 
than SOEs. When over-levered, POEs can be subjected to stricter lending criteria for 
nearby future borrowing and easily suffer from potential bankruptcy. Therefore, the costs 
of being over-levered are higher for POEs than SOEs, indicating that managers of POEs 
tend to eliminate excessive debt more proactively than do managers of SOEs. Furthermore, 
when under-levered with sufficient debt capacity, POEs should have higher incentives to 
borrow more debt and increase leverage ratios more quickly towards the optima. The 
intuition is quite straightforward. Unlike central SOEs, POEs do not have such power to 
affect the corporate tax policy. Also, due to the implementation of Company Law in 1994, 
local governments are no longer having direct methods to squeeze local POEs (compared 
to local SOEs). Therefore, if taking tax benefits of debt can increase the value of firm 
(Robinson et al., 2010), then a private shareholder whose interests is closely associated 
with the value of a controlled firm should have strong incentive to do so. From the 
perspective of shareholders, the benefits of increasing leverage ratios when under-levered 
are expected to be higher for POEs than SOEs. Overall, the financing decisions of POEs 
should be more sensitive to deviations from optimal leverage ratios than those of SOEs. 
We propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis I: The CLFs with state ownership should present lower adjustment speed of 
leverage than the firms with private ownership. 
 
3.4.2 Ownership concentration and leverage adjustment 
The monitoring benefits (expropriation risks) brought by a controlling shareholder 
should be positively (negatively) correlated with the amount of ownership stakes 
concentrated in his or her hands (La Porta et al., 1999 and Betrand et al., 2002). On the one 
hand, a controlling shareholder in China’s stock market usually owns a substantial 
proportion of the firm’s total shares and has strong incentives to monitor managers and 
maximize profits (Jiang and Kim, 2015). For instance, Xu and Wang (1999) and Chen et al. 
(2009) find that the CLFs with more concentrated ownership present better performances. 
On the other hand, it is also common to see that an ultimate shareholder controls a CLF 
through a pyramid system but obtains only a small proportion of the firm’s cash flow rights, 
i.e. large excessive control rights. The weak internal and external governance mechanisms 
provide strong incentives for such a controller to transfer wealth from the downside firm in 
the pyramid system to the upside firm in which he or she has higher cash flow rights. 
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Empirical evidence is provided by several studies to show the tunnelling behaviours of 
controlling shareholders in CLFs, e.g. earnings management (Liu and Lu, 2007); 
intercorporate loans (Jiang et al., 2010) and connected transactions (Peng et al., 2011).  
 
In the debt market, perceiving the risks of being expropriated, poorly protected creditors 
may avoid lending to firms with complex ownership structures (La Porta et al., 1997, 
2002). Using datasets from East Asia and West Europe, Lin et al. (2011) find that the cost 
of debt financing, measured by loan spreads, is significantly higher for companies with an 
ultimate owner having greater excess control rights. As a typical transition economy, China 
has a capital market with incomplete regulations and weak legal protections for investors. 
Given the prevalence of the pyramid system, it is also reasonable to infer a negative 
relation between the costs of debt faced by a firm and the degree of ownership 
concentrated in the hands of a firm’s controlling shareholder. Therefore, a firm with more 
complex ownership structure, i.e. lower ownership concentration, should face higher costs 
of leverage adjustment and present lower converging speed towards its target ratios. In 
contrast, a firm with less complex ownership structure, i.e. higher ownership concentration, 
is likely to be offered more flexible choices in terms of external borrowing as it is 
considered a much safer borrower. 
 
Additionally, in China’s stock market, a firm with more complex ownership structure 
should also face higher risk premium in equity issuance since outside equity buyers, 
especially individual investors, are afraid of being exploited by the firm’s controlling 
shareholder whose interests are not closely bonded with firm performance. If the firm is 
over-levered, then its manager may not be able to reduce the indebtedness level by easily 
expanding the firm’s equity. Lastly, if the optimal leverage converging behaviour is a sort 
of value maximizing policy, then the large controlling shareholders with a high level of 
ownership stakes are more likely to adjust the firm’s leverage ratio from deviations 
towards optimal levels, thereby maximizing their own values. Overall, our arguments 
suggest that the financing decisions of the firms with more (less) concentrated ownership 
structure should be more (less) sensitive to deviations from optimal leverage. Therefore, 
we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis II: The CLFs with higher (lower) ownership concentration should present 




The incentives of controllers are likely to vary between SOEs and POEs. Private large 
controlling shareholders often nominate themselves or their representatives as the CEO or 
the Chair and their incomes can be closely tied with firm performance as well as share 
value appreciation. For SOEs, however, the corporate governance can be characterized as 
an “agent monitoring agent” mechanism in which the state is the principal and all the 
provincial and local officials serve as agents of the state. These agents only have control 
rights but cannot claim residuals, so they may have built-in low incentives to pursue profit 
maximization. Nevertheless, state controlling shareholders should also have lower 
incentives to expropriate minority shareholders, since the state is not literally a person who 
can directly or personally benefit from tunnelling. 57  With poor legal protections to 
individual investors, however, the unrestricted private controlling shareholders who do not 
own substantial cash flow rights of the firm are more likely to exploit resources away from 
the firm (Jiang et al., 2010).  
 
The above arguments suggest that the connection between ownership concentration and 
leverage adjustment can be more significant in POEs than SOEs. First, if private large 
shareholders have higher incentives to be involved in firms’ value maximizing decisions 
than state large shareholders, then they should take the systematic deviations from optimal 
leverage more seriously as these deviations may dampen the value of firms. Second, if 
private shareholders are believed to have stronger built-in incentives to practice 
expropriation, then the controlled firms should face higher costs of being excessively 
levered as well as higher costs of large borrowing. For SOEs, however, the behaviours of 
their controllers may not exactly follow such a working mechanism. The nominated 
controllers of SOEs may still lack sufficient motivation to pursue value maximizing 
policies even if they are designated to manage a large amount share of the controlled firms. 
Correspondingly, they may also not be able to directly benefit from tunneling behaviours. 
Even if they show some signs of expropriating, their further borrowings are less likely to 
be strictly constrained due to the fact that the state has dual roles in corporate financing 
decisions. Overall, having higher level of ownership stakes should make the benefits of 
approaching optimal leverage levels larger for the private controlling shareholders than for 
the state controlling shareholders. Therefore, our last working hypothesis is: 
 
                                                          
57 Instead, the state may use SOEs as vehicles to pursue political objectives if necessary. Differently from 




Hypothesis III: The positive connection between ownership concentration and leverage 
adjustment speed should be stronger in POEs than in SOEs. 
 
 
3.5 Leverage adjustment speed measurements 
3.5.1 Baseline model 
Understanding the following structural model of partial adjustment is usually the 
starting point of estimating the adjustment speed of leverage (e.g. De Miguel and Pindado, 
2001; Fama and French, 2002; Kayhan and Titman, 2007):  
 
 𝐿𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝜆(𝐿𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝐿𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 (3.1) 
 
where 𝐿𝑖𝑡  is the actual leverage ratio for firm  𝑖 at time 𝑡 and 𝐿𝑖𝑡
∗  is the optimal/ target 
leverage ratio suggested by the implication of the trade-off theory. The intuition of 
equation (3.1) is that changes in actual leverage ratios (𝐿𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝑖𝑡−1) should partially absorb 
differences between target leverage (𝐿𝑖𝑡
∗ ) and the actual lagged leverage (𝐿𝑖𝑡−1) and hence 
coefficient 𝜆 should measure how quickly the manager can close the gap, i.e. the speed of 
leverage adjustment. If there are no costs of adjustment, then firms can adjust their 
leverage ratios instantaneously from deviations, i.e. 𝜆 = 1. Nevertheless, market frictions 
generate substantial adjustment costs which prevent managers completely rebalancing 
within a short time period, i.e. 0 < 𝜆 < 1. Therefore, a value maximizing firm facing 
lower costs of adjustment should present a higher value of 𝜆. 
 
One key issue is that the optimal target leverage ratio 𝐿𝑖𝑡
∗   is a hypothetical level for 
maximizing value of a firm and it is unobservable to economists. To make equation (3.1) 
estimable, we can firstly rearrange it as: 
 
 𝐿𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆)𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝐿𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡. (3.2) 
 
Then, we can replace 𝐿𝑖𝑡
∗  as the linear combination of some firm-level (observable) 
variables which are believed to be related with the costs and benefits of debt financing:  
 
 𝐿𝑖𝑡




where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 contains market to book ratio, firm size, profitability, tangibility, non-debt tax 
shields, median industry leverage, firm-level fixed effects and year dummies. All 
independent variables are lagged once to avoid direct reversed causality and all variable 
definitions can be found in Appendix B of this chapter. The conventional literature in 
trade-off theory can provide justifications for these variables as important determinants of 
leverage ratios. Specifically, the distress costs and value loss are larger for fast growing 
firms, so the benefits from tax savings are offset rapidly, leading to lower debt ratios for 
firms with high growth opportunities (Titman and Wessels, 1988). Larger firms tend to 
have lower default risks which allow them to gain more debts (Chan et al., 1985). Fixed 
assets can be used to collateralize and are relatively more immune from serious 
devaluation, indicating that firms with higher tangibility have lower distress costs and 
hence higher leverage level. Industry median leverage ratio can reflect a number of omitted 
common factors across firms within the same industry (Hovakimian et al., 2001). The most 
controversial issue is probably the relation between profitability and leverage ratio. 
Comparing to expected bankruptcy costs, in the trade-off theory, benefits from tax shields 
should be more valuable for firms with high profits. In the agency theory, for firms with 
high profits but low investment opportunities, debt discipline can reduce the free cash flow 
problem (Jensen, 1986). Therefore, there should be a positive relation between profitability 
and leverage ratio. However, the estimated coefficient for profitability in leverage model is 
usually negative and highly statistically significant, which is often regarded as rejection to 
the trade-off theory but the most straightforward evidence supporting the pecking order 
theory (Myers, 1993).58 
 
By substituting equation (3.3) into equation (3.2), we can obtain: 
 
 𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜃
′𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 (3.4) 
 
where 𝛾 = (1 − 𝜆) and 𝜃 = 𝜆𝛽 . The larger the value of  𝛾 , the smaller the value of  
𝜆 should be, i.e. lower adjustment speed. Equation (4) is the standard reduced-form partial 
                                                          
58 In the pecking order theory, firms should prefer internal funds, such as cash flow, to external debts. More 
discussion about the effects of profitability on firms’ market leverage ratio and financing decisions can be 
found in Hovakimian et al. (2001), Hovakimian et al. (2004) and Welch (2004). This debate is recently 
reconciled by Danis et al. (2014) who use the dynamic inaction model and find that a positive correlation 
between profitability and leverage exists when firms are undertaking large leverage restructuring while at 
other times this relationship is negative. Their results have further strengthened the insignificant positive 
correlation detected by Korteweg and Strebulaev (2012). 
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adjustment model proposed by Flannery and Rangan (2006). Ideally, we can also use 
equation (3.3) to generate the predicted 𝐿𝑖?̂? which can be used to replace the unobservable 
𝐿𝑖𝑡
∗  in equation (3.1) and then estimate equation (3.1) directly. However, the results 
obtained by using this method are very likely to suffer from measurement errors to target 
leverage ratios. Estimating equation (3.4) and calculating the adjustment speed coefficient 
from 𝛾 should largely alleviate this issue. We will return to this problem later in the 
robustness tests.  
 
3.5.2 Estimations 
Three major econometric issues are involved in the estimation procedure of dynamic 
panel data model (3.4) using financial variables. First, endogeneity is always problematic 
in the empirical research of corporate finance. The problem can be generated by the 
correlation between fixed effects and lagged dependent variable (𝐿𝑖𝑡−1) as well as the 
potential simultaneity between dependent variable and explanatory variables. Second, 
financial variables are usually very persistent over time (Lemmon et al., 2008). This can 
cause high serial correlation in the error terms which violates the assumption of some 
estimators, such as IV/GMM, used to solve endogeneity issue.59 Third, some financial 
variables, such as leverage and debt maturity, are usually treated as bounded variables 
distributing within 0 and 1. Since most linear estimators are designed for continuous 
variables, their properties may be affected if the dependent variable is fractional 
(Loudermilk, 2007). All these three problems should exist in the estimation of equation 
(3.4) and can make for some real empirical challenges.  
 
Unfortunately, even nowadays, there is no single general estimation method that can 
solve all these problems without losing efficiency or relying on very strict statistical 
assumptions (Dang et al., 2015). Therefore, in this chapter, we will attempt to use different 
methods to estimate one regression model and solve different issues respectively in each 
specification and draw conclusions about our research questions based on the shared 
tendency among different estimators. To begin with, the correlation between fixed effects 
and lagged leverage ratio should result in upward biased OLS estimator for the coefficient 
𝛾, i.e. lower than actual adjustment speed 𝜆 = (1 − 𝛾) (Baltagi, 2008). On the opposite 
                                                          
59 Another problem is lack of theoretical guidance. Different from economic regression model, the corporate 
finance models are usually intuitive ones and are more likely to suffer from measurement errors and 
misspecification (Welch, 2011 and Roberts and Whited, 2011). 
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side, although the Fixed Effects (FE) estimator can eliminate unobservable time invariant 
effects by using within transformation of variables, it should provide lower biased 
estimation of the coefficient 𝛾 and hence higher than actual value of 𝜆, due to finite-sample 
(short panel/ limited time periods per firm) bias (Nickell, 1981). To deal with the problem 
of FE estimator, we can firstly remove the unobservable fixed effects via the first-
difference transformation of equation (3.4): 
 
 Δ𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾Δ𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜃
′Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + Δ𝜈𝑖𝑡 (3.5) 
 
and use 𝐿𝑖𝑡−2 as instruments for Δ𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 (Anderson and Hisao, 1981). The main limitation 
of this instrumental variable (IVS) approach is its low efficiency. Therefore, researchers 
usually prefer to employ the generalized method of moments (GMM) and use longer 
lagged dependent variables as additional instruments. Arellano and Bond (1991) propose 
the first-difference GMM estimator (FD-GMM), which considers moment conditions, 
Ε[𝐿𝑖𝑡−𝑠Δ𝜈𝑖𝑡] = 0, with t = 3,…,T and s = 2,…,t-1, and uses a vector (𝐿𝑖1, … , 𝐿𝑖𝑡−2) as the 
GMM instrument set for Δ𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 in equation (9). Blundell and Bond (1998) further develop 
the system GMM estimator (SYS-GMM) which improves the efficiency of FD-GMM by 
utilizing additional moment conditions in the level equation (3.4). This estimator considers 
( Δ𝐿𝑖2, … , Δ𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 ) as instruments for 𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 under the following moment conditions:  
Ε[Δ𝐿𝑖𝑡−𝑠𝜈𝑖𝑡] = 0 for t = 3,…,T, and s = 1,…,t-1. The GMM estimator requires no second 
order serial correlation as well as valid instruments to be chosen. These conditions can be 
evaluated by using the AR(2) and Sargan/ Hansen tests. There are two major problems of 
the GMM framework. First, its properties hold when the number of firms is large enough, 
otherwise the results can be severely biased and imprecise. Second, estimation results are 
very sensitive to the chosen instrument sets. The Sargan/ Hansen test is very fragile and 
presents low statistical power in the dynamic panel data leverage model (Dang et al., 2015).  
 
A group of bias-corrected estimators can also be used to address the econometric issues 
in equation (3.4). One possible solution to unobservable fixed effects is adding one dummy 
variable for each firm into equation (3.4), which is called the least-squares dummy variable 
(LSDV) approach. Nevertheless, given finite T (e.g. the average number of years for each 
firm), the LSDV estimator is inconsistent (Nickell, 1981). Kiviet (1995) develops a bias-
corrected least-squares dummy variable (LSDVC) estimator which corrects FE estimator 
bias analytically. This LSDVC estimator has been extended to cases with unbalanced 
panels and heteroscedasticity (Kiviet, 1999; Bun and Kiviet, 2003; Bun and Carree, 2006). 
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In Monte Carlo analysis, Bruno (2005) finds that LSDVC outperforms all kinds of GMM 
estimators with finite sample. However, there are still two major limitations of the LSDVC 
estimator. First, it requires non-trivial matrix manipulations in the bias-correction 
procedure, which can result in extremely high computational burden for a large, or even 
modest dataset.60 Second, it relies on a strong assumption that the true model is an AR (1) 
model. An alternative approach to LSDVC is developed by Everaer and Pozzi (2007) and 
is named a bias-corrected FE estimator (BC). Instead of relying on complex analytical 
correction, a BC estimator is based on an iterative bootstrap that simulates the distribution 
of the FE estimator using the original (biased) FE estimates. This method then corrects the 
bias iteratively until unbiased estimates of the true parameters are found. The BC estimator 
has three advantages. First, it does not require instrument settings. Second, the non-
parametric bootstrapping does not rely on restrictive parametric distributional assumptions. 
Besides, the BC estimator is much less computationally demanding than LSDVC. 
Although both LSDVC and BC have the advantage that they can correct a finite sample 
bias efficiently, they still cannot provide valid inferences for the estimates when there is 
potential simultaneity between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables.  
 
According to the argument in Elsas and Florysiak (2015), all the above mentioned 
estimators ignore the effects from the fractional dependent variable (i.e. the leverage ratio 
is bounded between 0 and 1) and consequently get biased results. To solve this problem, 
Elsas and Florysiak propose a DPF estimator which generates an unbiased and consistent 
adjustment coefficient in the context of unbalanced panel data. More specifically, the DPF 
estimator is a doubly censored Tobit estimator, relying on a latent variable approach to 
account for the fractional nature of the dependent variable.61 It is fundamentally based on 
the random effects model but it also allows for endogeneity between explanatory variables 
and the fixed effect and the initial value effect of the dependent variable. The DPF 
estimator defines unobservable fixed effects in equation (3.4) as: 
 
 𝜇𝑖 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐿𝑖0 + 𝑏2?̅?𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖 (3.6) 
 
where 𝐿𝑖0 is the initial leverage ratio for each firm, ?̅?𝑖 is the sample average of the 
explanatory variables presented in equation (3.1) for each firm, 𝑏𝑖|(𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝐿𝑖0)~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑏
2) is a 
                                                          
60 Given just 800 firms, a computer with i3 core and 16GB memory takes more than 40 minutes to run 
equation (3.4) by using LSDVC in Stata 13. 
61 The DPF estimator is a kind of maximum likelihood estimator. We use the Stata package ‘xttobit’ to 
directly implement such estimation strategy.  
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random firm-level effect capturing additional individual effects outside the information set 
of  𝐿𝑖0 and ?̅?𝑖. One potential weakness of the DPF estimator is that equation (3.6) may not 
completely model the time variant/ invariant individual effects. The full specification is 
written as: 
 
 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃
′𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐿𝑖,0 + 𝑏2?̅?𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡. (3.7) 
 
Lastly, another common limitation of OLS, FE, LSDVC, BC and DPF estimators is that 
they all require the independent variables to be strictly exogenous. Although these 
estimators can control the correlation between explanatory variables and unobservable 
fixed effects, they are unable to solve the potential long feedback from dependent leverage 
to explanatory variables. In other words, most explanatory variables may still be modestly 
endogenous even after eliminating fixed effects and being lagged once. If this is the case, 
then GMM estimators are more favourable since they can treat all right hand side variables 
as endogenous. 
 
Flannery and Hankins (2013) and Dang et al. (2015) explicitly evaluate the 
performances of all the above mentioned estimators in the applications of the partial 
leverage adjustment model (3.4). Flannery and Hankins (2013) recommend System GMM 
and LSDVC as the most appropriate estimators. Nevertheless, under a more rigorous 
simulation design, Dang et al. (2015) show that the IV/ GMM estimators are very sensitive 
to control parameters used for the data generating process. For instance, the larger the 
impact from fixed effects is, the higher the bias of System GMM estimator may be. Dang 
et al. also find that the DPF estimator does not necessary outperform the LSDVC and BC 
estimators when the percentage of censoring is high. They conclude that the BC estimator 
seems to be the most stable one across different simulation environments. Overall, there is 
no unique estimator which can be applied to the dynamic panel data model given very 
general settings. Therefore, we do not stick to a single estimator in this study. Rather we 
use several different estimators such as FD/ SYS-GMM, LSDVC, BC and DPF and 








In this paper, we use the annual firm-level dataset drawn from the China Stock Market 
& Accounting Research (CSMAR) database from 1998 – 2010, covering all active firms 
listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. We use the following methods to 
clean the original dataset. First, financial firms and utility firms are excluded. Second, the 
firm-year observations with leverage ratios smaller than zero or larger than one are 
excluded. Third, the firm-year observations with missing values for used variables are 
eliminated. The firms with less than 3 consecutive year observations are also dropped. 
Lastly, the independent variables, included in equation (3.3), are winsorized at 1th and 99th 
percentiles. The final sample contains 1,490 firms with 14,779 firm-year observations and 
it is unbalanced. The minimum number of years per firm is 3, the maximum is 13, and the 
median is 12.  
 
There are several reasons for us to rely on the sample period until 2010. At the end of 
2008, the Chinese central government released an unprecedented 4 trillion RMB fiscal 
stimulus valid in 2009 and 2010. Although it helped bolster that slumping Chinese 
economy after the financial crisis, it caused some unintended consequences, e.g. explosive 
increasing in corporate debt to GDP ratio; expansion of shadow banking and further credit 
misallocation (Bai et al., 2016). These problems resulted in high level of uncertainty in the 
economy after 2010. Besides, the large investment expenditures stimulated by the fiscal 
plan are likely to be redundant and may seriously drag down the efficiency of firms’ 
financial decisions in the following years. Inappropriate treatment to such radical changes 
can result in misleading conclusion about the ownership effects on firms’ optimal leverage 
converging behaviours. In contrast, between 2000 – 2008, the economic growth was 
remarkably rapid. The non-tradeable share reform in China’s stock market was also 
promoted around 2005 and obtained significant progress at the end of 2010. The promising 
economy and the successful progress of marketization together create a relatively stable 
outside environment for firms, which can be regarded as a good experimental lab for 
researchers to understand the common incentives of controllers to adjust firms’ capital 
structures. Therefore, in this chapter, we put more weights on the sample period ended at 
year 2010. In Chapter 4, we will further extend the sample period to year 2016 and 





3.6.1 Ownership definitions 
According to our hypotheses presented in section 3.4, we have to measure a firm’s 
ownership type as well as the degree of its ownership concertation. To define a firm’s 
ownership type, many previous studies group the types of shares, e.g. state shares; legal 
person shares and individual shares (Sun and Tong, 2003 and Wei et al., 2005). 
Nevertheless, this method is too simplistic and ignores institutional realities (Green, 2004). 
For instance, legal person shares can be owned by either SOEs or pure POEs. These 
entities have completely different objectives and incentives and hence using the major 
proportion of share type to define ownership type can generate misleading results (Chen et 
al., 2009).  
  
In this paper, therefore, we choose to use the nature of a firm’s ultimate owner as proxy 
for its ownership type, i.e. who actually owns the shares.62 More specifically, if a firm-year 
observation shows that the nature of its ultimate controller is the state, then the firm at this 
year is regarded as an SOE. Although this variable is time invariant for most firms in our 
dataset, there are still some firms whose ultimate shareholders have been changed from the 
state to other types of investors due to continued privatization. To maintain as many firms 
as possible, we construct a time invariant 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 dummy variable which is equal to one if 
more than 60% of the observations of a firm present as state or government as its ultimate 
controller, otherwise the dummy variable is equal to zero.63 The major reason for us to 
choose such a time-invariant ownership definition is that we then do sample separation 
tests. Given the requirements of applied advanced estimators for the dynamic panel data 
model, within panel continuity over a certain number of periods is essential. In the sample 
separation tests, we mainly compare SOEs and POEs. If a firm-year observation shows that 
the nature of its ultimate controller is private investors, then the firm at this year is 
regarded as a POE. The 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 indicator is also time-invariant (60% cut off). Lastly, the 
firms with other kinds of ownership types, e.g. collective and foreign firms, occupy a 
relatively small proportion of the total sample. More importantly, the incentives of their 
controlling shareholders are vague and are difficult to conjecture. Therefore, we will not 
consider their situations in this chapter. 
 
                                                          
62 Missing information about firms’ ownership type is collected by hand from firms’ annual reports. 
63 We have also considered 50% and 70% cut-off and have even eliminated those firms who have changed 
their ownership types during the sample period. The results are not sensitive to these modifications.  
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We use the percentage of a firm’s total shares held by its largest shareholder to measure 
ownership concentration. We classify a firm into ‘ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 ’  or 
‘𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 ’ group if the average percentage of its total shares held by its largest 
shareholder is above or below the sample average of this percentage for all the firm-year 
observations. 64  To measure the expropriation incentives, previous literature usually 
computes a controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights as the sum of the products of all the 
equity stakes along the control chains (La Portal et al., 1999; 2002). Nevertheless, we 
cannot directly calculate the cash flow rights of ultimate shareholders since we do not have 
detailed equity chain information in the given dataset. Therefore, in this chapter, we choose 
to use the cash flow rights held by the firms’ largest shareholders to indirectly measure the 
ownership stakes of their controlling shareholders.  
 
Our choice can be justified as follow. First, in the case of three firms, A, B and C, where 
A owns 80% of B, B owns 51% of C. In this case, A as the ultimate controlling 
shareholder controls the target firm C through the intermediate firm B and B is the largest 
shareholder of C. The indirect cash flow rights of A to C is 40.8% = 80%*51%. If we 
maintain the direct cash flow rights of A to B at 80%, then increasing (decreasing) the 
direct cash flow rights of B to C from 51% to 70% (30%) can result in increasing 
(decreasing) the indirect cash flow rights of A to C from 40.8% to 56% (24%). This 
indicates that the higher percentage of the target firm’s total shares held by its largest 
shareholder or the intermediate firm in the equity chain, the higher possibility of the 
ultimate controlling shareholder owning more indirect cash flow rights of the target firm 
should be, if the stake connection between the ultimate controller and the intermediate firm 
does not change dramatically in the short-run. Of course, the equity chain can involve more 
than three firms but the logic is similar. More essentially, for CLFs, the close relationship 
between cash flow rights of the largest shareholder and size/ risks of expropriations of the 
controlling shareholder has already been detected by several studies. For example, Liu and 
Lu (2007) identify a negative relation between earnings management and the largest 
shareholder’s interest in the firm, when the cash flow rights of the largest shareholder 
reach a certain level. In Jiang et al. (2010), ‘other account receivables (OACR)’ is used as 
a vehicle for controlling shareholder tunneling in CLFs and they also detect that the value 
of OARC decreases with the increase of the percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholder. These results therefore indicate that the cash flow rights held by the largest 
                                                          
64 We have also considered the sample medium cut-off, no significant differences. 
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shareholders can be a good measurement of the expropriating incentives of the ultimate 
controlling shareholders of CLFs. 
 
3.6.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.1 contains statistical descriptions for most important financial variables. There 
are several pertinent facts. First, during our sample period, on average, both the book 
financial leverage (22%) and total liability (48%) of the non-financial, non-utility CLFs do 
not appear to be higher than those of US firms (24% and 51%).65 Second, short term debt 
(16%) and current liability (41%) are much higher than long term debt (5.5%) and long 
term liability (7%) respectively. Third, almost 62% of firm-year observations present the 
state as the ultimate controller while merely 24% of firm-year observations present private 
investors as the ultimate controller. Lastly, the ownership of CLFs is very concentrated. 
The largest shareholder, on average, owns more than 37% of the firm’s total shares which 
is 29% larger than the average percentage shares held by the second largest shareholder 
(8.8%). If the second largest shareholder is considered to constrain the behaviours of the 
largest shareholder, then such monitoring power may be ineffective. 
 
In the left half of Table 3.2, we compare the average leverage ratios as well as the mean 
values of firm performance measurements across ownership types. First, SOEs have higher 
financial leverage than POEs, but the difference in average financial leverages between the 
two groups of firms is statistically weak. More specifically, SOEs have lower short-term 
debt but higher long-term debt than POEs. In financing constraint literature, these facts are 
interpreted as the evidence of ‘political discrimination’ by the state-owned banks that 
prefer to lend to SOEs. 66 Second, if we use profitability as a performance measurement, 
then there is no obvious difference between SOEs and POEs. In terms of Tobin’s Q, 
however, POEs (1.86) have strictly higher value than SOEs (1.53). Furthermore, ownership 
is more concentrated in SOEs since the average percentage of shares owned by the state 




                                                          
65 For US firms’ leverage ratios data, see Halov and Heider (2011); Graham and Leary (2011); Danis et al. 
(2014). Some studies have compared the total liability of Chinese listed firms with the financial leverage of 
US firms and incorrectly concluded that Chinese listed firms are seriously over-levered, e.g. Jin and 
Kumbhakar (2015). 
66 For instance, Allen et al. (2005); Ayyagari et al. (2010); Ding et al. (2013), to name but a few 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics (Full sample) 
 Mean Std. Min Median Max Obs. 
Book leverage 0.221 0.149 0.000 0.212 0.999 14799 
Short term debt 0.165 0.131 0.000 0.148 0.999 14799 
Long term debt 0.055 0.085 0.000 0.015 0.800 14799 
       
Total liability 0.479 0.183 0.002 0.485 0.998 14611 
Current liability 0.409 0.174 0.002 0.402 0.998 14611 
Long term liability 0.069 0.091 0.000 0.024 0.800 14611 
       
Profitability 0.070 0.072 -0.339 0.072 0.256 14799 
Sales growth 0.125 0.377 -1.331 0.129 1.536 13309 
Cash flow 0.020 0.076 -0.213 0.018 0.248 14799 
Cash 0.158 0.121 0.000 0.129 1 14799 
       
Tobin Q 1.608 0.878 0.807 1.318 6.041 14799 
Investment 0.068 0.077 0.000 0.042 0.394 13309 
Size 21.250 1.047 18.699 21.133 24.433 14799 
Age 9.461 4.530 0 9 27 14799 
       
State control 0.618 0.486 0 1 1 14799 
Private control 0.241 0.428 0 0 1 14799 
Largest shareholder 0.377 0.158 0.035 0.355 0.864 9477 
2nd shareholder 0.088 0.080 0.003 0.061 0.440 9477 
2nd – 5th shareholders 0.158 0.119 0.011 0.132 0.609 9477 
State is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm at that year is ultimately controlled by the 
state. Private is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm at that year is ultimately controlled 
by the private investor. Definitions of all variables are presented in Appendix B. 
 
In the right half of Table 3.2, we classify a firm into the High (Low) concentration 
group if its largest shareholder owns the proportion of total shares more (less) than the 
sample median (36%). In China’s stock market, firms having financial or operational 
problem, i.e. losses in two consecutive years, are marked as the stock with ‘Special 
Treatment (ST)’. A notable fact observed in Table 3.2 is that the CLFs with higher level of 
ownership concentration present a higher value of profitability but lower value of Tobin’s 
Q. One possible explanation is that the lower concentrated group contains a higher 
proportion of ST/ distressed firms with values of equity more likely to be twisted by the 
misbehaviours of investors. Specifically, at the bottom of the table, we also report the 
percentage of ST/ distressed firms in each category. Outside speculators are eager to 
exchange ST stocks since they expect that prices will increase dramatically once the firms 
have recovered from the distress. Unfortunately, less than 5% firms ultimately escaped 
from ST during our sample period, indicating that ST stocks may often be overvalued. In 
the group with lower ownership concentration, the percent of ST observations (21%) is 
much higher than that of the firms in the group with higher ownership concentration (14%). 
In unreported results, we have also compared the Tobin’s Q between two groups without 




Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics (Ownership structures) 
 State Private Diff High Low Diff 
Book leverage 0.222 0.217 0.005* 0.219 0.222 -0.002 
Short term debt 0.161 0.172 -0.010*** 0.157 0.166 -0.008*** 
Long term debt 0.060 0.045 0.015*** 0.061 0.055 0.006*** 
       
Total liability 0.482 0.473 0.009** 0.498 0.500 -0.002 
Current liability 0.407 0.413 -0.006* 0.420 0.426 -0.006* 
Long term liability 0.069 0.052 0.017*** 0.071 0.064 0.007*** 
       
Profitability 0.070 0.071 -0.001 0.080 0.062 0.017*** 
Sales growth 0.129 0.127 0.002 0.174 0.105 0.068*** 
Cash flow 0.020 0.019 0.001 0.024 0.029 0.006 
Cash 0.153 0.172 -0.019*** 0.163 0.161 -0.002 
       
Tobin Q 1.536 1.867 -0.331*** 1.505 1.949 0.445*** 
Investment 0.069 0.068 0.001 0.076 0.063 -0.013*** 
Size 21.355 20.935 0.420*** 21.589 21.177 0.412*** 
Age 9.092 10.341 -1.249*** 9.732 11.995 -2.262*** 
       
Largest shareholder 0.406 0.322 0.083*** 0.508 0.245 0.262*** 
2nd shareholder 0.079 0.105 -0.025*** 0.065 0.112 -0.046*** 
2nd – 5th shareholders 0.138 0.195 -0.057*** 10.860 20.717 -9.857*** 
Other receivable 0.055 0.063 -0.008*** 0.036 0.054 -0.018*** 
       
ST stocks (distress) 21.37% 23.78%  14.25% 20.89%  
Firms 1067 614  898 847  
Observations 9672 3570  4814 4815  
State is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm at that year is ultimately controlled by the state. 
Private is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm at that year is ultimately controlled by the 
private investor. High (Low) is a dummy variable equal to one if the percentage of a firm’s total 
shares held by its largest shareholder is larger (smaller) than the sample medium. Definitions of all 
variables are presented in Appendix B. 
 
In Table 3.3, we further classify both SOEs and POEs into High and Low ownership 
concentration groups. 67 The comparisons show that on average the CLFs with more shares 
concentrated in the hands of their largest shareholders are likely to be more profitable, to 
grow faster and invest more but to have lower Tobin’s Q and are less likely to be distressed. 
Additionally, the SOEs in the High concentration group are significantly lower levered 
than the SOEs in the Low concentration group. In contrast, the more concentrated POEs 
seem to be higher levered than the lower concentrated POEs. Besides, Jiang et al. (2010) 
find that ‘other account receivables (OACR)’ is used as a vehicle for large shareholder 
tunnelling in CLFs and they detect an almost linear negative relationship between the value 
of OARC and the cash flow rights of the largest shareholder. This indicates that the 
controlling shareholder with a higher level of cash flow rights has less incentives to tunnel 
                                                          
67 We have also checked the industry distribution of the firms in each category and found no systematic 
pattern of the distribution across categories.  
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from minority shareholders. Based on this inference, in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, we also 
compare the average values of OARC across ownership types and structures. Indeed, the 
results show that the POEs and the firms with lower ownership concentration tend to have 
higher levels of OARC. 
 
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics (State and Private) 
 State Private 
 High Low Diff High Low Diff 
Book leverage 0.221 0.234 -0.013*** 0.216 0.208 0.008 
Short term debt 0.156 0.168 -0.012*** 0.167 0.164 0.002 
Long term debt 0.065 0.065 0.000 0.049 0.044 0.005* 
       
Total liability 0.504 0.522 -0.018*** 0.477 0.476 -0.000 
Current liability 0.421 0.436 -0.015 0.415 0.415 0.000 
Long term liability 0.076 0.077 0.001 0.057 0.051 0.005* 
       
Profitability 0.077 0.057 0.020*** 0.087 0.068 0.019*** 
Sales growth 0.167 0.102 0.065*** 0.194 0.112 0.081*** 
Cash flow 0.024 0.041 -0.017 0.020 0.015 0.005 
Cash 0.154 0.152 0.002 0.192 0.168 0.024*** 
       
Tobin Q 1.458 1.824 -0.366*** 1.678 2.132 -0.454*** 
Investment 0.078 0.065 0.012*** 0.079 0.065 0.013*** 
Size 21.707 21.404 0.303*** 21.213 20.885 0.327*** 
Age 9.832 12.441 -2.609*** 9.395 11.421 2.026*** 
       
Largest shareholder 0.516 0.250 0.266*** 0.482 0.240 0.241*** 
2nd shareholder 0.060 0.107 -0.046*** 0.079 0.119 -0.038*** 
2nd – 5th shareholders 0.098 0.195 -0.097*** 0.142 0.223 -0.081*** 
Other receivable 0.036 0.048 -0.012*** 0.037 0.062 -0.025*** 
       
ST 14.54% 21.47%  14.56% 16.78%  
Firms 660 517  261 417  
Observations 3,594 2,547  1047 2048  
State is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm at that year is ultimately controlled by the state. 
Private is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm at that year is ultimately controlled by the private 
investor. High (Low) is a dummy variable equal to one if the percentage of a firm’s total shares held 
by its largest shareholder is larger (smaller) than the sample average. ST defines the stocks marked as 
‘Special Treatment’ due to two years consecutive loss in profits. Definitions of all variables are 
presented in Appendix B. 
 
In summary, a few points are obtained from the descriptive analyses. First, the CLFs 
with state ownership have higher leverage ratios than the CLFs with private ownership. 
Nevertheless, it is still unclear whether or not state ownership brings better firm 
performances. Second, the controlling shareholders with higher level of cash flow rights 
may prefer to actively monitor their firms and hence there should be a positive relation 
between ownership concentration and firm performance. Lastly, the tunneling behaviours 






3.7.1 Evolution of capital structure 
We begin our empirical analysis by studying the evolution of leverage for our cross-
section of firms. Figure 3.1 presents the average leverage ratios of four portfolios in the 
period from 2000 to 2010. At the end of year 2000, we sort firms into four quartiles 
(portfolios) according to their leverage ratios, i.e. Very High, High, Medium, and Low. 68 
We then calculate the average leverage ratios for the firms in each portfolio in each 
following year until 2010. The component of each portfolio remains the same, i.e. we only 





Several features are worth mentioning. First, there is a large cross-sectional dispersion 
in the initial portfolio formation period (ranging from 5% to 40%). Second, all four 
portfolios present an obvious converging tendency over time. After 10 years, on average, 
the firms in the Very High book leverage group have reduced their ratios from 40% to 25%. 
Meanwhile, the firms in the Low portfolio have on average increased their leverage from 5% 
to 16%. Third, for Medium and Low portfolios, most of the convergences occur within the 
first 4 years while the Very High and High portfolios tend to converge from higher 
positions with relatively constant rates. Lastly, even after 10 years convergence, there are 
                                                          
68 Similar illustrative methods are firstly used by Lemmon et al. (2008). 
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still significant differences of average leverage ratios across different portfolios, especially 





One potential concern with interpreting Figure 3.1 is the effect of the bounded support 
of leverage, i.e. between zero and one. To address this potential weakness, we transferred 
the leverage ratios into the logit formation and repeat the same procedure in Figure 3.1. 69 
The results are presented in Figure 3.2. Two changes can be observed. First, the Medium 
portfolio becomes more stable over time. Second, the disparity between the Very High and 
Low portfolios becomes even larger at the end of the sample period than that presented in 
Figure 3.1. All this evidence suggests that although the general converging tendency has 
not been changed dramatically, the potential impact from the bounded dependent variable 
on leverage adjustment speed estimation should be non-trivial. 
 
A final potential concern is that the tendency in Figure 3.1 simply reflects the 
heterogeneity of firm-level characteristics. For instance, large firms usually have higher 
level of leverage ratios. Therefore, we control some firm-level variables which may 
determine cross-sectional variations in leverage ratios and estimate equation (3.3) by using 
fixed effects estimators. We then re-group the firms according to the error term (high or 
low unexpected shocks) and calculate the average leverage ratios in each group. The 
results are presented in Figure 3.3. There are three notable findings. First, it seems that the 
(possibly over-levered) firms in the Very high and High portfolios are more reluctant (have 
difficulty) to reduce their leverage ratios in the first 4 to 5 years. Second, the opposite 
                                                          
69 Logit(leverage) = ln(leverage/(1-leverage)) 
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situation happens for the Medium and Low portfolios in which firms are more likely to 
increase their leverage ratios in the first 3 to 4 years. Lastly, even after we have controlled 
the firm-level characteristics, the striking result is that the Low portfolio consistently 
maintains very low leverage ratios, around 16%, even at the end of sample period. The gap 
between the Very high and Low portfolios is very prominent over the whole evolution 





In summary, general guidance for our parametric analyses are provided by Figures 3.1-
3.3. First, CLFs indeed converge towards more modest levels of leverage from higher and 
lower positions, though the converging points are not necessarily optimal. Second, even 
though firms can offset the short-run deviations and move towards target leverage ratio, if 
there is one, their capital structure decisions are still determined by some unobservable 
(possible) time-invariant long-run components. Therefore, it may be essential for us to 
always control fixed effects in our estimations. Lastly, the fractional dependent issue may 


































































































































R-squared 68.37% 36.19%     38.77% 
AR(2)   0.708 0.969    
Hansen test   0.258 0.416    
Firms  1490 1490 1490  1490 1490 
N 13309 13309 11819 13309 13309 13309 13309 
This table presents the results for equation (3.4) by using the full sample size. All DPF results are generated by using equation (3.7) in 
this Chapter. In GMM estimators, all independent variables are treated as endogenous and their second and longer lags are used as 
instruments. In LSDVC approach, 2SLS estimators are used as the initial values of coefficients and 10 iterations have been set to 
obtain variance-covariance matrix. In BC approach, FE estimators are used as the initial values of coefficients and the max number of 
iterations and bootstrapping in each iteration have been set to 50 and 1000 respectively. All standard errors are robust in brackets. P-
values of AR (2) and Hansen tests are reported for GMM estimators. R-squared in column (2) for FE is within R-squared. R-squared 
in column (7) for DPF is pseudo-R-squared. Year dummies are included in all specifications. *, ** and *** correspond to P-values at 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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3.7.2 Baseline adjustment speed 
In Table 3.4, we report the results of equation (3.4) generated by using seven different 
estimators. Leverage ratio is expressed as financial debt to total assets. In terms of the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable in the dynamic panel data model, the 
correlation between lagged leverage ratio and unobservable time invariant effects will 
generate upward biased an OLS estimator but downward biased FE estimator, i.e. the 
endogeneity issue, so previous literature usually uses these two estimators as the upper and 
lower boundaries for the coefficient 𝛾. All other reasonable estimators suffering less from 
this issue should generate a value of 𝛾 which lies between that of OLS and FE estimators.  
 
In column (1) of Table 3.4, the OLS estimator presents a coefficient on lagged leverage 
ratio at 0.83, indicating that the speed of leverage adjustment (SOLA) is equal to 𝜆 =
(1 − 𝛾) = (1 − 0.83) = 0.17. In column (2), the FE estimator for 𝛾 is equal to 0.53 and 
the corresponding SOLA is 0.47. The dramatic difference between the OLS and FE 
coefficients reflects the large impact from unobservable time invariant effects on the 
estimated SOLA, i.e. the severity of endogeneity issue. In columns (3) and (4), the results 
generated by FD-GMM and SYS-GMM estimators are reported. We treat all explanatory 
variables in equation (3.4) as endogenous ones, thereby controlling the possible reversed 
causality. The coefficient on the lagged leverage in FD-GMM (SYS-GMM) is 0.69 (0.75) 
and the corresponding SOLA is 0.31 (0.25).  The p-values from AR (2) and Hansen tests 
are both large, indicating the validity of the chosen instrument sets and the correct 
specification of the model. Also, two GMM coefficients indeed lie between the OLS and 
FE coefficients. Nevertheless, Flannery and Hankins (2013) emphasise that the FD-GMM 
estimator still tends to generate a downward biased coefficient on the lagged leverage ratio. 
Dang et al. (2015) argue that the system GMM estimator is more likely to be upward 
biased. Therefore, in columns (5) and (6), we report the results from two bias correction 
estimators, i.e. LSDVC and BC estimators. The LSDVC (BC) estimator provides a value 
of 𝛾 equal to 0.71 (0.70) and the corresponding SOLA is 0.29 (0.30). Besides, in column 
(7), the DPF estimator is used to solve the fractional dependent variable issue, which 
generates 𝛾 = 0.76 and SOLA = 0.24.70 
 
 
                                                          
70 Our results show that for CLFs’ dataset, the fractional dependent variable issue may not be as serious as 
that met by Elsas and Florysiak (2015) when using the US firms dataset. 
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3.7.3 State ownership effects 
In this chapter, we perform the sample separation tests by estimating equation (3.4) 
respectively using the data of the firms classified into different ownership categories. The 
main assumption behind this method is that the costs and benefits of debt should differ 
across firms with different ownership structures. Both the target leverage ratio and the path 
to the optimal are heterogeneous for the firms in different ownership categories.  
 
We firstly classify all firms into two categories according to their ownership types, i.e. 
‘State’ and ‘Private’, and estimate equation (3.4) for the firms in each group. If our 
Hypothesis I is correct, the  𝛾𝑆𝑂𝐸 > 𝛾𝑃𝑂𝐸 , i.e. {𝜆𝑆𝑂𝐸 = (1 − 𝛾𝑆𝑂𝐸)} < {𝜆𝑃𝑂𝐸 = (1 −
𝛾𝑃𝑂𝐸)} , where 𝜆𝑆𝑂𝐸   and 𝜆𝑃𝑂𝐸 are the adjustment speed coefficients for SOEs and POEs, 
respectively. 
 
The results are reported in Panel A of Table 3.5. We use system GMM, LSDVC and 
DPF estimators, since they provide relatively reasonable estimation results in Table 3.4. 71 
According to the SYS-GMM results, in columns (1) and (2), there is a slight declining 
tendency of the coefficient on lagged leverage ratio from SOEs (77%) to POEs (72%). 
Nevertheless, for LSDVC and DPF estimators, in columns (3) and (4), POEs do not appear 
to adjust their leverage faster than SOEs. One potential issue is that the estimation results 
in Panel A are affected by the uneven distribution of ST/ distressed firms across ownership 
types. 72 Therefore, we simply eliminate the firms that have been marked as ‘ST stock’ at 
least once during the sample period and repeat the sample separation tests. The results are 
reported in Panel B of Table 3.5. For the SYS-GMM estimator, in columns (1) and (2), the 
coefficient 𝛾 on lagged leverage ratio obviously decreases from the SOEs (𝛾 = 75%, SOLA 
= 25%) to the POEs (𝛾 = 63%, SOLA = 37%). In columns (5) and (6), the DPF estimator 
presents a similar tendency, i.e. SOEs (𝛾 = 80%, SOLA = 20%) and POEs (𝛾 = 63%, 
SOLA = 37%). Although the LSDVC estimator, in columns (3) and (4), does not generate 
a difference as large as that of the SYS-GMM and DPF estimators, the declining tendency 
of the coefficient 𝛾 from SOEs to POEs still exists. Consequently, after we have controlled 
the effects of ST/ distressed firms across the ownership types, we are able to conclude that 
                                                          
71 The first-differenced GMM estimator is smaller than all other advanced estimators and it also reduces our 
sample size. The BC estimator cannot converge in some of our sample separation tests due to the small 
sample issue. 
72 See Tables 3.2&3.3 for more details.  
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SOEs tend to adjust their leverage ratios towards optimal levels at a slower speed than 
POEs, which supports our Hypothesis I. 
 
Table 3.5: Ownership types and leverage adjustment 
Panel A. Ownership types 




























R-squared     39.07% 40.42% 
AR(2) 0.649 0.433     
Hansen test 0.207 0.205     
Firms 884 458 884 458 884 458 
N 8632 3322 8632 3322 8632 3322 
       




























R-squared     35.52% 29.69% 
AR(2) 0.745 0.378     
Hansen test 0.104 0.630     
Firms 652 345 652 345 652 345 
N 6290 2174 6290 2174 6290 2174 
This table contains the results from sample separation tests by using equation (3.4). Variable 
definitions are presented in Appendix B. In this Table, only the coefficient on lagged leverage ratio 
is reported for brevity. The full version of this table is represented in Table B.11 in Appendix B. All 
standard errors are robust in brackets. P-values of AR (2) and Hansen tests are reported for GMM 
estimators. Year dummies are included in all specifications. Econometric specification is similar 
with the information presented at the bottom of Table 3.4. *, ** and *** correspond to P-values at 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
3.7.4 Ownership concentration effects 
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 report the results of the effects of ownership concentration on the 
leverage adjustment behaviours of SOEs and POEs, respectively. Since the ownership 
concentration information is only available from 2003 and after, we have excluded the 
firm-year observations before 2003. All the remaining firms are classified into the ‘Low’ 
or ‘High’ ownership concentration group. If Hypothesis II is correct, then 𝛾𝐿𝑂𝑊 > 𝛾𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 
since we expect that (𝜆𝐿𝑂𝑊 = 1 − 𝛾𝐿𝑜𝑊) < (𝜆𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 = 1 − 𝛾𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻) where 𝜆𝐿𝑂𝑊  and 𝜆𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 






Table 3.6: Ownership concentration and leverage adjustment (SOEs) 
Panel A. State Firms 




























R-squared     0.502 0.368 
AR(2) 0.570 0.536     
Hansen test 0.587 0.128     
Firms 365 495   365 495 
N 2377 3132 2377 3132 2685 3530 
 




























R-squared     0.419 0.328 
AR(2) 0.666 0.727     
Hansen test 0.149 0.210     
Firms 262 390   262 390 
N 1696 2458 1696 2458 1909 2755 
This table contains the results from sample separation tests by using equation (3.4). The data of 
SOEs is used. High (Low) is a dummy variable equal to one if the average percentage of a firm’s 
total shares held by its largest shareholder is larger (smaller) than the sample average. In this Table, 
only the coefficient on lagged leverage ratio is reported for brevity. The full version of this table is 
represented in Table B.12 in Appendix B. All standard errors are robust in brackets. P-values of AR 
(2) and Hansen tests are reported for GMM estimators. Year dummies are included in all 
specifications. Econometric specification is similar with the information presented at the bottom of 
Table 3.4. *, ** and *** correspond to P-values at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
In Table 3.6, Panel A reports the results for SOEs. According to the SYS-GMM and 
DPF results, in columns (1), (2), (5) and (6), the coefficient 𝛾 of the low concentration 
group is slightly larger than that of the high concentration group. For LSDVC estimator, in 
columns (3) and (4), such slight difference almost disappears. Our Hypothesis II is not 
strongly supported for SOEs at this stage. Again, to control the possible effects from the 
ST/ distressed firms, we exclude all ST firms and repeat the above estimation process. The 
results are reported in Panel B of Table 3.6. From column (1) to column (6), all three 
estimators convey very similar information: that the SOEs with lower ownership 
concentration tend to adjust their leverage ratios towards optimal levels at a slightly slower 
pace than the SOEs with higher ownership concentration. The difference of calculated 
SOLA between the low and high concentration groups varies from 5% in the SYS-GMM 
estimator to 10% in the LSDVC estimator. Therefore, after we have controlled the effects 
of the ST/ distressed firms, we can conclude that the SOEs with high ownership 
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concentration tend to adjust their leverage ratios to the target levels at a faster speed than 
the SOEs with low ownership concentration, which supports our Hypothesis II. 
 
Table 3.7: Ownership concentration and leverage adjustment (POEs) 
Panel A. Private Firms 




























R-squared     0.398 0.217 
AR(2) 0.282 0.166     
Hansen test 0.423 0.209     
Firms 266 178   266 178 
N 1512 856 1512 856 1661 925 
 




























R-squared     0.291 0.146 
AR(2) 0.652 0.242     
Hansen test 0.485 0.386     
Firms 193 152   193 152 
N 1025 690 1025 690 1103 737 
This table contains the results from sample separation tests by using equation (3.4) and POEs. High 
(Low) is a dummy variable equal to one if the average percentage of a firm’s total shares held by its 
largest shareholder is larger (smaller) than the sample average. In this Table, only the coefficient on 
lagged leverage ratio is reported for brevity. The full version of this table is represented in Table 
B.13 in Appendix B. All standard errors are robust in brackets. P-values of AR (2) and Hansen tests 
are reported for GMM estimators. Year dummies are included in all specifications. Econometric 
specification is similar with the information presented at the bottom of Table 3.4. *, ** and *** 
correspond to P-values at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Table 3.7 reports the effects of ownership concentration on the leverage adjustment 
behaviours of POEs. In panel A, all three estimators tell the same story: that the POEs with 
higher ownership concentration have higher SOLA than the POEs with lower ownership 
concentration. The difference in the calculated SOLAs between the high and low 
concentration groups varies from 10% in the DPF estimator to 26% in the System 
estimator. In Panel B, we again exclude all the ST firms. For the POEs in the high 
concentration group, the value of coefficient for lagged leverage ratio has not changed 
significantly. However, for the POEs with High ownership concentration, the coefficient 
has further reduced. This obviously increases the gap of the SOLA between the two groups 
of firms. For instance, in columns (1) and (2), the SYS-GMM estimator indicates that the 
SOLA for the high concentration group is 59% = (1-0.41) while the SOLA for the low 
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concentration group is just around 25% = (1-0.75). Therefore, the marginal impact from 
ownership concentration on the leverage adjustment behaviour is much larger in POEs than 
in SOEs. This is consistent with the prediction in Hypothesis III. 
 
There are several implications from our empirical results. First, the inefficiency of 
SOEs can be reflected by their relatively lower estimated leverage adjustment speed 
towards the optimal ratio than that of their private counterparts who are believed to be 
much more efficient. This low efficiency of SOEs is probably caused by the soft budget 
constraint as well as their lower incentives to take the tax advantages of debt. Second, in an 
immature capital market with poor legal protections of creditors, such as that of China, the 
risks of being expropriated by the controlling shareholders with low cash rights of the 
controlled firms can increase the costs of leverage adjustment which can prevent the firms 
from pursing their optimal leverage levels. This highlights the importance for information 
disclosure about shareholders’ behaviours. Lastly, including ST/ distressed firms in the 
capital structure analyses using CLFs’ dataset may generate misleading results as those 
firms, most of the time, will become ‘shell’ companies which do not behave normally in 
both product and capital markets. Further research in this field should pay higher attention 
to such potential issues. 
 
 
3.8 Robustness tests 
3.8.1 Two-step approach 
Except for the one-step reduced form approach, i.e. equation (3.4), used to generate our 
major results, the literature also applies the following two-step approach (e.g. De Miguel 
and Pindado, 2001; Fama and French, 2002; Kayhan and Titman, 2007; Faulkender et al., 
2012). Firstly, we can estimate equation (3.3) and then use the estimated coefficients to 
predict the leverage ratio for each firm-year observation. The predicted leverage can be 
regarded as an optimal one. In the second stage, we can obtain the adjustment coefficient 𝜆 
directly by estimating equation (3.1) once 𝐿𝑖𝑡
∗  is replaced by the predicted leverage. If we 
assume that costs and benefits of adjustment can vary across firms with and without state 





 λ = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡    (3.8) 
 
where 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡  is time-variant indicator to the presence of state ownership; the coefficient 
𝛼1 measures the direct effects from state ownership on firms’ adjustment speed and the 
coefficient 𝛼0 is the homogenous adjustment speed for all other firms in the absence of 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡. Therefore, the adjustment speed specific to SOEs can be calculated as (𝛼0 + 𝛼1). 
Then, we can substitute equation (3.8) into equation (3.1):  
 
 𝐿𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 = (𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡) ∗ (?̂?𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 (3.9) 
 
 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡      (3.10) 
 
where ?̂?𝑖𝑡 is the predicted leverage ratio;  𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = (𝐿𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝑖𝑡−1);  𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 =
(?̂?𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝑖𝑡−1). If the implication of our Hypothesis I is correct, then we shall see that 𝛼1 is 
negative and statistically significant. Similarly, we can replace 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 in equations (3.8) 
and (3.9) with the indicator measuring the degree of ownership concentration and rewrite 
equation (3.10) as: 
 
 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑏0𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏1𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 (3.11) 
 
where 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡  is a time-variant dummy variable equal to one if firm 𝑖 at 
time 𝑡 has a level of ownership concentration higher than the sample average level of 
ownership concentration, otherwise it is equal to zero. In equation (3.11), 𝑏1 can measure 
the direct effects from the ownership concentration level on firm’s adjustment speed and 
(𝑏0 + 𝑏1) can be treated as the adjustment speed specific to the firm with higher than 
average level of ownership concentration. If the implication of our Hypothesis II is correct, 
then we shall see that 𝑏1 is positive and statistically significant. More importantly, in the 
sample separation tests, we use the time-invariant ownership indicators. Although such 
treatment can help us to keep more observations and perform advanced estimators with 
relatively stable sample composition, it inevitably eliminates some potential effects from 







Table 3.8: Two-step approach 
Dependent: 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 





























Year Dummy Y Y Y 
AR(2) 0.904 0.480 0.841 
Hansen test 0.463 0.136 0.699 
Firms 1165 648 371 
Observations 9789 4125 2105 
This table contains the results for equations (3.10)&(3.11). 
System GMM results are presented. Twice and more lagged 
independent variables are used as instruments. 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡: ?̂?𝑖𝑡 −
𝐿𝑖𝑡−1; 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 = ?̂?𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝑖𝑡−1; 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡: in column (1), it is a time 
variant dummy variable. In columns (2) & (3), both state and 
private dummy variables are time invariant. 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑡: is a time 
variant high ownership concentration dummy variable. The 
target leverage ratio ?̂?𝑖𝑡  is predicted by using the fixed effects 
coefficients from equation (3.3). Largest shareholder 
information is only available from 2003 and after. Therefore, 
target leverage ratios are re-estimated by using reduced sample 
size in columns (2) & (3). More specific definitions of all 
variables are presented in Appendix B. All standard errors are 
robust in brackets. P-values of AR (2) and Hansen tests are 
reported. Year dummies are included in all specifications. *, ** 
and *** correspond to P-values at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
 
The System GMM results are reported in Table 3.8.73 Column (1) contains the results 
for equation (3.10). The coefficient 𝛼0 is equal to 0.28 which is very close to the calculated 
adjustment coefficient from our one-step approach (see Table 3.4). The coefficient for the 
interaction term between state ownership indicator and deviation from target leverage ratio 
is negative and highly statistically significant, which is very consistent with our 
Hypothesis I. Columns (2) and (3) contain the results for equation (3.11) using the dataset 
                                                          
73 It is still unclear whether or not there is a fixed effect which can determine firms’ adjustment coefficient in 
the second stage estimation, e.g. equations (3.10) & (3.11). One group of scholars believe that there are no 
fixed effects in equation (3.1) and they simply use OLS estimator with bootstrapped standard errors to solve 
the generated regressor problem (Oztekin and Flannery, 2012 and Faulkender et al., 2012). Nevertheless, 
Dang, (2013) and Dang et al. (2015) emphasize that the correlation between 𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝜈𝑖𝑡   may still behave as 
a time invariant effect which may bias adjustment coefficient estimation. Another unproved potential 
problem is that the systematic measurement error in predicted target leverage inherited from the first-stage 
estimation may act as a time-invariant effect in the second-stage estimation. Therefore, in unreported results, 
we have firstly used OLS and Fixed effects estimators to estimate both equations (3.10) & (3.11) and found a 
dramatic difference between the two groups of coefficients. This indicates that there should be unobservable 
fixed effects affecting the value of estimated adjustment speed. Considering the inconsistency of OLS and 
Fixed effects estimators in estimating dynamic panel data model, we rely on the GMM estimator. 
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of SOEs and POEs, respectively. The coefficients for the interaction term between high 
concentration indicator and deviation term are positive and highly statistically significant 
for both SOEs and POEs. This is consistent with the predication in our Hypothesis II. 
Furthermore, in magnitude, the coefficient of the POEs is much larger than that of state 
firms, indicating that the variation of ownership concentration can impose higher effects on 
the changes of leverage ratios in POEs than in SOEs. This result is consistent with the 
predication in our Hypothesis III. 
 
3.8.2 Asymmetric adjustment behaviours 
More recent studies suggest that firms’ leverage adjustment behaviours are likely to be 
asymmetric when over and under-levered (Byoun, 2008 and Faulkender et al., 2012). This 
is one limitation of the reduced one-step approach (3.4) which only generates an overall 
adjustment speed coefficient but cannot examine the asymmetric adjustment behaviours. 
To solve this issue, we can modify equation (3.1) as: 
 
 Δ𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆1𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆2𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 (3.12) 
 
where 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 = (?̂?𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝑖𝑡−1), 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to one if 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 <
0 otherwise equal to zero, 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to one if 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 ≥
0 otherwise equal to zero, 𝜆1 is the coefficient measuring the adjustment speed for over-
levered firms while 𝜆2 is the coefficient measuring the adjustment speed for under-levered 
firms.  
 
To estimate the potential differential impact from ownership structures on the leverage 
adjustment behaviours of over-levered and under-levered firms, we can parametrize the 
adjustment speed, i.e. 𝜆1 and 𝜆2 in equation (3.12), as a linear combination of a constant 
and some ownership variables: 
 
 𝜆1 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 (3.13) 
 




where 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 can be either the State ownership dummy or the High concentration 
indicator. Then we can replace 𝜆1 and 𝜆2 in equations (3.12) by the expressions (3.13) and 
(3.14), respectively and obtain our final equation as: 
 
Δ𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐0𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 +  𝑐1𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐2𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐3𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 
(3.15) 
 
where 𝑐0 and 𝑐2 are the adjustment speeds of over-levered and under-levered firms 
respectively, and 𝑐1 and 𝑐3 are the adjustment speeds affected by ownership structures for 
over-levered and under-levered firms respectively. If our Hypothesis I is correct, then 
(𝑐1 + 𝑐3) < 0 when 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 is replaced by 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡. If our Hypothesis II is correct, 
then (𝑐1 + 𝑐3) > 0 when 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 is replaced by 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡. 
 
The results are reported in Table 3.9. Column (1) contains the results for equation (3.12) 
using the full sample. Although the adjustment speed of over-levered firms is slightly 
higher than that of the under-levered firms, the difference between two coefficients (𝜆1 and 
𝜆2) is statistically weak. At the bottom of the table, we perform F-test under the null 
hypothesis that the firms present symmetric adjustment speed when they are over or under-
levered. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected at conventional significant levels. This is 
different from the results obtained by using the US firms dataset. For instance, US firms 
tend to adjust their leverage ratios faster when over-levered. The possible explanation is 
that, for CLFs, the benefits of removing excess leverage seem to be similar to the benefits 
of moving towards the target leverage from below. 
 
In column (2) of Table 3.9, we report the results for equation (3.15) by replacing 
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 with 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡. The firms with state as their ultimate controllers tend to adjust 
insignificantly faster when over-levered but substantially slower when under-levered, 
compared to the firms ultimately controlled by non-state investors. The lower adjustment 
speed of SOEs from below may indicate that SOEs have lower incentives to take the tax 
advantages of debt. Meanwhile, the combination of coefficients 𝑐1 and 𝑐2 is indeed smaller 































































AR(2) 0.907 0.861 0.544 0.863 
Hansen test 0.340 0.741 0.392 0.610 
over = under 0.608 0.039 0.592 0.783 
over = under (State/High)  0.093 0.004 0.118 
Firms 1165 1165 648 371 
Observations 9789 9789 4125 2105 
This table contains the results for equations (3.12) & (3.15). System GMM results are 
presented. (over = under) is a null hypothesis that the over-levered adjustment speed is equal 
to under-levered adjustment speed. (over = under (state/high)) is a null hypothesis that the 
over-levered SOEs adjustment speed is equal to under-levered SOEs adjustment speed. P-
values of F-tests are reported. All other information can be found in the bottom of Table 3.8. 
Definitions of all variables can be found in Appendix B. All standard errors are robust in 
brackets. P-values of AR (2) and Hansen tests are reported. Year dummies are included in all 
specifications. *, ** and *** correspond to P-values at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
We replace 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 with 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡  in equation (3.15) and estimate 
the equation for SOEs and POEs. The results are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 
3.9. For SOEs, the presence of largest shareholders owning a higher proportion of the firms’ 
total shares can result in the increase of adjustment speed for over-levered firms by around 
20% per year. This number is highly statistically significant. When under-levered, the 
SOEs with high level of ownership concentration are likely to adjust a little bit slower (5%) 
but the coefficient for the interactive term is statistically insignificant. For under-levered 
POEs, the coefficient for the triple interactive term is positive and large in magnitude as 
well as statistically significant (29%). For over-levered private firms, there is no evidence 
to show that ownership concentration level can impose any significant effect on leverage 
adjustment. Combining coefficients on the two triple interaction terms, (𝑐1 + 𝑐3) is larger 
than zero for both state and private firms, indicating that our Hypothesis II is valid. Also, 
(𝑐1_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝑐3_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒) < (𝑐1_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝑐3_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒), indicating that our Hypothesis III is valid 
as well. Notably, after controlling the effects from ownership concentration, we can see 
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that SOEs tend to adjust much slower than non-SOEs whenever over and under-levered. 
This is again consistent with the prediction in Hypothesis I.  
 
The faster over-levered adjustment speed for the highly concentrated SOEs probably 
reflects the low asset risk preference of state agency. Over the past decade, central 
government in China has gradually realized the importance of controlling the indebted 
risks of state assets. In the official document announced by SASAC 74  in 2006, the 
indebtedness level is treated as one of the most important criterions for judging a state-
owned firm’s financial performance. Furthermore, managers of SOEs are usually holding 
political positions in the government and they have no incentives to work against the 
preference of the state. Besides, the higher the proportion of ownership concentrated in 
state controlling shareholders’ hands, the higher the attention/ monitoring from the state 
agency should be. In such highly concentrated SOEs, managers may have built-in 
incentives to keep the firms’ leverage ratio at levels lower than the optimal, indicating that 
they are also more likely to be engaged in leverage reduction when firms are over-levered 
but less likely to proactively increase leverage ratios when firms are under-levered.  
 
The private blockholders may have strong incentives to prevent diluting of control. If 
the controlled firm is under-levered with high debt capacity, then the private blockholders 
may prefer to use more debt financing. The presence of large blockholders who have lower 
expropriation incentives should reduce the costs of borrowing to the controlled firms. 
Therefore, the controlled firms can more quickly increase their leverage ratios from below. 
Nevertheless, when over-levered, the coefficient for the triple interactive term is weakly 
negative and small in magnitude. This suggests that the external capital market is unlikely 
to offer flexible debt contracts to the POEs with low debt capacity, no matter whether the 
private blockholders have lower or higher incentives to practice expropriation. 
 
3.8.3 Non-linear effects from ownership concentration 
Lastly, several studies suggest a nonlinear relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance (e.g. Morck et al., 1988; Holderness et al., 1999; Tian, 
2002). Increasing ownership concentration from a very low level provides incentives as 
well as powers for large shareholders to monitor the manager behaviours. However, a 
                                                          
74 State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Details of this document can 
be found: http://www.sasac.gov.cn/2006rdzt/2006rdzt_0021/gzw/03/200701150269.htm  
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further increase in concentration may create an ambition for large shareholders to 
expropriate minority shareholders. When the concentration is close to 100%, the interests 
of controlling shareholders are completely bound up with that of the firm. In this situation, 
they do not have incentives to tunnel. Using the CLFs dataset, Ma and Tian (2010) find 
that total share ownership concentration results in an asymmetric U (V) shape of firm 
performance. This motivates us to test whether there is also a non-linear relation between 
ownership concentration and firms’ leverage adjustment speed.  
 
To examine the above inference, we firstly classify the firms into three different 
categories. In detail, a firm is added into the ‘Low (High) concentration’ group if the 
average percentage of its total share owned by its largest shareholder is lower (larger) than 
30% (50%). If a firm’s largest shareholder owns not less than 30% but not more than 50% 
of its total shares, this firm is added into the ‘Medium concentration’ group. To bypass the 
possible measurement errors, we estimate the one step reduced model (3.4). The results are 
reported in Table 3.10. In panel A, for the CLFs ultimately controlled by the state, the 
estimated coefficient for the lagged leverage ratio firstly increases from the Low to 
Medium concentration group and then decreases from the Medium to High concentration 
group. This means that the corresponding SOLAs of the firms in the Low and High 
concentration groups are larger than those of the firms in the Medium concentration group. 
The three different estimators share a similar tendency. These results suggest that the SOEs 
with a medium level of ownership concentration are more likely to suffer from the 
expropriation behaviours of their ultimate controllers than the SOEs with lower and higher 
levels of ownership concentration. In panel B, for POEs, there is an obvious linear positive 
relationship between the SOLA and the degree of ownership concentration, indicating that 
a higher level of ownership concentration may always be regarded as a sort of positive 




Table 3.10: Non-linear effects from ownership concentration 
Panel A State firms 








































AR(2) 0.962 0.947 0.468       
Hansen test 0.789 0.247 0.655       
Firms 175 287 190    175 287 190 
N 1124 1837 1193 1263 2061 1340 1263 2061 1340 
 








































AR(2) 0.942 0.308 0.868       
Hansen test 0.556 0.112 0.696       
Firms 142 159 44    142 159 44 
N 784 734 197 847 783 210 847 783 210 
This table contains the coefficient on lagged leverage ratio in equation (3.4). A firm is added into ‘Low (High) concentration’ group if the 
percentage of its total share owned by its largest shareholder is smaller (larger) than 25% (50%). If a firm’s largest shareholder owns not less 
than 25% but not larger than 50% of its total shares, then this firm will be added into ‘Medium concentration’ group. All standard errors are 
robust in brackets. P-values of AR (2) and Hansen tests are reported for GMM estimator. Year dummies are included in all specifications. 
Econometric specification is similar with the information presented at the bottom of Table 3.4. *, ** and *** correspond to P-values at 10%, 




Capital structure is not only the result of various financial characteristics of the firm but 
is also determined by the decision-makers’ choices (Pindado and La Torre, 2011). 
Ownership structure can be characterised by the degree of conflicts among decision-
makers and it has been proved to be an important determinant to variations of observed 
capital structures across firms. In this chapter, we use the Chinese listed firms (CLFs) 
dataset to test the effects from state ownership and concentration of ownership on firm’s 
leverage adjustment behaviour. 
 
We find that the trade-off theory, initially developed for US firms, presents decent 
explanatory power for the capital structure changes of CLFs. The results obtained from the 
one-step reduced dynamic leverage model show that the speed of leverage adjustment 
(SOLA) for CLFs should be around 25% to 30% per year. In the sample separation tests, 
we find that SOEs present lower SOLA than POEs. The relatively lower bankruptcy 
pressure together with the lower incentive to use interest expenses of debt to shield against 
corporate income tax can be the possible reasons for us to observe the less important role 
played by the deviations from optimal leverage ratio in determining the financing decisions 
of SOEs. Furthermore, the CLFs with more concentrated ownership structure present 
higher SOLA. We interpret this result as evidence for the argument that firms with less 
complex ownership structures, i.e. higher level of ownership concentration, may face lower 
costs of adjustment in the capital market as they are likely to be considered as safer 
borrowers with controlling shareholders who have lower incentives to expropriate 
resources away from the firms. Given lower costs of adjustment, the firms with higher 
ownership concentration should naturally present higher adjustment speed of leverage. 
This positive relation is more significant in POEs than in SOEs. A possible reason is that 
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Appendix B  
Book Leverage: (Short term debt + Long term debt + Bond payable) / Total assets 
Size: Log (Real sales) 
Age: Current year – Established year 
Cash: Cash&Cash equivalent / Total assets 
Profitability: Earnings before interest and tax / Total assets 
Tangibility: Fixed assets / Total assets  
Non-debt tax shields: Depreciation divided by total assets 
Other receivable (OACR): Other account receivable / Total assets 
Sales growth: Changes of logarithm of real sales 
Assets growth: Changes of logarithm of real total assets 
Tobin Q: (Market value of Equity + Market value of Net debt) / Total assets 
Industry Classification: SIC 12 categories 
Listed age: Listed year – current year 
Non-debt tax shields: Depreciation / Total assets 
Largest shareholder is the percentage of total shares held by the largest shareholder.  
Fixed investment: (Changes of fixed assets + depreciation)/beginning of period fixed assets 
Time variant State ownership dummy: Equal to one if a firm-year observation presents State 
agency as ultimate controller, otherwise equal to zero, i.e. non-state owned firms. 
Time invariant State ownership dummy: Equal to one if a firm has not less than 60% 
observations ultimately controlled by state agency, otherwise equal to zero, i.e. non-state owned 
firms. 
Time variant Private ownership dummy: Equal to one if a firm-year observation presents State 
agency as ultimate controller, otherwise equal to zero, i.e. non-state owned firms. 
Time invariant Private ownership dummy: Equal to one if a firm has not less than 60% 
observations ultimately controlled by private investor, otherwise equal to zero. 
Time variant High (low) concentration: If the percentage of its total shares held by its largest 
shareholder at year t is above (below) the sample average of this percentage for all the firm-year 
observations. 
Time invariant High (low) concentration: If the averaged percentage of its total shares held by 










Table B.11: Full version of Table 3.5 
Panel A Ownership types 











































































































R-squared     39.07% 40.42% 
AR(2) 0.649 0.433     
Hansen test 0.207 0.205     
Firms 884 458 884 458 884 458 
N 8632 3322 8632 3322 8632 3322 
 











































































































R-squared     35.52% 29.69% 
AR(2) 0.745 0.378     
Hansen test 0.104 0.630     
Firms 652 345 652 345 652 345 
N 6290 2174 6290 2174 6290 2174 
This table is the full version of Table 3.5. The coefficients on the independent variables, other 
than the lagged leverage ratio, capture their long-term effects on leverage choice. The calculation 





Table B.12: Full version of Table 3.6 
Panel A State Firms 











































































































R-squared     0.502 0.368 
AR(2) 0.570 0.536     
Hansen test 0.587 0.128     
Firms 365 495   365 495 
N 2377 3132 2377 3132 2685 3530 











































































































R     0.419 0.328 
AR(2) 0.666 0.727     
Hansen test 0.149 0.210     
Firms 262 390   262 390 
N 1696 2458 1696 2458 1909 2755 
This table is the full version of Table 3.6. The coefficients on the independent variables, other 
than the lagged leverage ratio, capture their long-term effects on leverage choice. The calculation 






Table B.13: Full version of Table 3.7 
Panel A Private Firms  











































































































R-squared     0.398 0.217 
AR(2) 0.282 0.166     
Hansen test 0.423 0.209     
Firms 266 178   266 178 
N 1512 856 1512 856 1661 925 











































































































R-squared     0.291 0.146 
AR(2) 0.652 0.242     
Hansen test 0.485 0.386     
Firms 193 152   193 152 
N 1025 690 1025 690 1103 737 
This table is the full version of Table 3.7. The coefficients on the independent variables, other 
than the lagged leverage ratio, capture their long-term effects on leverage choice. The calculation 






Table B.14: Multicollinearity test for specification in column (2) of Table 3.9 
Panel A 
Variables VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R-Squared 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 1.78 1.33 0.562 0.437 
𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 3.00 1.73 0.334 0.666 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 1.57 1.25 0.636 0.364 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 2.72 1.65 0.367 0.633 
Mean VIF 2.27    
     
Panel B     
Dimension Eigenvalue Cond Index 
1 2.4723 1.0000 
2 1.7587 1.1856 
3 0.3890 2.5209 
4 0.2459 3.1707 
5 0.1341 4.2932 
Condition Number 4.2932  
 
 
Table B.15: Multicollinearity test for specification in column (3) of Table 3.9 
Panel A 
Variables VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R-Squared 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 1.75 1.32 0.571 0.429 
𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 2.59 1.61 0.386 0.613 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 1.52 1.23 0.660 0.340 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 2.29 1.51 0.436 0.564 
Mean VIF 2.04    
     
Panel B     
Dimension Eigenvalue Cond Index 
1 2.4204 1.0000 
2 1.7191 1.1866 
3 0.4411 2.3423 
4 0.2705 2.9913 
5 0.1489 4.0315 














Table B.16: Multicollinearity test for specification in column (4) of Table 3.9 
Panel A 
Variables VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R-Squared 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 1.76 1.33 0.567 0.433 
𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 1.65 1.29 0.604 0.395 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 1.47 1.21 0.681 0.319 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 1.38 1.17 0.725 0.274 
Mean VIF 1.57    
     
Panel B     
Dimension Eigenvalue Cond Index 
1 2.2655 1.0000 
2 1.6108 1.1859 
3 0.5577 2.0156 
4 0.3886 2.4146 
5 0.1775 3.5727 





















Table B.17: Examples for leverage of firms in Very High Portfolio 
ID 
Year 
522 585 628 600620 600778 
2000 0.577 0.434 0.357 0.510 0.358 
2001 0.488 0.420 0.313 0.578 0.292 
2002 0.530 0.315 0.403 0.446 0.323 
2003 0.499 0.204 0.485 0.485 0.314 
2004 0.519 0.132 0.508 0.403 0.290 
2005 0.480 0.066 0.474 0.479 0.301 
2006 0.501 0.052 0.281 0.357 0.254 
2007 0.447 0.046 0.209 0.325 0.174 
2008 0.466 0.026 0.179 0.235 0.137 
2009 0.413 0.030 0.189 0.428 0.098 
2010 0.334 0.040 0.113 0.160 0.139 
522: Guangzhou Baiyunshan Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. (SOE), Medical 
585: Northeast Electric Development Co. Ltd. (non-SOE), Equipment 
628: Chengdu Hi-tech Dev (SOE), Real estate 
600620: Shanghai Tianchen Co., Ltd (non-SOE), General 
600778: Xinjiang Youhao (Group) CO., LTD (SOE), Retailing 
 
 
Table B.18: Examples for leverage of firms in High Portfolio 
ID 
Year 
40 701 739 200706 600774 
2000 0.291 0.271 0.214 0.236 0.250 
2001 0.351 0.273 0.330 0.291 0.370 
2002 0.440 0.272 0.326 0.310 0.397 
2003 0.408 0.275 0.362 0.301 0.304 
2004 0.352 0.245 0.441 0.287 0.382 
2005 0.325 0.299 0.413 0.212 0.339 
2006 0.344 0.229 0.344 0.251 0.336 
2007 0.211 0.341 0.284 0.214 0.295 
2008 0.276 0.165 0.287 0.165 0.275 
2009 0.245 0.143 0.240 0.220 0.283 
2010 0.130 0.120 0.268 0.205 0.251 
40: Shenzhen Jihong Co., Ltd. (SOE), Real estate 
701: Xiamen Xindeco (SOE), General 
739: Wafangdian Bearing (non-SOE), Equipment 
200706: Apeloa (non-SOE), Medical 










Table B.19: Examples for leverage of firms in Medium Portfolio 
ID 
Year 
2 419 837 952 600051 
2000 0.114 0.182 0.189 0.142 0.182 
2001 0.248 0.173 0.282 0.210 0.152 
2002 0.075 0.209 0.249 0.225 0.297 
2003 0.183 0.272 0.218 0.289 0.360 
2004 0.109 0.243 0.242 0.319 0.288 
2005 0.095 0.277 0.242 0.276 0.188 
2006 0.252 0.273 0.187 0.270 0.097 
2007 0.174 0.220 0.184 0.079 0.115 
2008 0.115 0.230 0.159 0.067 0.188 
2009 0.135 0.218 0.187 0.212 0.213 
2010 0.121 0.263 0.113 0.237 0.167 
2: Vanke (SOE), Real estate 
419: Changsha Tongcheng (SOE), Retailing 
837: Shaanxi Qinchuan Machinery Development Co., Ltd. (SOE), Equip. 
952: Hubei Guangji Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. (SOE), Medical 
600051: Ningbo United Group Co., Ltd. (SOE), Retailing 
 
 
Table B.20: Examples for leverage of firms in Low Portfolio 
ID 
Year 
31 153 617 600643 600697 
2000 0.056 0.066 0 0.110 0.027 
2001 0.139 0.091 0.032 0.203 0.086 
2002 0.120 0.063 0.125 0.087 0.087 
2003 0.149 0.101 0 0.142 0.070 
2004 0.238 0.191 0 0.116 0.136 
2005 0.218 0.281 0.086 0.194 0.121 
2006 0.305 0.238 0.217 0.234 0.188 
2007 0.247 0.160 0.266 0.131 0.139 
2008 0.367 0.187 0.171 0.134 0.158 
2009 0.252 0.233 0.226 0.142 0.114 
2010 0.371 0.189 0 0.161 0.120 
31: COFCO Property (Group) (SOE), Real estate 
153: Anhui Fengyuan (SOE), Medical 
617: Ji'nan Diesel Engine Co., Ltd. (SOE), Equipment 
600643: Shanghai Aijian co., Ltd. (non-SOE), General 









Further sample description: 
The annual firm-level dataset is drawn from China Stock Market & Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) database. Different from the NBS dataset, the CSMAR dataset contains 
significantly less number of firms. Nevertheless, the data quality of CSMAR dataset should 
be much better than that of the NBS dataset, since the former is the pure accounting record 
or the information extracted from the stock market while the latter is the census like data 
which may contain some systematic recording issues. More importantly, the unlisted firms 
in NBS dataset do not report many of their financial variables, e.g. financial debt. In the 
CSMAR dataset, however, most of financial variables that will be used in our research are 
clearly identified. Major corporate governance indicators are also non-existent in the NBS 
dataset but are reported in detail by the CSMAR dataset. To explore the potential long-
term effects from the 4 trillion RMB fiscal stimulus plan on firms’ behaviours, we have 
also extended the CSMAR dataset to the end of 2016 in Chapter 4.  
 















1999 653 53 146     
2000 736 75 157     
2001 781 94 154     
2002 784 144 150     
2003 778 217 134 43% 55% 59% 61% 
2004 788 289 135 42% 55% 59% 61% 
2005 790 307 113 40% 54% 57% 60% 
2006 762 373 122 36% 48% 52% 56% 
2007 764 450 135 35% 47% 51% 55% 
2008 800 499 118 36% 48% 50% 54% 
2009 775 511 53 36% 47% 50% 54% 
2010 671 474 50 36% 47% 54% 54% 
All ownership indicators are time variant. The ‘Other’ category includes: foreign firms, 
collective firms and so on. ‘Top 1 Largest’ means the proportion of shares hold by the 
first largest shareholder. ‘Top 3 Largest’ means the sum of proportions of shares owned 
by the first 3 largest shareholders. Similarly, the ‘Top 5’ and ‘Top 10’ indicate the first 5 









Table B.22: Industry distribution 
 Full sample State Private 
Agriculture 286 161 109 
Mining 144 130 9 
Manufacturing 9026 5516 2222 
Construction 270 185 63 
Transportation 23 15 6 
Technology 860 473 300 
Retailing 1173 829 188 
Real estate 1159 614 341 
Service 366 225 64 
Media 51 48 0 
Other 805 423 241 




























Chapter 4                                    
Short debt maturity and corporate 
investment: New evidence from 






The recent debt refinancing problem in China has aroused widespread concern. For 
example, in the economy, the share of short-term external debt in the overall external debt 
grew to 78% at the end of 2013 (Sun, 2015). According to an IMF report, the China non-
financial corporate debt ratio approached 169% of its GDP in the first quarter of 2016 and 
more than half of these debts will come due in less than 3 years (Maliszewski et al., 2016). 
The declining profitability of the corporate sector may further deteriorate the economy’s 
repayment ability as a whole (Chivakul and Lam, 2015). In this chapter, we use the 
Chinese listed firms (CLFs) dataset over 1998 – 2016 to explicitly study the impact from 
short debt maturity on capital expenditures through the channel of rollover risk. 
 
The effect of capital structure related decisions on corporate investment is a 
fundamental issue in corporate finance. In their seminal paper, Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) show that in a complete and perfect capital market, capital structure is irrelevant to 
a firm’s investment decisions. By relaxing the perfect capital market assumption, Myers 
(1977) firstly demonstrates a debt overhang concept that if risky debt matures after the 
expiration of investment option, then the equity value maximizing shareholder-
management coalition will have lower incentive to invest in the positive NPV project since 
the benefits accrue, at least partially, to debtholders. To avoid such an underinvestment 
issue, managers can implement a policy of rolling over shorter term debt since a contract 
with shorter maturity offers more space for renegotiation between equityholders and 
debtholders before the expiration of growth opportunities. Nevertheless, the flexibility of 
short-term debt is accompanied by high rollover loss (Bodie and Taggart, 1978 and 
Flannery, 1986). As the short-term issues are rolled over, the firm suffers the full 
consequences of any undervaluation (Barnea et al., 1980), interest rate changes (Wall, 
1989) and sub-optimal liquidations (Diamond, 1991 and Sharp, 1991). 
 
Empirically, several studies indeed detect a significant negative relation from debt 
maturity to a firm’s capital expenditure (Aivazian et al., 2005b and Dang, 2011), indicating 
that longer term debt can generate larger overhang costs and hence less investment 
incentives. Nevertheless, the mainstream literature on debt maturity has only applied 
theories to the behaviours of firms from developed economies with very mature capital 
markets. A common feature of these firms’ capital structure decisions is that they mainly 
rely on long-term debt financing and merely regard short-term debt as complementary over 
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time. Specifically, the averaged ratio of long-term debt to total debt is 0.72 in the US, 0.59 
in France and 0.53 in Germany (Barclay and Smith, 1995 and Antoniou et al., 2006). In 
such a situation, the (negative) impact from short-term debt usage, e.g. rollover risk, on 
firms’ real economic decisions may be difficult to fully investigate. 
 
In the Chinese economy, the relatively immature capital market together with a bank 
dominating financial system results in the prevalence of heavy reliance on short-term debt 
financing among non-financial companies. For example, Cai et al. (2008) first notice that 
Chinese (listed) firms have an abnormally low average ratio of long-term debt to total debt, 
i.e. 0.23, compared to the firms in the above mentioned developed economies. This feature 
of capital structure decisions of Chinese (listed) firms offers us an excellent chance to 
analyse the systematic role played by short-term debt in determining firms’ real decisions. 
The primary reason for us to concentrate on investment behaviour is that fixed capital 
accumulation has been a significant determinant of economic growth in China over the 
past one to two decades (Ding and Knight, 2009; 2011). 
 
Although short-term debt can provide low interest advantages at the moment, over 
reliance on it can make firms suffer from high rollover risk which will in turn substantially 
increase costs of future borrowing (Goplalan et al., 2014 and Wang et al., 2016). Therefore, 
we argue that in an economy where short-term bank loan is the major financing resource, 
such as that of China, firms with shorter debt maturity tend to suffer more from potential 
rollover risks, and hence are more likely to cut their near future capital expenditures. 
Furthermore, Diamond and He (2014) theoretically prove that a short-term debtholder does 
not share as much risk as a long-term debtholder and that this leads to more volatile 
earnings and equity value, and hence larger overhang costs when a firm’s assets-in-place 
deteriorates. Since firms in China are subject to more stringent lending conditions than the 
firms in developed economies (Allen et al., 2008), their debt refinancing activities are more 
likely to be affected negatively by deterioration in their own financial health or contraction 
in outside credit-supply. 
  
To test our hypotheses, we estimate a classical investment regression augmented by 
leverage and short debt maturity (Lang et al., 1996 and Aivazian et al., 2005b). Using the 
full sample, the first-differenced GMM results generate a significantly negative coefficient 
on short debt maturity term. The results show that a 10% increase in the sample average 
value of short debt maturity will lead to a reduction in fixed investment by 0.03, i.e. around 
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11% of the sample average investment value. This indicates that firms in China indeed 
invest less when they have shorter debt maturity. We further classify firms into different 
groups according to their own financial health conditions, measured by liquidity ratio, 
solvency and Z-score. The sample separation tests clearly show that the firms with 
relatively bad financial conditions are more likely to suffer from the rollover risk 
associated with shorter debt maturity and present lower capital expenditures. More 
specifically, the absolute value of coefficient on short debt maturity is much larger for the 
firms in the group marked as low liquidity/ solvency/ Z-score. These results are consistent 
with our hypothesis that shorter debt maturity imposes a larger overhang effect on the 
investment of firms with worse financial health. 
 
The 2008 financial crisis is regarded as an exogenous credit shock which amplified the 
negative impact from credit risk by dramatically increasing the rollover risk in the whole 
capital market. Most recent studies find that the firms that used more short-term debt pre-
crisis or had a large amount of debt due in 2008 cut their investment expenditures much 
more during and after the crisis than otherwise similar firms who had less refinancing 
requirements when the crisis happened (Almeida et al., 2011 and Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 
2015). Nevertheless, the situation is different in China. At the end of 2008, the central 
government proposes a 4 trillion fiscal stimulus plan implemented in 2009 and 2010. In 
other words, the credit-supply condition should be tighter before the crisis in the Chinese 
economy. Therefore, if we classify the sample into before and after the financial crisis, 
then we are actually comparing firms’ behaviours in the periods with and without a credit 
boom. Our results show that the negative effect of shorter debt maturity on investment 
becomes much smaller after the year 2008 than before. This indicates that the rollover risk 
faced by firms may be temporarily reduced by the injection of more long-term bank loans 
due to the implementation of government policy. However, some scholars argue that the 
fiscal stimulus plan was carried out at the expense of future long-term economic growth in 
China (Chen et al., 2017 and Cong et al., 2017). 
 
We also test the ownership effect on the debt-investment relation. SOEs in China are 
believed to have soft budget constraints as well as much lower default costs of debt than 
non-SOEs (Fan et al., 2013). For example, SOEs are able to borrow more long-term bank 
loans at lower interest costs (Liu et al., 2011). Therefore, compared with non-SOEs, SOEs 
should face lower rollover pressure and hence should present lower sensitivity of 
investment to short debt maturity. Nevertheless, due to strong government intervention, 
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SOEs are also likely to suffer from inefficient investment decisions which can result in 
poor financial performances (Fan et al. 2007). Based on the hypothesis that financially 
weak firms suffer more from the refinancing problem associated with high reliance on 
short-term debt, investments of SOEs may be more sensitive to the variation of short-term 
indebtedness than those of non-SOEs. These two contrasting predictions motivate us to do 
detailed sample separation tests between SOEs and non-SOEs. Our results show that the 
investments of SOEs are negatively affected by shorter debt maturity but the corresponding 
marginal impact from shorter debt maturity on the investments of SOEs is much lower than 
that of non-SOEs. Therefore, to be consistent with the argument in many previous Chinese 
studies, we conclude that soft budget constraints may reduce the importance of financial 
variables for SOEs’ investment decisions.  
 
In the robustness tests, we first clarify the concept of over-reliance on short-term debt. 
Theoretically, firms can choose a shorter but optimal maturity structure by balancing the 
interest benefits and the rollover costs of short-term debt (Jun and Jen, 2003). Therefore, 
the firms with an excessive proportion of short-term debt in their debt structure tend to 
suffer more from refinancing pressure and hence have lower incentives to take positive 
growth opportunities. Using predicted short debt maturity as well as industry median value 
of this variable as the target short debt maturity, we indeed find that only the firms with the 
level of short debt maturity higher than the optimal tend to reduce investment expenditures.  
Furthermore, we have also considered the potential effects from time variant financial 
health indicators, industry characteristics and alternative definitions to regression variables. 
Our major inference does not change significantly. 
 
Our research contributes to previous literature in the following aspects. First, we 
provide new systematic evidence on the impact of short-term debt on a firm’s investment 
incentives. Several recent theoretical studies propose mixed predictions about the potential 
impact from short-term debt usage on a firm’s real economic decisions (Moyen, 2007 and 
Diamond and He, 2014). The major reason is that the overhang costs generated by debt 
with different maturities are likely to be state contingent. Our work explicitly considers 
such a problem. Second, previous empirical studies using US and EU firms’ dataset show 
that the underinvestment issue caused by shorter debt maturity is either non-existent or 
only appearing during a time of financial crisis (Almeida et al., 2011 and Kalemli-Ozcan et 
al., 2015). Nevertheless, we find that in an economy with the prevalence of heavy reliance 
on short-term debt financing, underinvestment associated with short debt maturity should 
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be a common phenomenon among firms. The corresponding implication of our results may 
be useful for some other emerging economies in which firms face high costs of long-term 
financing. Furthermore, Custodio et al. (2013) first notice that the financing of US firms 
has gradually shifted from long-term debt to short-term debt over the past two to three 
decades and that this change definitely exposes these firms to credit and liquidity shocks. 
Therefore, our results may also be generalized to developed economies, in certain aspects. 
Lastly, to the best of our knowledge, no past literature has studied the relation between 
investment and debt maturity by using the Chinese firms dataset. We fill this gap and 
conduct comprehensive analyses. 
 
The structure of this chapter follows: Section 2 is the literature review. Section 3 
describes the Chinese background. Section 4 develops our working hypotheses. Section 5 
explains the empirical methods. Section 6 provides data descriptions and some stylized 
facts. Section 7 reports the regression results. Section 8 conducts robustness tests. Section 
9 concludes our main findings. 
 
 
4.2 Literature review 
The plausible causal relation from debt maturity to corporate investment can be traced 
back to an idea in a seminal paper by Myers (1977), who proposes the concept of debt 
overhang. In detail, a firm with assets comprising risky debt has to pay a premium to 
debtholders. If debt matures after the expiration of the investment option, then the equity 
value maximizing shareholder-management coalition will have lower incentive to invest in 
the positive NPV project since the benefits accrue, at least partially, to debtholders. In 
some extreme cases, e.g. the costs of investment plus the costs of debt larger than the 
return of the project, the growth opportunity will even be abandoned. One possible method 
to avoid such underinvestment issue is by shortening the maturity of outstanding debt.
75 The key assumption is that shorter term debt matures before the expiration of growth 
option, which offers a space for shareholders and debtholders to renegotiate the debt 
contract so as to reduce the promised payment to creditors below the NPV of investment. 
                                                          
75  Myers (1977) also discuss other possible methods: e.g. rewriting/ renegotiating the debt contract; 




Therefore, it seems that permanent debt capital is best obtained by a policy of rolling over 
shorter term debt.  
 
Nevertheless, the conventional idea indicates that firms should avoid relying on short-
term debt since the flexibility of short-term debt is accompanied by high potential rollover 
risks. For example, Bodie and Taggart (1978) mention that a firm’s choice of long-term 
debt may either reflect a desire to avoid transaction costs or a fear of credit rationing. 
Barnea et al. (1980) argue that the degree of undervaluation of each single short-term debt 
issuance may be smaller than for a bond with a maturity equal to the revelation period; but 
as the short-term issues are rolled over, the firm suffers the full consequences of any 
realised or foreseeable undervaluation. Similarly, Flannery (1986) argues that a firm 
without a signalling requirement should choose long-term debt over short-term debt since 
the former can eliminate or substantially postpone the effects of uncertainty about the 
refinancing rate, e.g. interest rate changes (Wall, 1989). Additionally, given the relatively 
higher rollover frequency of short-term contracts, borrowers also face a higher possibility 
of undergoing sub-optimal liquidation as the short-term lenders tend to ignore the value of 
future control rents and will choose to liquidate whenever sign appears to show that the 
amount that can be pledged is less than the value received from liquidation. Without very 
appropriate handling of contracting problems, this excessive liquidation issue is difficult to 
solve (Diamond, 1991). In contrast, long-term debt alleviates incentive problems by 
shifting some of the financing costs from bad to good states of nature, but without the 
complexity of a fully explicit contingent contract (Sharp, 1991). Overall, the symptom of 
short-term debt overhang caused by rollover losses may generate even stronger 
underinvestment incentives. 
 
The conflicting opinions above motivate more systematic studies for the possible 
differential impact from short-term and long-term debts on firms’ investment. For instance, 
Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) model the reorganization process to a financially distressed 
firm and show that short-term debt has more ex post negative effect on investment. Moyen 
(2007) measures overhang costs with long-term debt or short-term debt quantitatively. 
Moyen focuses on an assumed asymmetry in leverage adjustment such that leverage cannot 
be adjusted if there is long-term debt but can be adjusted every period if short-term debt is 
issued. In worse income shocks, short-term debt overhang is smaller than long-term debt 
overhang since the firm can reduce its leverage. As income shocks improve, the firm can 
take advantage of tax shields by using more short-term debt but the default probability, and 
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consequently the overhang problem, remains present, i.e. short-term debt overhang 
surpasses long-term debt overhang in better income shocks. Nevertheless, the overall 
overhang effect is similar across both maturity structures. More recently, Diamond and He 
(2014) use a Black-Scholes-Merton model to further introduce the concept of contingent 
overhang. They show that if a firm invests immediately before the release of any new 
information about the value of existing assets, the overhang at the current time is just the 
equally-weighted average of all possible future levels of overhang in different states. In 
this situation, shorter term debt imposes a lower overhang since it is less sensitive to the 
variation of firm value. In contrast, if the investment opportunity appears after some 
resolution of uncertainty about existing assets but before short-term debt has matured, then 
the shorter term debt can impose a stronger negative effect on investment incentives when 
the released information implies the deterioration of assets-in-place. The reason is that 
sharing of less risk by shorter-term debt holders implies more volatile earnings and equity 
value, and hence larger debt overhang. 
 
Empirically, Aivazian et al. (2005b) firstly present a significant negative relation 
between debt maturity and investment in non-financial firms with high growth 
opportunities. This is consistent with the idea that debt overhang costs are larger for firms 
with more growth options. Considering the possible endogenous relation that firms could 
mitigate the underinvestment problem by lowering the debt maturity if future growth 
opportunities are recognized sufficiently early, using a panel of UK firms, Dang (2011) 
develops a system of structural equations that models leverage, debt maturity and firm 
investment simultaneously. Although the obtained results do not support the hypothesis 
that firms can (or are willing to) proactively adjust debt maturity to reduce 
underinvestment issue, a highly robust ex-post negative impact from maturity to actual 
investment, a result similar to that of Aivazian et al. (2005b), is still found in high growth 
firms. There are two possible reasons. First, not all investment opportunities are observable. 
Second, even if all growth opportunities are foreseeable, cost of adjustments can also 
prevent firms freely adjusting their capital structures. In other words, the coefficient for 
maturity term in the investment regression should, at least partially, reflect the ex-post 
overhang effect generated by longer term debt, which may become more severe with 
unanticipated investment opportunities.  
 
The recent financial crisis in 2008 offers an excellent experimental lab for testing the 
causal effect of capital structure related decisions on real behaviours conditioned on a 
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relatively exogenous credit shock. For example, using a difference-in-differences matching 
estimator method, Almeida et al. (2011) find that US firms with a large proportion of long-
term debt maturing at the end of 2007 cut their investment much more than otherwise 
similar firms whose debt was scheduled to mature after 2008. Nevertheless, such a 
phenomenon is not observed during a period without credit contraction and also becomes 
insignificant for firms who do not relay on long-term debt as their major financing resource. 
Furthermore, using an extensive pan-European firm-bank matched data set, Kalemli-Ozcan 
et al. (2015) find that firms finance investment increasingly using more short-term debt in 
the run-up to crisis and expose themselves to rollover risk when the lending standards are 
tightened. Their results show that short-term debt does not curtail investment during 
normal times but turns into a heavy drag on investment during crisis times. The 
interpretation is that the sudden deterioration of the lending environment can substantially 
increase rollover risk for short-term debt and force firms with shorter maturity to reduce 
capital expenditures. 
 
In conclusion, debt maturity structure affects debt overhang and the corresponding 
connection can be state-contingent. More specifically, shorter term debt should generate a 
larger negative impact on capital expenditure if firms face higher liquidity or rollover risks 
which can either be caused by deteriorating outside credit-supply conditions or distress in 
their own financial status. On the other hand, in normal times, shorter term debt may 
impose lower ex-post overhang effects since it is less sensitive to increased firm value from 
new investment and its flexibility can also offer a space for renegotiation between equity 
and debt holders. Therefore, firms in principle can trade off the cost of underinvestment 
problems against the cost of increased liquidity risk when choosing short debt maturity 
(Johnson, 2003). Nevertheless, due to costs of adjustment, the stickiness of debt level and 











4.3 CLFs preference for short-term debt financing 
The common limitation in previous literature studying debt maturity structure is that the 
authors merely concentrate on firms in developed economics with a mature financial 
market in which firms relay on long-term debt as their major interest generating liability. 
For example, if we define debt maturity as the percentage of total debt that matures in 
more than one year, then the mean (median) value of this ratio is 0.72 (0.83) for US; 0.46 
(0.47) for UK; 0.53 (0.57) for Germany and 0.59 (0.61) for France (Barclay and Smith, 
1995; Antoniou et al., 2006). In these economies, short-term debt is probably just treated 
by non-financial firms as complementary to long-term debt. It is not surprising therefore 
that some studies using the US firms dataset even interpret the ‘long-term’ as the maturing 
period over at least 3 years (Custodio et al., 2013). Therefore, the impact from short-term 
debt usage on firms’ real economic decisions may not be fully presented by previous 
empirical work. To fill this gap, in this chapter, we investigate the casual relation of firms’ 
heavy reliance on short-term debt to their capital expenditures, by using the listed firm-
level dataset from the Chinese economy where short-term debt is the dominating external 
credit resource for most local companies.  
 
Cai et al. (2008) first notice the abnormally low ratio of long-term debt to total debt for 
Chinese (listed) firms, i.e. 0.23, compared to the firms in the above mentioned developed 
economies. There are several possible reasons for firms in China to depend on short-term 
debt financing. First, the Chinese economy has a bank dominating financial system, in 
which official lending activities are largely controlled by the credit supply from the 
banking sector. Therefore, the first choice of debt financing for Chinese firms is usually 
bank loan (Ayyagari et al., 2010). For instance, firms in the state sector relay on bank loans 
to raise more than 25% of their total financing needs (Allen et al., 2005). Measuring the 
size of the banking system as total debt credit to non-state sectors divided by GDP, over 
2001–2007, the ratio is 116%, which is considerably larger than the average of other major 
emerging economies in the world, i.e. around 65% (Allen et al., 2008). It is common 
knowledge that banks prefer to lend short-term debt (Custodio et al., 2013).  
 
Second, poor creditor protection, the low judicial and institutional efficiency can result 
in higher costs but fewer choices to long-term debt financing. Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1998) find that a greater proportion of firms use long-term external financing 
in countries with more efficient legal systems. This is because an effective legal system 
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can better protect the interest of creditors by deterring violations and enforcing 
compensation for infractions. Given low foreseeable recovery rates, creditors in China’s 
capital market should naturally impose higher risk premium on a debt contract with longer 
maturity. Besides, China’s corporate bond market is poorly developed and the major 
source of long-term debt available for most non-financial firms is still bank loan. Although 
banks have an advantage in minimizing costs of financial distress but face their own 
intermediation costs that are passed on to the borrower, so bank long-term debt is 
nominally more expensive than public long-term bond (Cantillo and Wright, 2000). To 
survive under such a financing environment, Chinese firms may proactively choose shorter 
term debt, thereby minimizing the interest costs.  
 
Lastly, the weak legal protection of individual investors and the lack of enforcement of 
company laws may encourage managers to replace long-term debt by equity issuance 
(Chen, 2004). Specifically, Li et al. (2008) find that 52% of managers of CLFs in their 
surveyed sample think that costs of equity are lower than costs of debt. He (2012) also 
finds that the dividend pay-out ratio of CLFs is much lower than that of the firms in 
developed economies. Nevertheless, China’s stock market has a complex regulatory 
system which makes common equity financing very inflexible.76 Except for some basic 
legal rules, the listed firms also have to fulfil the regulations formulated by CSRC in order 
to obtain offering rights.77 From 1993 to 2006, such regulations have been changed at least 
5 times, indicating that the final decision rights of IPOs and SPOs are controlled by 
government hands.78 Due to high policy restrictions, firms’ equity issuing decisions may 
largely depend on whether or not they can fulfil the criterion to issue rather than their 
specific financial requirements. Therefore, considering the higher observable transactions 
costs and the long approving process of issuing new equity, CLFs may not be able to use 




                                                          
76 Although the stock market is a symbol of capitalism, it was treated as an experiment by Deng Xiaoping, 
the paramount political leader at that time, who made an explicit pledge to close it down if this experiment 
turned out to be against the interests of the people. This was another important reason for the existence of the 
complex regulatory system, constrained IPOs and limited secondary public offering in China’s stock market. 
77 China’s Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is an institution of the State Council of the People's 
Republic of China, with ministry-level rank. It is the main regulator of the securities industry in China. 
78 According to the regulations, firms are required to reach a certain level of performance, including historical 
profitability and dividend pay-out, for example. Nevertheless, it is sometimes difficult for CSRC to exactly 
judge the real situation of the firm.  
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4.4 Hypothesis development 
Given the number of factors that result in the prevalence of heavy reliance on short-term 
debt financing among Chinese non-financial firms, the question arises about what the 
economic outcome of such an ‘extreme’ choice of short debt maturity could be. In this 
chapter, we provide answers with respect to firms’ investment decisions as fixed capital 
accumulation is a significant determinant of economic growth in China over the past one to 
two decades (Ding and Knight, 2009; 2011). More specifically, we argue that firms with 
shorter debt maturity tend to invest less, since they face higher rollover risks. In terms of 
consequence, the debt overhang effect described in this chapter is similar to the 
underinvestment issue in Myers (1977). However, the working mechanism is somewhat 
different. 
 
To begin with, we argue that the preference for Chinese listed firms (CLFs) to apply 
short debt maturity policy is mainly driven by the relative costs advantage as well as 
accessibility of short-term debt. The conventional ideas, i.e. owner-manager conflicts and 
signalling requirement, should present less explanatory power (Cai et al., 2008). In detail, 
some specific characteristics of corporate governance system in China, e.g. high ownership 
concentration and government nominated management, indicate that managers of CLFs 
have low incentives to work against shareholders (Jiang and Kim, 2015). Therefore, 
shareholders may have less incentive to discipline managers’ behaviours by using more 
short-term debt to reduce free cash flow by forcing the firm to repay principals periodically. 
Furthermore, all studies exploring the effect of changes in credit supply at bank level on 
firm level outcomes recognize that bank-firm relation is likely to be stable (Greanstone et 
al., 2015 and Chodorow-Reich, 2014). A longer relation means more information filtered 
to banks (Farinha and Santos, 2002). In practice, bypassing information problems, most 
bank loans in China are backed by collateral, and the only type of collateral acceptable to 
many banks is land or buildings (Gregory and Tenev 2001 and Cousin 2006). Therefore, 
shorter maturity structure itself may not be treated as a signalling tool for CLFs to convey 
their qualities to banks.  
 
Although the motivation behind short-term debt usage of Chinese firms is different 
from what has been suggested by conventional theories, it does not mean that these firms 
are also immune from the well-recognized disadvantage of relying on short-term debt, i.e. 
high rollover risk. Generally, cost of debt financing increases with credit risk which can be 
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amplified due to refinancing risk (He and Xiong, 2012). Empirically, Gopalan et al. (2014) 
show that the firms with greater exposure to rollover risk (measured by the amount of bond 
payable within one year) have lower credit quality and face higher yield spreads. Chiu et al. 
(2015) find that the rollover risk exposure also increases firm default probabilities. Wang 
et al. (2016) argue that the rollover risk effect is more significant in private debt markets 
since private debts are usually settled at shorter maturity than public traded debts. Using 
firm-bank syndicated loan data, their results indicate that firms using more short-term debt 
have to pay higher bank loan spreads. The implication of all this evidence is that creditors 
will require higher risk premium by more than that justified on default risk alone once they 
perceive a high level of borrowers’ short-term repayment pressure. Therefore, in an 
economy where short-term bank loan is the major financing resource for firms, such as that 
of China, it is reasonable for us to conjecture that firms with shorter debt maturity tend to 
suffer more from the potential rollover risks, and hence are more likely to cut their near 
future capital expenditures due to either unfordable high costs for further borrowing or 
high existent repayment pressure.  
 
Hypothesis I: A Chinese firm with shorter debt maturity should present lower capital 
expenditure. 
 
The overhang costs generated by short-term debt are proved to be significantly larger at 
bad state, i.e. inside financial weakness or outside credit-supply contraction, since the 
rollover risks in these situations are much higher than in normal time. For example, when a 
firm’s assets-in-place deteriorates, a short-term debtholder does not share as much risk as a 
long-term debtholder and this leads to more volatile earnings and equity value, and hence 
larger overhang costs (Diamond and He, 2014). Furthermore, Duchin et al. (2010) and 
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015) find that firms having high short-term debt before the 2008 
financial crisis presented more significant decline in investment after the crisis. The main 
reason is that lenders are often unwilling to renew expiring credit lines during economic 
downturn when collateral values drop. Even worse, Acharya et al. (2011) introduce a 
‘market freeze’ phenomenon such that exorbitant rollover risk can result in a sudden 
collapse in the ability to borrow short-term debt against long-lived assets through the 
whole market even if fundamental value of collateral is at its highest level. To avoid sub-
optimal liquidation, therefore, firms at bad state may extract more internal funds for debt 




As emphasized by Cull and Xu (2005) and Allen et al. (2008), Chinese banks are 
unwilling to lend secured loans unless they have high enough bargaining power as well as 
ability to seize collateralized assets upon default. Having such a dominating position in 
credit relation, it is very hard to believe that banks in China will play a very proactive role 
in relieving borrowers’ financial strain. Additionally, unlike moveable assets, tangible 
assets are usually utilized in the daily production process of non-financial firms. If the new 
investment project is highly irreversible and requires a time relatively longer than expected 
to generate new cash flow, then the default losses caused by the sudden break in the 
financing chain can be devastating for equityholders, e.g. termination of production or 
even losing the whole future control rents. Therefore, in comparison to the firms listed in 
developed economies, in terms of debt refinancing, CLFs are more likely to suffer from 
deterioration in their own financial health or contraction in outside credit-supply.  
 
Hypothesis II: Shorter debt maturity should impose larger overhang effect on 
investment decision for the firms with bad financial health or when the credit-supply is 
contracted. 
 
Corporate financing decisions is likely to be different between SOEs and non-SOEs in 
China. Simply speaking, SOEs usually have better access to debt credits and are able to 
borrow more long-term bank loans than non-SOEs (Liu et al., 2011). Also, they are 
believed to have much lower default costs of debt (Fan et al., 2013). Therefore, it is 
reasonable to infer that SOEs on average face lower rollover risks than non-SOEs. The 
corresponding implication is that the underinvestment issue caused by shorter debt 
maturity is likely to be less severe for SOEs or the negative impact from shorter debt 
maturity on investment should be lower in SOEs than in non-SOEs. Nevertheless, several 
previous studies also find that SOEs tend to have worse financial performances than non-
SOEs (Wei and Varela, 2003; Fan et al., 2007 and Li et al., 2008). The explicit or implicit 
government support may create a sort of soft budget constraint incentive problem which 
can reduce the efficiency of operating and investment decisions of SOEs. In the extreme 
situation, the direct government intervention can force SOEs to conduct political projects 
and to deviate from profit maximizing strategies. Either of these two issues can result in 
the worse financial condition of SOEs than that of non-SOEs which are more efficient and 
suffer less from direct government intervention. Based on the inference of our Hypothesis 
II, it is also reasonable to expect that SOEs present a negative short debt maturity-
investment relation stronger than that of non-SOEs since SOEs are more likely to have 
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worse financial performances than non-SOEs79. Therefore, instead of proposing a specific 
hypothesis for the potential variation of the marginal impact from shorter debt maturity on 
investment decision between the firms with and without state ownership, we firstly 
generate the results and then see which logic is more plausible. 
 
Finally, the stock market in China was initially established to finance those very largest 
SOEs who have close relations with government at either central or local level. After two 
to three decades of decentralization and privatization, a large proportion of shares in the 
stock market are still firmly grasped by governments’ hands. In Figure C.4 in Appendix C, 
we can clearly see that the number of SOEs is much larger than the number of non-SOEs 
in the stock market from 1999 to 2010. Nevertheless, the number of non-SOEs is growing 
very fast during this period and it finally exceeds the number of SOEs at 2012. In Table 4.1, 
we can also see that on average almost 60% of firms are controlled by government. 
Therefore, the listed firms’ dataset offers a considerably good laboratory to analyse the 
potential effect of government intervention on the debt-investment relation at firm-level. 
 
 
4.5 Empirical specification 
4.5.1 Baseline model 
We apply a reduced form investment equation as our baseline model. The specification 




= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2
𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑇𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑡 
(4.1) 
 
where 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is fixed investment of firm 𝑖 at time  𝑡 ; 𝐾𝑖.𝑡−1 is lagged fixed assets; 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is total financial debt divided by total assets; 𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is cash flow defined as 
earnings before interest, tax and depreciation; 𝑆𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 is our key variable measuring the 
level of short debt maturity and is defined as the financial debt maturing within one year 
(including one year) divided by total financial debt (Johnson, 2003 and Wang et al., 2016); 
                                                          
79 For more details about (financial) performance of SOEs over the past one to two decades, please refer to Li 
et al. (2010) and Lardy (2014). 
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𝑇𝑡 is time dummy; 𝜇𝑖 is firm-level fixed effect; 𝑖,𝑡 is idiosyncratic error term. According to 
our Hypothesis I, 𝛽4 should be negative and statistically significant. After controlling the 
level of leverage, the firms with shorter debt maturity invest less due to higher rollover risk.  
 
4.5.2 Sample classification methods 
To test our Hypothesis II, we have to firstly classify firms into different groups 
according to their own financial health. Refinancing risks of short-term debt are more 
likely to be triggered when firms are trapped in financial problems. The assumption behind 
this is quite realistic: a financially healthy firm should have higher repayment ability and 
lower default probability. In this chapter, we choose to rely on a firm’s liquidity ratio and 
solvency as proxy for its financial status. Specifically, we define liquidity ratio as current 
assets divided by current liabilities. If a firm-year observation has a liquidity ratio larger 
than the sample median, then it is classified as in better financial state, otherwise in worse 
financial state. Also, solvency is defined as earnings before interests, tax and depreciation 
divided by total liabilities (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2015). A higher debt-to-earnings indicates 
a lower capacity to repay debt and that a larger fraction of earnings needs to be used to 
cover interest payments instead for new investments. The main reason to use the inverse of 
debt-to-earnings ratio, i.e. earnings to debt ratio, is that some observations present negative 
earnings. If a firm-year observation has a solvency ratio larger than the sample median, 
then it is classified as in good state, otherwise in bad state. We argue that higher liquidity 
or better solvency can attenuate the overhang costs generated by short-term debt through 
the channel of reducing rollover risks.  
 
In addition, either liquidity ratio or solvency may not be able to fully reflect a firm’s 
financial status. To consider such a possibility, we apply the Z-score developed by Altman 
(1968). This score is formulated by using the linear combination of working capital, 
retained earnings, cash flow, market value of equity and sales. It is initially used to predict 
bankruptcy and it is also used by recent studies to measure firms’ financial performances, 
e.g. Denis and Sibilkov (2009). Similarly, the higher the Z-score is, the better the firm’s 
financial status should be. Although Z-score can be a more comprehensive measurement, 
its limitation is also obvious. The relative weight allocated to each element in the function 
is calculated by using the dataset of bankrupt US firms from more than half a century ago. 
This sample driven characteristic of Z-score suggests that we need to treat it as a 
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complementary classification criterion to the liquidity ratio or the solvency which can be 
directly provided by using our own sample. 
 
To do more robust sample separation tests, we further modify our classification methods. 
In detail, if a firm has at least 60% or no more than 40% observations marked as high or 
low liquidity, based on the criterion mentioned above, then this entire firm is regarded as 
having higher or lower probability of staying at good or bad financial status, respectively, 
during the sample period. The same procedure is repeated when we use solvency and Z-
score as measurements of firms’ financial status. Finally, we estimate equation (4.1) by 
using the data of firms in the ‘good’ or ‘bad’ group and comparing the coefficient on SDM 
between the two groups. If our Hypothesis II is correct, then we should see that the 
absolute value of coefficient 𝛽4 is larger in the ‘bad’ group than in the ‘good’ group. What 
is noteworthy is that our indicator is time-invariant and it is constructed by using a method 
similar to that utilized by Guariglia (1999). Although financial variables are very time 
persistent (Lemmon et al., 2008), it is still possible for firms to shift their financial status 
during the sample period. Therefore, in the robustness test, we create an interaction term 
between financial health measurements and short debt maturity in equation (4.1). If our 
Hypothesis II is correct, then we should see that the coefficient on the interaction term is 
positive and statistically significant. 
 
In terms of the 2008 financial crisis effects, we separately estimate equation (4.1) by 
using the data before and after the year 2008. It is also necessary for us to consider the 
potential entry effect, since we find that entrance is much more frequent than delisting in 
China’s stock market. A newly listed firm may enjoy equity financing and be less 
dependent on debt financing. Therefore, we will firstly use the full sample and then repeat 
the financial crisis analysis by only using the data of firms listed before 2008. The major 
reason for us to use a year dummy to identify the presence of financial crisis effect is that 
the outside financing environment should change dramatically during that period of time. 
According to the western literature, either public or bank credit-supply in US and European 
markets shrank dramatically over the crisis period (e.g. Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; 
Cornett et al., 2011; Popov and Udell, 2012). This can substantially increase the rollover 





At the end of 2008, the Chinese central government released an unprecedented 4 trillion 
RMB fiscal stimulus (12.6% GDP in 2008) valid in 2009 and 2010. There are several 
features of this stimulus plan. First, due to the public-goods nature of the infrastructure-
investment-centric stimulus package, it is local governments that carried out the credit 
expansion through their own ‘financing vehicles’ with 90% spending funded by bank loans 
(Bai et al., 2016). Second, the debt expansion is highly asymmetric. SOEs and publicly 
listed firms proved to be more favoured by not only the stimulus plan but also the 
corresponding monetary expansionary policies (Huang et al., 2016). Lastly, although the 
stimulus plan helped bolster the slumping Chinese economy, it caused some unintended 
consequences which may have damaged long-term economic growth, e.g. shadow banking 
(Chen et al., 2017) and deeper credit misallocation (Cong et al., 2017). These facts indicate 
that CLFs were able to enjoy a strong credit expansion rather than contraction after 2008 
financial crisis, in terms of bank financing. Also, compared to the pre-crisis period, the 
rollover risks should have suddenly become lower. Besides, such expansion is unlikely to 
be quickly digested and its effects are ongoing even some years after 2010 (Cong et al., 
2017). Therefore, using the CLFs dataset, if we separate the sample by using year 2008 as 
the ‘watershed’, then we shall see that the absolute value of coefficient 𝛽4 is smaller in the 
period after the crisis than in the period prior.  
 
Finally, we use the nature of a firm’s ultimate controller to define its ownership type 
(Chen et al., 2009). More specifically, if a firm-year observation shows that the nature of 
its ultimate controller is the state or a non-state investor, then the firm at this year is 
regarded as an SOE or a non-SOE, respectively. Although this variable is time invariant for 
most firms in our dataset, there are still some firms with ultimate shareholders who have 
changed from the state to other types of investors due to continued privatization. Therefore, 
we first classify firms into a ‘State’ or ‘non-State’ group and then eliminate the firms that 
have changed their ownership status during the sample period. 
 
4.5.3 Endogenous issue and Estimation method 
There are potential endogenous resources in equation (4.1). Our major hypothesis does 
not exclude the possibility that the underinvestment incentives generated by short-term 
debt could be mitigated by the firm’s financing through more long-term debt or by 
lowering the overall leverage level, if future growth opportunities are recognized 
sufficiently early when the firm has outstanding debt. Nevertheless, this argument has its 
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own limitations. First, not all investment opportunities can be anticipated. Second, capital 
structure adjustments are costly. For instance, the unanticipated growth opportunities will 
leave less scope for attenuating underinvestment problems. Renegotiations with 
debtholders have to be taken quickly before the unanticipated growth opportunities 
dissipate in a competitive market. Time constrained renegotiations will be more costly in 
comparison to when growth is anticipated, since either buying back a substantial amount of 
debt or restructuring the composition of external capital within a short time period can 
result in high transaction/ adjustment costs. In the extreme case, even if all growth 
opportunities are anticipated, various costs associated with adjustment can still be large 
enough to prevent firms fully resolving the underinvestment problem. Therefore, the 
stickiness of debt level and its structure may offer a possibility for testing the ex-post 
overhang effects on the actual investment expenditures, even without controlling the 
potential effects from endogeneity. 
 
Nevertheless, in the empirical tests, it is highly possible that investment opportunities 
cannot be effectively captured by Tobin’s Q. For example, Chinese stock prices have 
proved to be likely to deviate from the corporate fundamental values due to political 
actions (Bondt et al., 2015). If we assume that leverage decision is correlated with 
investment opportunities which cannot be completely controlled in the regression or if we 
believe that there are some common factors that affect leverage and investment 
opportunities but are omitted from the investment model, then both OLS and fixed effects 
estimators tend to generate biased coefficients on leverage and short debt maturity terms in 
equation (4.1). To solve such potential endogeneity issues, we follow Aivazian et al. 
(2005b) and estimate our investment models by using the first-differenced GMM 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This method takes first differences of all 
elements in equation (4.1) to eliminate the individual effect 𝜇𝑖 and then utilities all the 
lagged values of the regressor as instruments. 
 
 
4.6 Data and Stylised facts 
In this chapter, we use the annual firm-level dataset drawn from the China Stock Market 
& Accounting Research (CSMAR) database from 1998 to 2016, covering all active firms 
listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. We use the following methods to 
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clean the original dataset. First, financial firms and utility firms are excluded. Second, we 
exclude the firm-year observations with zero total financial debt. This is because debt 
maturity is calculated as the ratio of short-term debt to total financial debt. If the value of 
total financial debt is equal to zero, then the short debt maturity will be a missing value. 
Besides, the firm-year observations with financial leverage values larger than 1 or smaller 
than 0 are excluded. After that, all variables presented in equation (4.1) are winsorized at 
1th and 99th percentiles.80 Lastly, firms with less than 5 consecutive observations are 
excluded. The final sample contains 1,769 firms with 19,970 observations. The processed 
dataset is unbalanced, and the average number of observations for firms is 11.3 years. 
 
4.6.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1 provides descriptive information on the variables used in equation (4.1). We 
can see that the mean value of investment rate of CLFs is 0.27 and it is much larger than 
the ratio obtained by past literature using the US firms dataset, e.g. 0.08 in Aviazian (2005) 
and 0.05 in Almeida et al. (2011). This is consistent with the fact that fixed asset 
investment accounts for about 50% of GDP growth in China. The sample average Tobin’s 
Q is 1.71, which reflects market expectations of strong growth opportunities for CLFs over 
our sample period. The mean cash flow ratio is 0.49, which reflects a relatively high 
availability of internal funds for investment. The average leverage level is 0.23 which is 
lower than the 0.27 for US firms, see Custodio et al. (2013). The mean proportion of the 
short-term debt to total debt is 72%, indicating that CLFs on average hold much more 
short-term debt than long-term debt. At the bottom of Table 4.1, we report the ratio of 
short/ long – term debt to total assets. For CLFs, the average short-term debt ratio is 0.16 
and the average long-term debt ratio is 0.07. Nevertheless, Welch (2011) emphasizes that 
non-interest generating liabilities cannot be treated as equity and should be controlled 
when evaluating a firm’s indebtedness level. Therefore, we further report the ratio of short/ 
long – term debt to total shareholder’s equity. The average value of the ratio of short-term 
debt to total shareholder’s equity is equal to 0.31. This suggests that short-term debt should 
be a non-trivial component of CLFs’ capital structure. 
 
The possible high correlation among the variables in equation (4.1) can be an issue in 
the estimation process. For example, past studies show that the firms with high growth 
                                                          
80 All variables are deflated back to year 2000 by using annual CIP deflator. The only exception is the fixed 
capital which is deflated by using the index specific to fixed assets. The index can be found on the National 
Bureau of Statistics of the PRC. 
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opportunities tend to reduce their leverage as well as their debt maturity (Barclay and 
Smith, 1995). This may lead to serious multicollinearity among Tobin’s Q, leverage, and 
the short debt maturity variables. Also, in the trade-off theory, the firms with higher cash 
flow ratio may also have higher leverage level and longer debt maturity. Therefore, in 
Table 4.2, we report the correlation matrix among all the regression variables. The results 
show that the correlation coefficients are not high and hence multicollinearity should not 
be a serious issue. 
 
Table 4.1: Statistic description 
Variable names Mean Sdt. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡 𝐾𝑖.𝑡−1⁄  0.277 0.369 -0.113 0.151 1.379 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 1.712 1.387 0.191 1.302 7.629 
𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1⁄  0.496 0.818 -0.906 0.322 9.868 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.232 0.138 0.001 0.234 0.999 
𝑆𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 0.721 0.309 0 0.838 1 
      
State ownership 59.18% 49.15% 0 1 1 
Long-term debt/total assets 0.069 0.092 0 0.031 0.845 
Short-term debt/total assets 0.162 0.124 0 0.142 0.999 
Long-term debt/total equity 0.151 0.212 0 0.055 0.999 
Short-term debt/total equity 0.309 0.253 0 0.251 0.999 
Definitions of all variables are available in Appendix C. 
 
 
Table 4.2: Correlation table among regression variables 
 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 𝐾𝑖.𝑡−1⁄  𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1⁄  𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 𝑆𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡 𝐾𝑖.𝑡−1⁄  1.000     
𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 0.040 1.000    
𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1⁄  0.271 0.087 1.000   
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.045 -0.259 -0.086 1.000  
𝑆𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.050 0.158 -0.114 -0.096 1.000 
 
The distribution of short debt maturity is presented in Figure 4.1. The chosen cut-off 
percentages of short debt maturity reflect the percentiles at 25th (51%), 50th (83%) and 75th 
(100%). More specifically, around 75% of firm-year observations show a proportion of 
short-term debt usage larger than 51% of total debt usage and almost 30% of firm-year 
observations only have short-debt term debt as their interest generating liabilities. The 
corresponding mean value of book financial leverage for firm-year observations in each 
short debt maturity category is also plotted in Figure 4.2. Surprisingly, on average, the 
firms with short debt maturities larger than zero but smaller than one tend to have similar 
leverage levels, slightly over 0.25, regardless of how they are classified in lower or higher 
maturity percentiles. For the firms with solely short-term or long-term debt, their averaged 
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leverage ratios are 0.12 and 0.16 respectively, which are significantly smaller than those of 
the firms in other categories. These facts provide two useful suggestions for our regression 
analysis. First, although CLFs have generally high short debt maturity levels, the variations 
of choices between short-term and long-term debts are still substantial among firms. This 
should allow us to more confidently pin down the relation from short debt maturity to 
capital expenditure. Second, for the majority of sampled firms, the information contained 
in maturity and leverage levels is unlikely to overlap. For example, the short debt maturity 
term itself should convey information about the degree of rollover risk while leverage may 
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In Figure 4.3, we plot the annual median value of fixed investment rate and the annual 
median value of short debt maturity over our sample period. First, there is a sudden 
collapse in short debt maturity after 2008 (0.87) followed by a slight rebound in 2011 (0.82) 
but a continuous drop until the end of the sample period in 2016 (0.68). Second, 
investment rate declines gradually before the 2008 financial crisis and almost reaches the 
sample bottom in 2008 (0.08) but it immediately jumps up to our sample peak in 2009 
(0.27) followed by a breakneck drop in 2010 reaching the actual sample bottom at 0.078. 
After that, investment rate recovers very quickly and reaches the second sample peak at 
0.24 in 2012 but returns to the normal level in the following years, i.e. around 0.15, which 
is somewhat higher than the investment rate in the pre-crisis period. The high volatile 
investment and financing behaviours of CLFs after the 2008 financial crisis should reflect 
the implementation of the 4 trillion RMB fiscal stimulus plan. Also, our data show that the 
average proportion of long-term debt to total debt of CLFs increases substantially after 
2008. This is consistent with the finding obtained by Cong et al. (2017) who use a much 
broader manufacturing dataset in China. Overall, the general rollover risk in China should 
have reduced during the credit expansion period. Nevertheless, such fiscal stimulus may 
still increase the future rollover risks which can in turn constrain long-term economic 
growth (Chen et al., 2017).81  
 
Lastly, in section 4.3 of this chapter, we argue that short-term debt plays an important 
role in fulfilling the financial requirements of Chinese listed firms. We can explore this 
issue through two aspects. First, in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, we compare the actual issuances of 
short-term debt, long-term debt and equity. The changes of all securities are calculated by 
using balance sheet information and are normalized by using the beginning period of total 
assets. If a firm makes issuance of one sort of security for at least 5% of last period’s total 
assets, then we define it as one financing spike.82 In Table 4.3, the percentage of the 
number of large adjustments to total observation is 27%, 18% and 12% for short-term debt, 
long-term debt and equity issuances, respectively. The average number of adjustments per 
firm over our sample period is 2.78, 1.87 and 1.19 for short-term debt, long-term debt and 
equity issuances, respectively. These results suggest that CLFs are more likely to make 
large proactive capital structure changes through short-term debt issuance. However, this 
                                                          
81 A complete discussion to the causes and consequences of such stimulus plan is out of the scope of this 
paper. See Bai et al. (2016), Cong et al. (2017) and Chen et al. (2017) for more details.  
82 Similar analyses can be found in Leary and Roberts (2005) for US firm-level dataset. 
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may only reflect the frequent rollover requirement of short-term debt rather than the short-
term debt preference of firms. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Time variation of Investment and short debt maturity 
 
 
Table 4.3: Large security issuance 




Adjustments per Firms 
   Mean Min Median Max 
Short debt issue  4916 27.01% 2.78 0 2 12 
Long debt issue 3314 18.21% 1.87 0 1 11 
Equity issue 2019 11.59% 1.19 0 1 11 
Short debt issuance is calculated as changes of short-term debt divided by lagged total assets. Long 
debt issuance is calculated as changes of long-term debt divided by lagged total assets. Equity 
issuance is calculated as the cash received from the issuance of stocks net of commission and other 
issuance fees divided by lagged total assets. If the security issuance is larger (not less than) 5% of 
lagged total assets, then it is regarded as refinancing spike, i.e. large adjustment. This treatment also 
helps to separate firms’ real financial requirements from other trivial changes of capital structures. 
Number of adjustments is number of observations defined as refinancing spike. Percent of periods is 
the ratio of number of adjustments to (total observations - total number of firms), since we use lagged 
total assets in the calculation of all issuances.  
 
 Therefore, in Table 4.4, we report summary statistics on the magnitude of the different 
types of issuances larger than zero.83 We focus on the results of medians because of the 
large skew in each measure’s distribution. The median size of positive short-term debt 
issuance is 483 million in RMB, which is much larger than that of positive long-term debt 
                                                          
83 All variables are deflated back to year 2000 using CPI index. 
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issuance (345 million in RMB) and positive equity issuance (246 million in RMB). 
Besides, after normalizing these numbers by firms’ total assets, we can see that short-debt 
issuance occupies 4.4% of total assets, which is slightly higher than the 4.1% of long-debt 
issuance and much higher than the 0.6% of equity issuance.84 On average, although the 
ratio of short-term debt issuance to total asset is similar to the ratio of long-term debt 
issuance to total asset, we must keep in mind that the number of observations presenting 
positive short-term issuance is obviously larger than the number of observations presenting 
positive long-term issuance. The difference is around 14% of the total number of 
observations. In terms of equity issuance, either its magnitude or relative value to assets is 
much smaller than that of debt issuance. Therefore, at least, our statistical descriptions do 
not support the conventional idea that CLFs can on average replace long-term debt 
financing with equity issuance.85 
 
Table 4.4: Size of security issuance 
  Median Mean Std. Obs. 
Short debt issue Size in RMB 48.3 148 491 9133 
 Divided by total assets 0.044 0.070 0.083 9133 
Long debt issue Size in RMB 34.5 282 1360 6631 
 Divided by total assets 0.041 0.072 0.095 6631 
Equity issue Size in RMB 2.46 39.9 183 7476 
 Divided by total assets 0.006 0.063 0.128 7476 
The unit of size in RMB is 10 million. This table only reports the size of positive issuance. Definitions 
of all other variables can be found in bottom of Table 4.3.  
 
Another deeper question is how CLFs finance their investment. Firms can support their 
positive growth opportunities by using either cash flow, cash holdings, short/ long – term 
debt and even new equity or arbitrary combinations of these options. If short-term debt is 
indeed important in determining firms’ real decisions, then it should at least be a major 
resource for financing those decisions. To check this intuition, we use the framework 
provided by Gatchev et al. (2009). The general logic is that financing decisions in practice 
are related to each other by accounting identities. Firms are constrained by the fact that 
sources of cash must equal uses of cash. Adjusting any one policy variable will result in 
adjustment of other policy variables. Therefore, we should examine corporate financial 
decisions in a constrained multivariate setting. In Appendix C of this chapter, we list the 
group of equations (C.2) used to describe such a concept. More specifically, in the system, 
there are four sub-equations referring to changes of cash balance, short-term debt issuance, 
                                                          
84 Total assets here are all lagged by one year. 
85 However, we do not exclude the possibility that Chinese listed firms were indeed able to replace long-term 
debt financing very easily through equity issuance in years past, e.g. before and around year 2000. 
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long-term debt issuance and equity issuance, respectively.86 The coefficient constraints 
settings are also provided in Appendix C. The four sub-equations are estimated 
simultaneously and the results are reported in Table A.16 in Appendix C. Our 
interpretations focus on the coefficients on working capital investment and fixed capital 
investment. First, 0.34, 0.25 and 0.17 of one unit increase in working capital financing 
requirements will be supported by short-term debt, long-term debt and equity, respectively. 
Second, 0.42, 0.28 and 0.13 of one unit increase in fixed capital financing requirements 
will be supported by short-term debt, long-term debt and equity, respectively. The 
differences among these coefficients are highly statistically significant. Overall, at this 
stage, it should be reasonable to conclude that short-term debt on average plays a more 
important role in supporting the financial requirements of CLFs than long-term debt and 
equity. This indicates that rollover risk should be a common problem faced by these firms. 
 
4.6.2 Univariate analyses 
Table 4.5 contains the results for the univariate tests to Hypothesis I. We classify all 
firm-year observations into five different categories according to their short debt maturity 
(SDM) levels: Zero (SDM=0); Low (0<SDM<=25th %tile); Median (25th %tile 
<SDM<=50th %tile); High SDM (50th %tile<SDM<1) and One (SDM=1). Then, from Zero 
SDM group to One SDM group, we list the mean value of investment rate in each group. 
There is a clear declining tendency of investment rate from Low SDM group (0.29) to 
High SDM (0.23). In the bottom of the table, we have also presented the F-test results for 
the null hypothesis that the (positive) difference in investment rates between any two 
adjacent groups is statistically insignificant. The P-values show that the investment rates 
are highly statistically different from Low SDM group to Med SDM group and from Med 
SDM group to High SDM group. Besides, the averaged investment rates are 0.27 and 0.24 
respectively for the group of firms with zero and unit values of SDM. Although there are 
no significant declines in investment from Zero SDM group to Low SDM group and from 
High SDM group to One SDM group, the firms in Zero (One) SDM group still present 
strictly higher (lower) investments than the firms in Med, High (Low) and One (Zero) 
SDM groups. From the overall perspective, therefore, these results are consistent with the 
description in our Hypothesis I. 
 
                                                          
86 Strictly speaking, there should also be a fifth equation: share repurchase. However, share repurchase in 
China’s stock market is extremely rare. Adding it does not change anything in our results. Therefore, we 
eliminate it from the equation group. 
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Table 4.6 contains the results for the univariate tests to Hypothesis II. We firstly 
classify firm-year observations into High SDM and Low SDM using the sample median 
value of short debt maturity as the threshold. Second, we further separate observations in 
either High SDM or Low SDM into good/ bad financial state: i.e. High/ Low liquidity 
group; High/ Low solvency group and High/ Low Z-score group, respectively. After that, 
within either good or bad state, we compare the averaged investment rates between High 
SDM and Low SDM. The P-values generated by F-test show that all differences are highly 
statistically significant, indicating that firms with shorter debt maturity tend to invest less 
in either good or bad state. Nevertheless, such difference in investment rate is likely to be 
much larger for firms in bad state than in good state and this phenomenon is consistent 
across all measurements of firms’ financial status. For example, fixing the liquidity at low 
(high) level, the firms with High SDM have an average investment rate 9% (3%) lower 
than the firms with Low SDM. These preliminary results indeed support our Hypothesis II. 
 











𝐼𝑖,𝑡 𝐾𝑖.𝑡−1⁄  (Mean) 0.276 0.295 0.257 0.236 0.244 
      
Diff (Zero - Low) -0.019    
P-value 0.277    
Diff (Low - Med)  0.038***   
P-value  0.000   
Diff (Med - High)   0.021***  
P-value   0.003  
Diff (High - One)    -0.008 
P-value    0.300 
Observation 494 3975 4493 3960 5279 
All firm-year observations are classified into five different categories 
according to their short debt maturity (SDM) levels: Zero (SDM=0); 
Low (0<SDM<=25th %tile); Median (25th %tile <SDM<=50th %tile); 
High SDM (50th %tile<SDM<1) and One (SDM=1). The mean value of 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡 𝐾𝑖.𝑡−1⁄  for each group is presented. The difference between any two 
adjacent groups is calculated. The P-values for the t-test under the null 
that the difference is statistically insignificant are reported. *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% conventional levels, 
respectively. Definitions of all variables are available in Appendix C. 
 
In Table 4.6, we also classify the observations in each SDM category into ‘Before’ and 
‘After’ 2008 financial crisis. Clearly, during the credit expansion period, i.e. after 2008, the 
SDM imposes much lower negative impact on the investment rate of firms than in the 
normal time, i.e. before 2009. This requires us to clarify the implication of our Hypothesis 
II. In the hypothesis, firms are more likely to suffer from shorter debt maturity during the 
credit-supply contraction period. The financial crisis in 2008 should provide a chance to 
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identify such a relation. Nevertheless, due to the 4 trillion stimulus plan, our focus turns 
from the expected credit contraction into the unexpected credit expansion. In other words, 
compared with the after crisis period in China, the credit-supply should be much more tight 
before the crisis. Instead of repeating the depression story which has already been widely 
detected by western literature, we provide new empirical evidence for the debt-investment 
relation under the credit boom environment.  
 
Table 4.6: Univariate analysis (Hypothesis II) 
 High SDM Low SDM Difference P-value 
High Liquidity 0.273 0.301 -0.028*** 0.000 
Low Liquidity 0.237 0.324 -0.087*** 0.000 
     
High Solvency 0.271 0.317 -0.046*** 0.000 
Low Solvency 0.237 0.307 -0.069*** 0.000 
     
High Z-score 0.276 0.322 -0.046*** 0.000 
Low Z-score 0.226 0.304 -0.078*** 0.000 
     
Before 2008 Crisis 0.237 0.329 -0.091*** 0.000 
After 2008 Crisis 0.272 0.301 -0.029*** 0.000 
     
SOEs 0.300 0.226 -0.074*** 0.000 
Non-SOEs 0.289 0.331 -0.042*** 0.000 
If a firm-year observation has SDM value larger (smaller) than the sample median value of 
SDM among all observations, then this observation is classified as High SDM (Low SDM). If a 
firm-year observation has liquidity ratio higher (lower) than the sample median value of this 
variable, then this observation is classified as High Liquidity (Low liquidity). We create other 
groups in the same way: i.e. High Solvency, Low Solvency, High Z-score and Low Z-score. If a 
firm-year observation presents before year 2009, then it is classified as Before 2008 crisis. If a 
firm-year observation presents after year 2008, then it is classified as After 2008 crisis. The 
mean value of investment rate is calculated for each sub-category, e.g. the firms in High 
Liquidity – High SDM group have an averaged investment rate equal to 0.27. For either high or 
low financial health group, we calculate the difference in the mean values of investment rates 
between High SDM group and Low SDM group. The P-values for the t-test under the null that 
the difference is statistically insignificant are reported. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% conventional levels, respectively. Definitions of all variables 
are available in Appendix C. 
 
Lastly, at the bottom of Table 4.6, we further classify observations into ‘SOEs’ and 
‘non-SOEs’. The average fixed investment rate declines much more from ‘Low SDM’ 
group to ‘High SDM’ in SOEs than in non-SOEs. This result may support the argument 
that SOEs present lower financial health and are more likely to suffer from rollover risks 
than non-SOEs. In Table A.17 in Appendix C, we compare the values of three financial 
health indicators between SOEs and non-SOEs. Nevertheless, the results are mixed to 
some extent. Specifically, SOEs indeed present lower values of liquidity and Z-score than 
non-SOEs but also have significantly higher solvency than non-SOEs. Besides, such 
univariate test results may suffer from an endogeneity issue. For example, the budgets of 
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non-SOEs are more constrained than that of SOEs. Therefore, non-SOEs should be more 
active in controlling their rollover risks, thereby reducing the potential underinvestment 
issue caused by shorter debt maturity. Besides, in unreported results, we also find that the 
non-SOEs with higher shorter debt maturity have much higher investment opportunities 
than the SOEs with higher shorter debt maturity. In other words, that SOEs in ‘High SDM’ 
group invest less may simply be because they have low investment opportunities. These 
potential problems require us to draw our conclusion about ownership effect by relying on 
the regression results rather than the univariate test results. 
 
 
4.7 Regression Results 
4.7.1 Investment and short debt maturity 
The baseline results of the estimated investment equation (4.1), using the full sample, 
are reported in Table 4.7. Columns (1), (2) and (3) report OLS, fixed effects and first-
differenced GMM (FD-GMM) estimators, respectively. First, the coefficient on short debt 
maturity (SDM) term is negative and highly statistically significant, across all three 
different estimators. This is consistent with the predication in our Hypothesis I that the 
firms with shorter debt maturity tend to suffer more from rollover risk and hence invest 
less. According to the FD-GMM estimator, for example, the results show that a 10% 
increase in sample average value of SDM will lead to a reduction in fixed investment by 
0.03, i.e. around 11% of sample average investment value.87 Therefore, the effect of SDM 
on investment is not only statistically significant but also economically important. 
Furthermore, the coefficients on all other independent variables have expected signs. The 
investment opportunity measurement, Tobin’s Q, has a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient. Besides, higher cash flow is associated with higher investment while higher 
leverage ratio leads to lower investment. These results are consistent with those of previous 
studies about the investment-cash flow sensitivity (e.g. Fazzari et al., 1988 and Gilchrist 
and Himmelberg, 1995) and of leverage-investment relation (Lang et al., 1996 and 
Aivazian et al., 2005). 
 
                                                          
87 The sample averaged value of lagged SDM is 0.72. A 10% increase in SDM is equal to 0.72*0.1 = 0.072. 
This will lead to reduction in fixed investment by 0.072*(-0.42) = 0.03. The sample averaged value of 
investment is equal to 0.27. Therefore, 0.03/0.27 = 0.108, i.e. around 11%. 
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Lastly, while the FD-GMM results are qualitatively similar to those of OLS and FE, one 
finding of note is that the magnitudes of the coefficients on both leverage and short debt 
maturity terms are significantly larger than the magnitudes of the corresponding 
coefficients in OLS and FE. One possible explanation is that the coefficients generated by 
OLS and FE estimators capture managers’ unobservable expectation about debt overhang 
which can affect their investment decisions and capital structure related decisions 
simultaneously. In other words, the actual negative impacts from leverage as well as short 
debt maturity may have been ‘attenuated’ by OLS and FE estimators.88 Nevertheless, the 
absolute value of coefficient on SDM changes dramatically from 0.039 in the OLS 
estimator to 0.43 in the FD-GMM estimator. This huge gap in magnitude makes us anxious 
about the reliability of the results generated by both estimators.  
 
Therefore, in columns (4) and (5) of Table 4.7, we provide the results generated by 
System GMM and IV estimators respectively. The System GMM (SYS-GMM) results 
present a seemingly more normal absolute value of coefficient on SDM equal to 0.20. 
Nevertheless, they also produce a P-value of Hansen test at 0.000, indicating that the twice 
lagged first-differenced independent variables may not be valid additional instruments. 
More surprisingly, the IV estimators show a coefficient on SDM with an absolute value 
equal to 1.88 which is almost 50 times larger than that of the OLS coefficient. This 
embarrassing situation is a regular finding in the finance and growth literature (e.g., Molina, 
2005; Laeven and Levine, 2007; Barth et al., 2009).89 Using Chinese listed firms’ dataset 
over 1991-2004, Firth et al. (2008) study the relation between total investment and 
leverage ratio and obtain an IV coefficient on leverage term 10 times larger than the fixed 
effects coefficient. This is a common feature of their results throughout their whole paper. 
More specifically, in our IV approach, we follow Firth et al. (2008) and use tangibility as 
an instrument for leverage.90 We follow Gopalan et al. (2011) and use asset maturity 
together with current assets ratio as instruments for SDM.91 All instruments are lagged one 
to two years. At the bottom of column (5) of Table 4.7, we can see that the P-value 
                                                          
88 For instance, managers can reduce leverage or short-term usage in the anticipation of future investment 
opportunities. Then, the observed values of leverage and short debt maturity are ex-post outcomes of such 
forward decisions. If most of firms can follow this strategy, then the magnitude of coefficient on short debt 
maturity term in the investment regression will be reduced. In other words, the actual impact of capital 
structure related decisions on investment decision is hidden by such an endogenous problem. What we have 
seen is that OLS results are biased towards the sample of firms who were unable to adjust their capital 
structures before the investment decisions were taken. Lastly, determinants of managers’ expectation can be 
time variant. Therefore, fixed effects estimators still suffer from a serious endogenous issue. 
89 Jiang (2017) provides more detailed study of this “implausibly large” IV estimate in finance research. 
90 Tangibility is defined as fixed assets divided by total assets. 
91 Asset maturity is defined as fixed assets divided by depreciation. Current asset ratio is defined as total 
current assets divided by total assets. 
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generated by the under-identification test shows that the null hypothesis, that our model is 
insufficiently identified, can be rejected at 1% significant level. Also, the F statistic shows 
that a weak instrument should not be a big problem in our IV approach. Nevertheless, the 
Hansen test is still rejected at 1% significant level, indicating that there is potential 
correlation between our chosen instrument sets and the error term.  
 
Table 4.7: Baseline model (Hypothesis I) 
Dependent: 






























































Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y 
AR(2) test (p-value)   0.723 0.423  
Hansen test (p-value)   0.135 0.000*** 0.000*** 
UnderID-test (p-value)     0.000*** 
WeakIV-test     16.415 
Firms  1769 1769 1769 1769 
Observations 18201 18201 16432 18201 16430 
In column (1), OLS estimators are reported. In column (2), Fixed effects estimators are reported. In 
column (3), first-differenced GMM estimators are reported. Equation (4.1) is first-differenced and all 
independent variables are lagged twice and more as instruments. In column (4), system GMM estimators 
are reported. In this case, all independent variables in the first-differenced equation (4.1) are 
instrumented by their twice and more lagged values. For equation (4.1) in level, additional instruments 
are differenced values of independent variable lagged twice. P-values of AR(2) test and Hansen test are 
reported. In column (5), the instrumental variable estimators are reported. Leverage is instrumented by 
tangibility defined as the ratio of fixed capital to total assets. Short debt maturity is instrumented by asset 
maturity defined as fixed capital divided by depreciation and the ratio of current assets to total assets. All 
3 instrumental variables are lagged once and twice. UnderID-test: The p-value is calculated for the 
under-identification test, given the null hypothesis that the equation is not well identified. WeakIV-test: 
The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is also reported for the Stock-Yogo weak identification test. The 
corresponding critical values: 5%, 10%, 20% maximal instrumental variable relative bias is equal to 
15.72, 9.48 and 6.08 respectively. Standard errors are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% conventional levels, respectively. Definitions of all variables 
are available in Appendix C. 
 
In summary, if we believe that our treatment of possible endogenous effects may over 
‘pump up’ the coefficient on SDM towards a negative direction for some reason, then we 
can say that this problem should be more serious in the IV approach. If we believe that the 
Hansen test is important for evaluating the performance of instrument sets, then both the 
SYS-GMM and IV approach are likely to provide problematic results. Overall, comparing 
across the results generated by the FD-GMM, SYS-GMM and IV approach, it is probably 
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still more appropriate for us to rely on the results generated by the FD-GMM. There are 
two obvious reasons. First, the FD-GMM coefficients are larger than SYS-GMM 
coefficients but much smaller than IV coefficients. Second, both the P-values of the AR(2) 
test and Hansen test in our FD-GMM results are larger than the 10% conventional 
threshold, indicating that the chosen instruments are less likely to be correlated with the 
error term. Therefore, in all the following regression analyses, we only report the results 
generated by the FD-GMM.  
 
Table 4.8: Financial health and investment-SDM relation (Hypothesis II) 
 Liquidity ratio Solvency Z-score 
Dependent: 

































































       
Z-statistics 3.455*** 1.997** 1.198 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.765 0.971 0.263 0.804 0.597 0.726 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.034** 0.157 0.315 0.359 0.216 0.202 
Firms 832 689 686 696 824 678 
Observations 6738 7223 6070 6522 6504 7196 
First-differenced GMM estimators are reported. Equation (4.1) is first-differenced and all independent variables 
are lagged twice and more as instruments. Standard errors are reported in brackets. P-values of AR(2) test and 
Hansen test are reported. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% conventional levels, 
respectively. In columns (1) and (2), a firm is classified into ‘High’ group, if it has at least 60% observations 
that present values of liquidity ratio larger than the sample median value of this variable. A firm is classified 
into ‘Low’ group, if it has no more than 40% observations that present values of liquidity ratio smaller than the 
sample median value of this variable. Similarly, in columns (3), (4), (5) and (6), we classify firms by referring 
to their values of solvency and Z-score respectively. Z-statistic is calculated to identify the statistical 
significance of the difference in two coefficients on SDM between High and Low groups. For example, using 
solvency category results, Z-statistic = (-0.271+0.646)/sqrt(0.097^2+0.161^2) = 1.997, which produces a P-
value equal to 0.046. Definitions of all variables are available in Appendix C. 
 
 
4.7.2  ‘Good’ and ‘bad’ states 
To test Hypothesis II, we estimate equation (4.1) by using the data of firms in the 
group with good or bad financial health. The results are reported in Table 4.8. Obviously, 
the absolute value of coefficient on SDM for the firms in ‘Low’ financial health group is 
much larger than the absolute value of coefficient on SDM for the firms in ‘High’ financial 
health group. Such a tendency is quite consistent across all three measurements of firms’ 
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financial conditions. Referring to the results in columns (3) and (4) as example, for an 
average firm with lower (higher) solvency, a 10% increase in SDM will lead to a reduction 
in investment by 0.047 (0.019). In the bottom of Table 4.8, we also calculate the z-statistics 
for checking the significance of difference between two coefficients on SDM across ‘High’ 
and ‘Low’ groups (Paternoster et al., 1995). The corresponding null hypothesis, that the 
difference between two coefficients is insignificantly different from zero, can be rejected at 
1%, 5% and 12% significant levels for liquidity, solvency and Z-score specifications, 
respectively. These results strongly support our Hypothesis II that the firms with worse 
financial conditions tend to face higher rollover risks and hence are less likely to take 
positive growth opportunities given shorter debt maturity. 
 
Table 4.9: Financial crisis effect (Hypothesis II) 
 
Full sample 
Listed before  
2008 
Dependent: 



































Z-statistics 3.006*** 2.951*** 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.773 0.637 0.899 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.478 0.183 0.871 
Firms 1105 1595 1196 
Observations 6735 9697 8115 
First-differenced GMM estimators are reported. Equation (4.1) is first-
differenced and all independent variables are lagged twice and more as 
instruments. Standard errors are reported in brackets. P-values of AR(2) 
test and Hansen test are reported. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% conventional levels, respectively. Z-
statistic is calculated to identify the statistical significance of the difference 
in two coefficients on SDM between High and Low groups. In columns (1) 
and (2), 2009 year is used as threshold to classify observations. The main 
reason is that the 4 trillion fiscal stimulus plans was firstly implemented in 
2009. In column (3), we eliminate all firms that were listed before year 
2008, thereby considering the entry effect. Definitions of all variables are 
available in Appendix C. 
 
Table 4.9 contains the estimation results covering the potential effects of 2009 credit 
expansion on the relation between investment and SDM. In columns (1) and (2), we can 
see that the absolute value of the coefficient on SDM is equal to 0.814 before the year 2009 
and it becomes much smaller in the period thereafter, i.e. 0.224. According to the Z-
statistic, the difference between these two coefficients is highly statistically significant. 
193 
 
More specifically, a 10% increase in SDM leads to a reduction in investment by 0.063 
(0.015) before 2009 (after 2008). To eliminate the entry effects, we repeat the analysis in 
column (2) by using the data of the firms listed before 2008. Comparing the results 
between columns (1) and (3), we can still conclude that the negative impact from SDM on 
capital expenditures becomes much weaker in the period after 2008, even after controlling 
the entry effects. These results are consistent with our predication that the rollover risk is 
reduced after 2008 financial crisis due to large fiscal stimulus in the Chinese economy.  
 
Table 4.10: State ownership 
Dependent: 


























Year dummies Yes Yes 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.652 0.330 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.125 0.189 
Firms 779 742 
Observations 7704 4741 
First-differenced GMM estimators are reported. Equation (4.1) is first-
differenced and all independent variables are lagged twice and more as 
instruments. Standard errors are reported in brackets. In columns (1) and 
(2), we define a firm’s ownership type by using the nature of its ultimate 
controller. If a firm’s ultimate controller is state, then it is classified as 
‘State’ group. If a firm’s ultimate controller is non-state investor, then it 
is classified as ‘non-State’ group. P-values of AR(2) test and Hansen test 
are reported. Z-statistic is calculated to identify the statistical significance 
of the difference in two coefficients on SDM between State and non-
State groups. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% conventional levels, respectively.  
 
 
4.7.3 Ownership structures 
Table 4.10 reports the results of ownership effects on the relation between investment 
and short debt maturity. The coefficient on SDM is -0.15 for SOEs and -0.44 for non-SOEs. 
The difference between these two coefficients is statistically significant. Specifically, for 
non-SOEs, a 10% increase in average value of SDM will lead to a reduction in fixed 
investment by 0.03. For SOEs, a 10% increase in average value of SDM will lead to a 
reduction in fixed investment by 0.01. These regression results are opposite to the previous 
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results provided by our univariate tests in section 6.3 of this chapter. After controlling the 
investment opportunities as well as the potential endogenous issue, we find that non-SOEs 
tend to suffer more from the rollover risks brought by short debt maturity than do SOEs. 
 
Another interesting question is whether or not SOEs were indeed able to receive more 
subsidizing from banks than non-SOEs during the credit expansion period. If the answer is 
yes, then the rollover risk may not be important for SOEs after the crisis. We simply repeat 
the analysis presented in Table 4.9 for SOEs and non-SOEs. The results are reported in 
Table 4.11. For both state and non- SOEs, the negative impact from SDM on investment 
has reduced by around 50% after the crisis. Nevertheless, the coefficients on both leverage 
and SDM terms in column (2) become statistically insignificant for SOEs. Therefore, our 
results may indirectly support the finding in Huang et al. (2016) that SOEs are more 
favoured by the stimulus plan. 
 
Table 4.11: State ownership and financial crisis 
 State Non-state 
Dependent: 

















































Z-statistics 0.782 0.957 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.828 0.390 0.860 0.618 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.268 0.612 0.647 0.148 
Firms 606 689 275 688 
Observations 3053 4651 1191 3550 
First-differenced GMM estimators are reported. Equation (4.1) is first-differenced and all 
independent variables are lagged twice and more as instruments. Standard errors are reported 
in brackets. P-values of AR(2) test and Hansen test are reported. *, ** and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% conventional levels, respectively.  Z-statistic is 
calculated to identify the statistical significance of the difference in two coefficients on SDM 








4.8 Robustness tests 
4.8.1 Over-reliance on short-term debt 
Short-term debt has cost advantage over, but incurs higher refinancing risk, than long-
term debt. Theoretically, firms can choose a shorter but optimal maturity structure by 
balancing the interest benefits and the rollover costs of short-term debt (Jun and Jen, 2003). 
This indicates that the firms with excessive proportion of short-term debt in their debt 
structure tend to suffer more from refinancing pressure and hence have lower incentives to 
take positive growth opportunities. In other words, the negative coefficient on SDM in 
equation (4.1) presented in Table 4.7 may be driven by the group of firms with too much 
short-term debt. If this conjecture is correct, then we shall be able to conclude that over-
reliance on short-term debt can damage investment incentives of firms. 
 
We use two different methods to consider the possible situation mentioned above. First, 
we follow the conventional debt maturity literature to parameterize short debt maturity as a 
linear function of lagged growth opportunities, leverage, size, tangibility, profitability, 
asset maturity and year effects (Barclay and Smith, 1995). Then, we use the coefficients 
generated by fixed effects estimators to predict firms’ next period target/ optimal short debt 
maturity. After that, we calculate the difference between the predicted value and the actual 
value of short debt maturity. If a firm-year observation presents at least 5% above (below) 
its optimal short debt maturity, then it is regarded as having excessive (insufficient) short-
term debt. Lastly, we create two dummy variables: if an observation presents excessive 
state, then 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑆𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 is equal to one, otherwise zero. Similarly, if an observation 
presents insufficient state, then 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 is equal to one, otherwise zero. The other 
method is that of directly classifying firm-year observations into the excessive or 
insufficient group according to the industry median value of short debt maturity. Either 
method has its own advantages and disadvantages. For example, our first strategy contains 
more comprehensive information which may determine managers’ incentives to choose 
maturity structure while it may suffer from systematic measurement errors in the prediction. 
Although the second approach avoids the measurement problem, it relies on a strict 
assumption that industry median can be a good proxy for target short debt maturity for all 
different firms in the same industry. We replace the SDM term in equation (4.1) by 






Table 4.12: Over-reliance on short-term debt 
 Predicted SDM Industry median SDM 
Dependent: 

















































AR(2) test (p-value) 0.881 0.769 0.862 0.927 
AR(3) test (p-value) 0.631 0.603 0.514 0.403 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.210 0.171 0.198 0.254 
Firms 1769 1769 1769 1769 
Observations 14662 14662 16432 16432 
First-differenced GMM estimators are reported. Equation (4.1) is first-differenced and 
all independent variables are lagged twice and more as instruments. 𝑆𝐷𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 in 
equation (4.1) is replaced by 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑆𝐷𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝐷𝑀𝑖𝑡−1. Standard errors are 
reported in brackets. P-values of AR(2) test and Hansen test are reported. *, ** and 
*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% conventional levels, 
respectively. In columns (1) and (2), we parameterize short debt maturity as a linear 
function of lagged growth opportunities, leverage, size, tangibility, profitability, asset 
maturity and year effects. Then, we use the coefficients generated by fixed effects 
estimators to predict firms’ next period target/optimal short debt maturity. After that, 
we calculate the difference between the predicted value and the actual value of short 
debt maturity. If a firm-year observation presents at least 5% above (below) its optimal 
short debt maturity, then it is regarded as having excessive (insufficient) short-term 
debt. Lastly, if an observation presents excessive state, then 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑆𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 is equal to 
one, otherwise zero. Similarly, if an observation presents insufficient state, then 
𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 equals to one, otherwise zero. In column (3), 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑆𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 is a 
dummy variable equal to one if an observation presents a short debt maturity value 
larger the industry median value of this variable, otherwise zero. In column (4), 
𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 is a dummy variable equal to one if an observation presents a short 
debt maturity value smaller than the industry median value of this variable, otherwise 
zero. Definitions of all variables are available in Appendix C. 
 
In columns (1) and (3) of Table 4.8, we can clearly see that the coefficient on 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑆𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1  is negative and highly statistically significant, regardless of the proxy for 
optimal SDM. More specifically, having excessive short-term debt, a firm will on average 
invest around 38% less than its counterparts. In contrast, in columns (2) and (4), the 
coefficient on 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1  is small in magnitude and statistically insignificant, 
indicating that the overhang effect of short debt maturity is trivial for the firms who 
maintain their short-term debt level below the optima. The possible explanation is that for 
the firms with insufficient usage of short-term debt, the costs of underinvestment due to 
rollover risk are much larger than the loss from giving up the interest benefits of short-term 
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debt. Overall, although short-term debt can provide low interest costs, over-reliance on it 
can result in higher rollover risk and hence dampen the growth of firms. 
 
Table 4.13: Time variant financial health indicators 
Dependent: 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡 𝐾𝑖.𝑡−1⁄  













































𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1   
-0.027 
(0.019) 
𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1   
0.046** 
(0.021) 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.981 0.835 0.960 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.234 0.175 0.011** 
Firms 1769 1769 1769 
Observations 16432 16432 16432 
First-differenced GMM estimators are reported. All equations are first-
differenced and all independent variables in each equation are lagged twice and 
more as instruments. Standard errors are reported in brackets. P-values of 
AR(2) test and Hansen test are reported. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% conventional levels, respectively. Definitions 
of all variables are available in Appendix C. 
 
 
4.8.2 Time variant states 
Our Hypothesis II indicates that the firms with worse financial health are more likely to 
suffer from refinancing risk. In the major results presented in Table 4.6, firms are not 
allowed to change their financial status. This may not be a very reasonable assumption. 
Therefore, in the robustness tests, we add an interaction term between financial health 
measurements and SDM in equation (4.1) and we expect that the interactive coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant. The results are reported in Table 4.9. In all three 
different specifications, from column (1) to (3), the coefficient on the interactive term is 
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significantly positive. In detail, controlling the liquidity ratio, Z-score and solvency ability 
at their sample averages, the negative marginal impact of SDM on capital expenditures can 
be reduced by 75%, 38% and 14%, respectively. Although the results in magnitude are 
different from what have been obtained by our pervious sample separation tests, they are 
still qualitatively consistent with each other. Therefore, we should be able to conclude that 
our Hypothesis II is valid given either time-variant or time-invariant financial health 
measurements. 
 
4.8.3 Alternative definitions to variables 
There are several reasons for us to choose different measurements of leverage. 
Consistent with previous literature, leverage is firstly constructed by using financial debt in 
our main tests. Nevertheless, for Chinese listed firms, more than 15% firm-year 
observations present zero financial debt. It is of concern that eliminating those 
observations may generate a selection problem. Furthermore, on average, financial debt 
constitutes less than 50% of the total liabilities in the dataset, indicating that the non-
interest paying liabilities can also be an important source for liquidity pressure. According 
to the argument in Ding et al. (2013), Chinese firms prefer to well manage their working 
capital, thereby eliminating the effects of negative cash flow shocks on investment. On the 
other hand, having too much liability may reflect the relatively low working capital 
management ability and hence impose larger negative impact on real activities, i.e. similar 
impact to the overhang outcomes generated by financial debt. Besides, it is reasonable for a 
firm to have zero financial debt but not common to have zero total liabilities. Therefore, 
we are able to keep more observations by replacing the financial debt with liabilities. 
Correspondingly, the short debt maturity is expressed as the ratio of current liabilities to 
total liabilities. The results are reported in column (1) of Table 4.14. The coefficient on 
SDM is again negative and highly statistically significant, indicating that our major 
conclusion is still valid. 
 
In addition, the discretionary investment may be in maintenance of plant and equipment. 
It may be in advertising or other marketing expenses, or in expenditures on raw materials, 
labour, research and development, etc. (Myers, 1977). If we view growth opportunities as 
call options, then debt overhang can prevent firms from exercising some of these options. 
Obviously, it is too narrow for us to limit those growth opportunities within the range of 
fixed capital expansion. Therefore, we follow Chen et al. (2011) and use cash payments for 
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fixed assets, intangible assets, and other long-term assets from the cash flow statement 
minus cash receipts from selling these assets to measure a firm’s total investment. The 
results are reported in column (2) of Table 4.14. The coefficient on SDM is still 
significantly negative. A 10% increase in SDM will lead to reduction in total investment 
by 0.006 which is around 8.9% of the sample average value of total investment. Although 
the absolute value of the coefficient here is much smaller than what has been observed in 
Table 4.5, its economic impact on total investment is still important. 
 
Table 4.14: Alternative definitions to variables 
 
Dependent: 


















































Industry-Year dummies    Yes 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.411  0.644 0.444 
AR(4) test (p-value)  0.416   
Hansen test (p-value) 0.237 0.092 0.158 0.131 
Firms 2121 1690 1769 1769 
Observations 19382 14395 16432 16432 
First-differenced GMM estimators are reported. Equation (4.1) is first-differenced and all 
independent variables are lagged twice and more as instruments. Standard errors are 
reported in brackets. P-values of AR(2) test and Hansen test are reported. *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% conventional levels, respectively. In 
column (1), 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is defined as total liabilities divided by total assets; 
𝑆𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 is defined as current liabilities divided by total liabilities. In column (2), the 
dependent variable is defined as cash payments for fixed assets, intangible assets, and 
other long-term assets from the cash flow statement minus cash receipts from selling these 
assets to measure a firm’s total investment divided by last period total assets. In column 
(3), 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 is defined as change of logarithm of real sales. In column (4), there 
are 44 different industries according to the SIC (2012) from CSRC. Definitions of all other 
variables are available in Appendix C. 
 
Lastly, one of most challenging jobs in estimating the investment equation is the 
measurement of investment opportunities. In our case, we use average q to replace 
unobserved marginal q. However, such a proxy is widely recognized as an insufficient 
option (Cooper and Ejarque, 2003). If there is systematic measurement error in average q, 
then the lagged values of average q cannot be used as instruments (Ecrickson and Whited, 
2000). Even worse, such measurement error may also correlate with financial factors and 
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results in unreliable interpretation for the corresponding coefficients in investment 
equation. To bypass this potential problem, we use sales growth to control for investment 
opportunities (Guariglia, 2008). Additionally, we also attempt to use the interaction of 
industry dummies and year dummies to capture the investment opportunities that can be 
anticipated (Brown et al., 2009). The results are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 
4.14. Compared with the coefficient on SDM in column (3) of Table 4.7, no large 
difference is found in any specification here. Therefore, our major conclusion should not 
be significantly affected by the problem of measurement to investment opportunities. 
 
4.8.4 Industry effects 
The industry effect is largely controlled as fixed effect in our main analyses and it is 
eliminated mechanically by first-differencing equation (4.1). Intuitively, the real economic 
decisions of the firms in more external finance dependent industries should be more 
sensitive to the variations of financial factors. In our case, the negative impact of rollover 
risk caused by short-term debt should be more significant in those industries with high 
external finance dependent characteristic. We follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) to identify 
whether or not an industry is financially dependent. First, for each firm-year observation, 
the amount of external finance required is calculated as: total capital expenditure minus 
cash flow from operations plus decreases in inventories and plus decreases in receivable 
plus increases in payables. For each industry, we use the sum of this number over the 
sample period and then we divide it by the sum of lagged total capital expenditure. If an 
industry has this ratio larger (smaller) than the median value of this ratio over all industries, 
then this industry is classified as a high (low) external finance dependence industry. After 
that, we estimate equation (4.1) by using the data of firms in both external finance high-
dependent and low-dependent industries. The results are reported in Table 4.15. Clearly, 
the financial dependent industries present a SDM coefficient with higher absolute value 
than the financial less dependent industries. The difference between two coefficients is 
again statistically significant. These results confirm the idea that rollover risk is more 









Table 4.15: Industry effects 
Dependent: 




























Year dummies Yes Yes 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.628 0.948 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.351 0.316 
Firms 774 995 
Observations 7243 9189 
First-differenced GMM estimators are reported. Equation (4.1) is first-differenced and 
all independent variables are lagged twice and more as instruments. Standard errors are 
reported in brackets. P-values of AR(2) test and Hansen test are reported. *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% conventional levels, respectively. For 
each firm-year observation, the amount of external finance required is calculated as:  
total capital expenditure minus cash flow from operations plus decreases in inventories 
and decreases in receivable and increases in payables. For each industry, we use the sum 
of this number over sample period and then we divide it by sum of lagged total capital 
expenditure. In columns (1) and (2), if an industry has this ratio larger (smaller) than the 
median value of this ratio over all industries, then this industry is classified as high (low) 
external finance dependence industry. Z-statistic is calculated to identify the statistical 
significance of the difference in two coefficients on SDM between two different groups. 




In this chapter, using the CLFs dataset over 1998 – 2016, we have tested the casual 
relation from short debt maturity to firm’s fixed capital expenditure. The short debt 
maturity is defined as the ratio of short-term debt to total debt. After controlling the level 
of leverage, we obtain a significant negative coefficient on short debt maturity in the 
investment regression model, indicating that rollover risk plays an important role in 
determining firm’s investment decision. The implication of our results on the relation 
between debt maturity and investment is opposite to that of previous literature in this area. 
For example, both Aivazian et al (2005b) and Dang (2011) have presented a negative 
coefficient on long-term debt maturity defined as the ratio of long-term debt to total debt, 
i.e. a positive coefficient on short debt maturity, in the investment regressions. This is 
consistent with the argument in Myers (1977) that firms holding risky debt with longer 
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maturity are more likely to have lower investment incentives since their shareholders are 
unwilling to transfer returns from projects to debtholders. In other words, firms can reduce 
underinvestment issues by using more short-term debt. Nevertheless, such a working 
mechanism of debt maturity policy may only be valid in economies with very mature 
capital markets in which firms largely rely on long-term debt financing.  
 
In most emerging economies, such as that of China, the high degree of asymmetric 
information plus a bank dominating financial system can easily result in high risk premium 
of the debt contract with longer maturity. Therefore, short-term debt may provide cost 
advantage over long-term debt for the firms in the economies with immature capital 
markets. However, the current flexibility of short-term debt is accompanied by high 
potential rollover risks which can substantially limit a firm’s future borrowing. Given the 
prevalence of heavy reliance on short-term debt financing, it is reasonable for us to 
conjecture that firms in China with shorter debt maturity may act more conservatively in 
capturing growth opportunities due to either unaffordable costs of further borrowing or 
high existent rollover/ repayment pressure.  
 
The model proposed by Diamond and He (2014) provides a good theoretical 
justification of our empirical results. They show that short-term debt can impose larger 
overhang costs when firm’s assets-in-place deteriorates since short-term debtholders share 
less risk with firms at bad times. Our results demonstrate that the negative impact of 
shorter debt maturity on investment is significantly stronger in the firms with worse 
financial conditions, i.e. lower liquidity/ solvency/ Z-score. The explanation is that the 
rollover risks faced by these firms are much higher. Additionally, following several recent 
studies on the 2008 financial crisis effects on the relation between finance and investment, 
we have also tested our hypothesis separately by using the sample of data before and after 
the crisis. In contrast with the credit-supply contraction story relayed by western literature, 
we take advantage of China’s 4 trillion fiscal stimulus plan implemented in 2009 and 2010 
and study firms’ behaviours during a credit boom period. The results show that shorter 
debt maturity imposes less negative impact on investment expenditures after 2008 and this 
is likely to have been caused by the usage of more long-term bank loans after the crisis. 
 
The policy implications of our research are obvious. Chinese governments should keep 
deepening the reforms of financial markets and provide local non-financial firms with 
more alternatives for long-term debt financing. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily 
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mean that more fiscal stimulus packages, such as the 4 trillion one after 2008, should be 
utilized. Although such a policy-driven credit boom can increase firms’ access to more 
long-term credits and temporally reduce the overall refinancing risks in the economy, it 
may put long-term growth in danger when a large amount of credit is allocated to 
inefficient sectors, e.g. SOEs and over-capacity industries, that may be unable to repay 
those debts at the future maturity date. To avoid this unwanted outcome, for example, it is 
probably wiser for governments to ameliorate institutional efficiency and to allow financial 
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Appendix C  
𝐼𝑖,𝑡 𝐾𝑖.𝑡−1⁄ = (𝐾𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐾𝑖.𝑡−1 + 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡) 𝐾𝑖.𝑡−1⁄  ;  𝐾𝑖.𝑡−1 is tangible assets 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 Market to book ratio 
𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1⁄  Earnings before interests, tax, depreciation divided by lagged tangible asset 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (Short-term debt + Long-term debt) / total assets 
𝑆𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 Short-term debt / (Short-term debt + Long-term debt) 
Liquidity ratio = Current assets / Current liabilities 
Solvency ratio = Net operating cash flow / (Short-term debt + Long-term debt) 
Z-score = 1.2*working capital/total assets + 1.4*retained earnings/total assets + 
3.3*earnings before interest and taxes/total assets + 0.6*Market value of equity/total 
liabilities + 1.0*sales/total assets 
Size is the logrithem of total assets 
Tangibility = fixed assets/total assets 
Profitability = earnings before interest and tax/total assets 

















Number of SOEs and non-SOEs
Number of SOEs Number of non-SOEs
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Equation group (C.2): 
 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡,𝑗    
= 𝛼1 + 𝛽11 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡,𝑗 + 𝛽21
∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡,𝑗 + 𝛽31 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡,𝑗
+ 𝛽41 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡,𝑗 + 𝛾1 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡,𝑗 + 𝑡,𝑗1 
 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑡,𝑗
= 𝛼2 + 𝛽12 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡,𝑗 + 𝛽22
∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡,𝑗 + 𝛽32 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡,𝑗
+ 𝛽42 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡,𝑗 + 𝛾2 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡,𝑗 + 𝑡,𝑗2 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑡,𝑗
= 𝛼3 + 𝛽13 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡,𝑗 + 𝛽23
∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡,𝑗 + 𝛽33 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡,𝑗
+ 𝛽43 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡,𝑗 + 𝛾3 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡,𝑗 + 𝑡,𝑗3 
 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑡,𝑗  
= 𝛼4 + 𝛽14 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡,𝑗 + 𝛽24
∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡,𝑗 + 𝛽34 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡,𝑗
+ 𝛽44 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡,𝑗 + 𝛾4 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡,𝑗 + 𝑡,𝑗4 
 
 
Ignoring the constant, the first four terms in each equation are the specific requirements for 
finance. The 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡,𝑗 terms include other determinants of financing choices. These five 
equations are estimated simultaneously (Seemly Unrelated regression, SUR) with the 
following coefficients constraints: 
 
−𝛼1 + 𝛼2 + 𝛼3 + 𝛼4 − 𝛼5 = 0
−𝛽11 + 𝛽12 + 𝛽13 + 𝛽14 − 𝛽15 = 1
−𝛽21 + 𝛽22 + 𝛽23 + 𝛽24 − 𝛽25 = 1
−𝛽31 + 𝛽32 + 𝛽33 + 𝛽34 − 𝛽35 = −1
−𝛽41 + 𝛽42 + 𝛽43 + 𝛽44 − 𝛽45 = 1
−𝛾1 + 𝛾2 + 𝛾3 + 𝛾4 − 𝛾5 = 0.
 
 
The intuition is simple: each dollar use of finance should be fully accommodated by the 









Table C.16: How do Chinese listed firms finance their investments? (Restricted coefficients) 
 Dependent variables 






























































































Diff: [STD]fix -  [LTD]fix  0.135***  
Diff: [STD]fix -  [EQ]fix    0.286*** 
Diff: [STD]WK -  [LTD]WK  0.090***  
Diff: [STD]WK -  [EQ]WK    0.168*** 
Seemingly unrelated regression results are presented in this table. Standard errors are reported in brackets. 
All 4 equations are estimated simultaneously with coefficient constraints conditions listed above this table. 
Change in Cash holdings = (The change from year t-1 to t of Cash and Short-term investments); Short-term 
debt issues = (The change from year t-1 to t of short-term debt); Long-term debt issues = (The change from 
year t-1 to t of long-term debt); Equity issue is calculated as the cash received from the issuance of stocks net 
of commission and other issuance fees; Investment in net working assets = The change from t −1 to t of 
[Current Assets − Cash and Short-term Investments] − [Current Liabilities − Debt in Current Liabilities]; 
Investment in Net Fixed Assets = The change from t−1 to t of Net Property, Plant and Equipment. Dividends 
= Cash Paid For Distribution Of Dividends Or Profits Or Cash Paid For Interest Expenses. At the bottom of 
this table, we present the difference in the coefficients on investment in working capital and fixed capital 
between short-term debt and long-term debt equations; short-term and equity issue equations. *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% conventional levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table C.17: Financial condition between SOEs and non-SOEs 
 SOEs non-SOEs Difference P-value 
Liquidity 1.398 1.719 -0.321*** 0.000 
Solvency 0.264 0.235 0.029*** 0.000 
Z-score 3.437 4.502 -1.065*** 0.000 









Table C.18: Industry distribution 
 Full sample State Non-State 
Agriculture 393 182 211 
Mining 709 535 174 
Manufacturing 12,162 6,880 5,282 
Construction 586 352 234 
Retailing 1,656 1,124 532 
Transportation 905 798 107 
Accommodation 102 67 35 
Technology 654 263 391 
Real Estate 1,600 895 705 
Leasing 289 148 141 
Scientific research 58 21 37 
Public facility 261 180 81 
Education 24 18 6 
Health 26 9 17 
Culture 217 143 74 
Diversified 328 204 124 




























5.1 Summary of this Thesis 
Using annual firm-level NBS data (unlisted, 1998-2007) and CSMAR data (listed, 
1998-2010; 1998-2016), this thesis studies Chinese firms’ fixed capital accumulation and 
their capital structure decisions. After introducing our motivation, the research questions 
and the major findings, Chapter 2 starts with the empirical analyses of the variations of the 
degree of financing constraints faced by firms across the provinces and regions with 
different levels of institutions and financial development. First, we follow Fazzari et al. 
(1988) and use investment cash flow sensitivity to measure the degree of firm-level 
financing constraints. Then, we use the province-level Marketization index generated by 
Fan et al. (2009) to measure the status of regional development in institutions and finance 
in China. Using POEs as example, our results show that the firms located in the provinces 
with higher institutional and financial development present lower investment cash flow 
sensitivity and hence are likely to be less financially constrained. Notably, we find that 
such reduction in financing constraint degree seems to be more significant among the 
POEs without political background. This implies that the market-oriented reforms in China 
may narrow the financing gap between the firms with and without government connection, 
in the domestic capital market. 
 
In Chapter 3, we turn to Chinese listed firms’ capital structure policy. If we believe that 
the firms with different ownership structures face different costs of external capital, then 
we should see that ownership structures are correlated with firms’ capital structure related 
decisions in some ways. Relying on the implications from dynamic trade-off theory, we 
apply the one-step reduced partial adjustment model of leverage (Flannery and Rangan, 
2006) and estimate the optimal leverage converging speeds of firms with different 
ownership types as well as different levels of ownership concentration. Our results show 
that SOEs present significantly lower adjustment speed than POEs. The argument is that 
the abnormally low costs of default plus low tax saving incentives result in low incentives 
for managers in SOEs to eliminate deviations from optimal leverage. Furthermore, we find 
that there is a positive relation between ownership concentration and leverage adjustment 
speed, especially for POEs. The possible interpretation is that in a capital market with 
weak internal and external corporate governance mechanisms, a firm with more complex 
ownership structure tends to face higher costs of external financing and hence larger costs 
of leverage adjustment (Lin et al., 2011). Differently from US firms with quite diffused 
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ownership structures, Chinese firms may use higher ownership concentration to reduce 
information and transaction costs in their financing activities. 
 
In Chapter 4, we are back to investment behaviour and further consider the potential 
underinvestment issue caused by firms’ heavy reliance on short-term debt financing. 
Specifically, short-term bank loan is the major debt financing resource for most non-
financial Chinese firms since the costs of long-term financing are quite high in China’s 
immature capital market. The average debt maturity of Chinese listed firms in our dataset 
is 0.28, which is ‘abnormally’ low compared with the 0.72 of US firms. This fact motivates 
us to explicitly explore the firm-level real economic outcome of such an ‘extreme’ debt 
maturity structure choice. In the investment regression model, we obtain a significant 
negative coefficient on the short debt maturity term measured as the ratio of short-term 
debt to total debt. This indicates that the Chinese firms with shorter debt maturity structure 
tend to invest less. The most possible explanation is that they face high rollover risks and 
act more conservatively in taking up positive growth opportunities. Our empirical analyses 
offer another important channel for understanding the interaction between firms’ 
investment and external financing decisions.  
 
Different from many countries in eastern Europe, China's initial reform efforts began as 
experimental changes aimed at improving performance rather than establishing a Western-
style market system (Jefferson and Rawski, 1994). Therefore, it is not surprising that 
institutional change has been gradual and uneven, with many features of the pre-reform 
system surviving even today. Our findings suggest that market-oriented developments in 
the institutions and the financial system in China impose positive effects on the growth of 
private sector. Therefore, the Chinese government should deepen the decentralization and 
marketization of the economy. For example, the deposit rate liberalization would motivate 
the Chinese (state owned) banks to compete for more deposit at higher interest costs92. 
This should force those banks to increase their efficiency by increasing share of lending to 
POEs, which tend to make much better use of the funds than SOEs. Also, the government 
can further promote the creation of truly private banks. In 2013 and 2014, the State council 
together with the China Banking Regulatory Commission provided detailed guiding lines 
and regulation for establishing (private) banks. Besides, the public corporate bond market 
requires to be developed and is expected to offer local non-financial firms more 
                                                          
92 In October 2015, The People’s Bank of China allowed the deposit rate to be upward fluctuated more than 




alternatives for long-term debt financing. These institutional and financial arrangements 
should be able to improve POEs’ access to debt credits and hence reduce the credit 
misallocation between state and non-state sectors in the Chinese economy. 
 
 
5.2 Directions for Future Research 
5.2.1 External debt financing and market-oriented reforms 
In Chapter 2, we have only used investment cash flow sensitivity to indirectly measure 
the degree of financing constraints faced by firms. Is there any other more direct method? 
Strictly speaking, we should always add a word ‘external’ in front of the phrase ‘financing 
constraint’. The intrinsic assumption behind the correlation between investment and cash 
flow is that external debt financing is (very) expensive for some firms regarded as 
financially constrained. Therefore, one most straightforward approach should be estimating 
a regression with debt related dependent variables. The independent variables should 
contain conventional determinants of firms’ debt usage and the marketization index. The 
key hypothesis can be: the firms located in more developed regions use more debt 
financing. Nevertheless, there are still some problems about this approach. First, in the 
given NBS dataset, for unlisted firms, there is no clear information on financial debt usage. 
Although there is a total liability term, it is still too risky for us to equalize the non-interest 
generating liabilities and interest generating ones since we are more interested in whether 
or not developments can increase not only the supply of credit but also the access to 
external financial resources. Second, the financing constraint theory actually indicates that 
financially constrained firms cannot get enough financial resources to support the projects 
that should be otherwise taken on. To express such a concept, we can simply create an 
interactive term between investment opportunities and the marketization index in the debt 
regression model. If those developments can help firms to capture positive growth 
opportunities by borrowing more, then the corresponding coefficient should be positive. 
Unfortunately, for unlisted firms, measurements of investment opportunity can be a huge 
problem. Even worse, the potential endogenous issues in this framework can be too 
complex to handle. GMM estimators are probably not enough to solve these problems. 





5.2.2 State-contingency and Capital structure theories 
Whether or not firms have optimal capital structures is a fundamental question in 
corporate finance study. Finding answers for this question necessitates exploring which 
one of the mainstream capital structure theories presents better explanatory power for firms’ 
financing decisions. Over more than four decades debate, however, scholars still have not 
obtained agreement on the existence of such unobservable optimal ratios. Nevertheless, 
one thing can be settled. The applicability of any capital structure theory, including the 
trade-off theory, is state-contingent and is likely to differ from situation to situation. In 
other words, it might not be wise for future research to attempt to find or justify a general 
capital structure theory which can perfectly describe firms’ financing decisions in all 
situations. Instead, scholars should figure out what sorts of firms in which situations are 
more likely to follow the guidance from which theory.  
 
For example, the concentration of recent studies has turned to whether or not pursuing 
the optimal capital structure is a first-order issue in corporate financing decisions. The 
logic is simple. Firms can access external capital market if they have specific financial 
requirements, such as investment and growth opportunities. Meanwhile, if maintaining/ 
pursuing optimal capital structure is indeed very important, then the securities issuances of 
firms should also be motivated by the requirements of eliminating deviations from their 
optimal capital structures. If firms prefer to firstly satisfy their financial deficits and then 
adjust their capital structures later on, or do not proactively react to the corresponding 
changes in their capital structures, then maintaining the optimal capital structures is 
probably just a second-order issue or even unimportant. Using the US firms dataset, the 
published evidence of this new research topic suggests that firms’ specific choices depend 
on the shocks in investment opportunities, past and current financial health as well as the 
accessibility of external capital market, i.e. the degree of financial constraints. Clearly, 
none of the existing capital structure theories has covered all these factors at the same time. 
 
5.2.3 Employment, Productivity and Indebtedness level 
There is no reason for us to limit the impact from capital structure related decisions on 
firms’ capital expenditures only. As emphasized by Myers (1977), growth opportunities 
can be in advertising or other marketing expenses, or in expenditures on raw materials, 
labour, research and development. Several studies using the US firms dataset have done 
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research on the relation of financial decisions to employment decisions. For Chinese firms, 
however, no such studies have been available until now. The ongoing decentralization and 
marketization in the Chinese economy have resulted in rapid wage growth as well as in 
wider wage disparities between skill-intensive and labour-intensive industries (Yang and 
Chen, 2010). It should be interesting to know in which way a Chinese firm’s financial 
decisions may be connected with its employment policy. Furthermore, although several 
studies have provided empirical analyses for the productivity and leverage relation, it 
seems that systematic theoretical justifications for the empirical results are still insufficient. 
Among the works on productivity of Chinese firms, there are one or two that present a 
positive relation between cash flow and productivity. Nevertheless, to the best of our 
knowledge, no systematic research on the relation between leverage and productivity has 
been conducted by using Chinese firm-level data. There are at least two reasons for us to 
propose this research topic. First, the relatively frequent and high strength fiscal and 
monetary stimulus over the past decade in China may have pushed the indebtedness level 
of the corporate sector over the sustainable boundary. Although these policies prevent a 
hard lending of Chinese economy temporarily, they may also result in some unwanted 
negative impact on long-run economic growth. Compared to decline in the space of capital 
accumulation, increase in employment wage and decrease in productivity may be of more 
vital concern for the economy. Having excessive debt may prevent firms from investing in 
high levels of human capital and in skilled employees which are essential for innovation 
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